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Abstract 
 The ability to self-generate thoughts in imagination is a central aspect of the 
human experience. Mind-wandering episodes are multifaceted and are heterogeneous 
in terms of their content, form (e.g. modality, level of detail), and behavioural outcomes. 
Older adults’ neurocognitive profile shows impairments in functions highly linked to the 
generation and management of such episodes, namely episodic memory, attentional 
control, and abilities associated with the recruitment of the default mode network 
(DMN). Robust findings have documented a decrease in the frequency of mind-
wandering with increasing age. However, age-related changes in thought content, and 
how this is related to the cerebral organisation of the brain, has largely been neglected. 
This PhD project aimed to: (i) investigate older adults’ neurocognitive profile alongside 
the complexities of mind-wandering, and importantly (ii) explore the impact of 
moderating factors on thought content as we grow older. Converging behavioural and 
neuroimaging methods were employed to provide a comprehensive account of self-
generated thoughts. The first two chapters combined self-reports with 
electrophysiological and fMRI connectivity data, and demonstrated associations 
between changes in the recruitment of the DMN and age-related changes in self-
generated thoughts. Subsequent experimental chapters considered the influence of key 
factors believed to impact on the content of thoughts. Examining the influence of culture 
revealed that native French speakers favoured self-reflection and engaged in more 
positively oriented thoughts, in comparison to English native speakers. In addition, the 
manipulation of task difficulty encouraged verbal rehearsal, and meta-awareness 
mainly targeted the temporal characteristics of thoughts. Finally, after a 4-week 
meditation intervention, there was a reduction in both negative and past-oriented 
thoughts.  Throughout, behavioural measures demonstrated older adults’ bias toward 
deliberate on-task thoughts, with evidence of a decrease of negatively oriented 
ii 
 
thoughts, stable rates of positively oriented thoughts, and an increase of visual 
thoughts, and task-related interference. Overall, the systematic use of convergent 
behavioural and neuroimaging methodology has provided a more in-depth 
understanding of mind-wandering experiences in ageing where previously the 
frequency of these episodes has only been considered. 
 
 
   
 
 
  
iii 
 
Table of contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... i 
List of tables ............................................................................................................. ix 
List of figures ............................................................................................................ xi 
Published work ....................................................................................................... xiii 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................... xv 
Authors’ declaration .............................................................................................. xvii 
Chapter 1. General introduction ............................................................................... 1 
1.1. Conceptualizing mind-wandering experiences. ................................................ 1 
1.2. The characteristics of mind-wandering experiences. ........................................ 2 
1.2.1. The default mode network and mind-wandering experiences. ................... 3 
1.2.2. The costs of mind-wandering experiences ................................................. 4 
1.2.3. The content of mind-wandering experiences.............................................. 5 
1.2.4. The form of mind-wandering experiences. ................................................. 7 
1.2.5. The benefits of mind-wandering experiences. ............................................ 8 
1.3. The process account of mind-wandering experiences ...................................... 9 
1.3.1. How does attention become internally focused? ........................................ 9 
1.3.2. How do people self-generate task-unrelated mental content? ...................10 
1.3.3. How do people coordinate and/or regulate mind-wandering experiences?10 
1.4. Influencing factors of mind-wandering experiences. ........................................11 
1.4.1. Pathologies ...............................................................................................12 
1.4.1.1. Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder ................................................12 
iv 
 
1.4.1.2. Depression ......................................................................................... 13 
1.4.2. Context-dependent characteristics ........................................................... 14 
1.4.3. Individual differences and other factors .................................................... 15 
1.5. Mind-wandering during the ageing process ..................................................... 17 
1.5.1. Older adults’ experiential and cognitive features. ...................................... 17 
1.5.2. Older adults’ neural activity ....................................................................... 21 
1.6. Project overview and rationale ........................................................................ 23 
Chapter 2. Convergent methods ............................................................................ 26 
2.1. Why use converging methods to study mind-wandering? ................................ 26 
2.1.1. Self-report methods .................................................................................. 29 
2.1.2. Behavioural Methods ................................................................................ 32 
2.2. Neuroimaging Tools ........................................................................................ 34 
2.2.1. ERPs and EEG ......................................................................................... 35 
2.2.2. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging ................................................. 38 
2.2.3. Functional and Structural Connectivity ...................................................... 40 
– Section A – Consideration of the neurocognitive processes underlying mind-
wandering experiences in ageing. ......................................................................... 46 
Chapter 3. Understanding mind-wandering experiences in young and older 
individuals using electrophysiology. ..................................................................... 48 
3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 48 
3.2. Method ............................................................................................................ 53 
3.2.1. Participants............................................................................................... 53 
3.2.2. Procedure ................................................................................................. 54 
3.2.3. N-back working memory task.................................................................... 54 
v 
 
3.2.4. EEG acquisition and processing ...............................................................56 
3.3. Results ............................................................................................................57 
3.3.1. Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling ...................................................57 
3.3.2. Brain activity in ageing and relation to the task .........................................59 
3.3.3. Neuronal characteristics underlying self-generated thought ......................62 
3.4. Discussion ......................................................................................................65 
Chapter 4. Understanding mind-wandering experiences in young and older 
individuals using functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging. ........... 72 
4.1. Introduction .....................................................................................................72 
4.2. Method ............................................................................................................76 
4.2.1. Participants ...............................................................................................76 
4.2.2. Procedure .................................................................................................76 
4.2.3. N-back working memory task ....................................................................77 
4.2.4. Additional behavioural measures ..............................................................77 
4.2.5. Neuroimaging ...........................................................................................78 
4.2.5.1. MRI acquisition ..................................................................................78 
4.2.5.2. MRI pre-processing ............................................................................79 
4.2.5.3. Region of Interest (ROI) Mask Creation .............................................79 
4.2.5.4. MRI first level analysis........................................................................80 
4.3. Results ............................................................................................................81 
4.3.1. Behavioural performance ..........................................................................81 
4.3.2. Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling ...................................................81 
4.3.3. Brain connectivity in ageing and relation to the task .................................84 
vi 
 
4.3.4. Relationship to control tasks ..................................................................... 87 
4.4. Discussion ...................................................................................................... 88 
– Section B – Consideration of other factors influencing mind-wandering 
experiences in ageing. ............................................................................................ 94 
Chapter 5. The implications of culture. .................................................................. 96 
5.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 96 
5.2. Method .......................................................................................................... 102 
5.2.1. Participants............................................................................................. 102 
5.2.2. Measures ............................................................................................... 103 
5.2.2.1. Mind-wandering ............................................................................... 103 
5.2.2.2. Mindfulness ...................................................................................... 103 
5.2.2.3. Mood ................................................................................................ 104 
5.2.2.4. Future thinking ................................................................................. 104 
5.2.2.5. Self-attentiveness ............................................................................ 105 
5.2.2.6. Cognitive failures ............................................................................. 105 
5.2.2.7. Depressive symptoms ...................................................................... 106 
5.2.3. Procedure ............................................................................................... 106 
5.3. Results .......................................................................................................... 107 
5.3.1. Effect of native language ........................................................................ 107 
5.3.2. Effect of Age and native Language ......................................................... 109 
5.3.2.1. Mind-wandering ............................................................................... 110 
5.3.2.2. Mindfulness ...................................................................................... 111 
5.3.2.3. Mood ................................................................................................ 111 
vii 
 
5.3.2.4. Future thinking ................................................................................. 112 
5.3.2.5. Self-attentiveness ............................................................................. 113 
5.3.2.6. Cognitive failures.............................................................................. 115 
5.3.2.7. Depressive symptoms ...................................................................... 115 
5.3.3. Confirmatory factor analysis. .................................................................. 116 
5.4. Discussion .................................................................................................... 122 
Chapter 6. The implications of meta-awareness and meditation. ...................... 134 
6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 134 
6.2. Experiment 1 ................................................................................................. 137 
6.2.1. Aims and objectives ................................................................................ 137 
6.2.2. Method ................................................................................................... 139 
6.2.2.1. Participants ...................................................................................... 139 
6.2.2.2. Procedure ........................................................................................ 139 
6.2.2.3. The n-back working memory task ..................................................... 140 
6.2.3. Results ................................................................................................... 141 
6.2.4. Discussion .............................................................................................. 143 
6.3. Experiment 2 ................................................................................................. 148 
6.3.1. Aims and objectives ................................................................................ 148 
6.3.2. Method ................................................................................................... 150 
6.3.2.1. Participants ...................................................................................... 150 
6.3.2.2. Procedure ........................................................................................ 150 
6.3.2.3. Materials .......................................................................................... 151 
6.3.3. Results ................................................................................................... 155 
viii 
 
6.3.3.1. Descriptive characteristics................................................................ 155 
6.3.3.2. Intervention effects on thoughts ....................................................... 156 
6.3.3.3. Explaining the dropout rates ............................................................. 159 
6.3.4. Discussion .............................................................................................. 160 
6.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 163 
Chapter 7. General discussion of project findings. ............................................ 166 
7.1. Overview ....................................................................................................... 166 
7.2. Summary of the findings ............................................................................... 168 
7.3. Original contribution to knowledge ................................................................ 171 
7.4. Methodological considerations and limitations .............................................. 174 
7.5. Future directions ........................................................................................... 176 
7.6. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 180 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 182 
APPENDIX A: Instructions given to participants in both the control and 
experimental condition. ........................................................................................ 234 
APPENDIX B: Transcript of one of the four guided meditation used in the 
experimental condition (Toe-Head). ..................................................................... 236 
 
  
ix 
 
List of tables 
Table 3.1. Means (Standard Deviations) of participants’ characteristics as well as probe 
count. ........................................................................................................................53 
Table 3.2. Questions and scales used in Multidimensional Experience Sampling. ....56 
Table 3.3. Summary of linear mixed models computed and their BIC and AIC indicators 
with maximum likelihood estimation. ..........................................................................64 
Table 3.4. Estimates of final models, after bootstrapping. .........................................65 
Table 4.1. Means (Standard Deviations) of participants’ characteristics and probe 
count. ........................................................................................................................76 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics, means (standard deviations), of young and older adults 
on cognitive measures. ..............................................................................................81 
Table 5.1. Correlations between variables for both English and French speakers 
individually and jointly. ............................................................................................. 108 
Table 5.2. Mean scores, standard deviation and number of participants of pertinent 
measures. ............................................................................................................... 109 
Table 5.3. Age means, standard deviations, and number of participants for each defined 
age group for both the English and French native speaker samples. ....................... 109 
Table 5.4. Factor loading for models with data from both groups separately. .......... 121 
Table 6.1. Mean (Standard Deviation) of participants’ years of education, number of 
days practiced, and participants’ rating of the intervention, all for each group under 
study. ...................................................................................................................... 156 
  
x 
 
  
xi 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1.1. Brain regions composing the Default Mode Network. ............................... 4 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of both 0-Back and 1-Back conditions included in the working 
memory task used. ....................................................................................................55 
Figure 3.2. Determining patterns of self-generated thought and their relationship to 
ongoing task and age group. .....................................................................................58 
Figure 3.3. Significant effects of Age (Young, Old) on spectral power for delta, theta 
and beta bands. .........................................................................................................60 
Figure 3.4. Effect of interaction between Beta power in the Centro-Parietal left and right 
areas of the scalp and the difference of Mental Time Travelling thoughts occurrence 
between the two conditions (0-Back - 1-Back). ..........................................................62 
Figure 4.1. Thresholded spatial maps displaying functional connectivity of the seed 
region separately for younger and older participants. ................................................80 
Figure 4.2. Determining patterns of self-generated thought and their relationship to 
ongoing task and age group. .....................................................................................83 
Figure 4.3. Significant effects of Age (Young, Old) on brain connectivity from the left 
ATL, the right ATL and the left IFG. ...........................................................................85 
Figure 4.4. Relationship between age-related changes in functional connectivity and 
large scale networks. .................................................................................................86 
Figure 4.5. Association between patterns of age related difference in functional 
connectivity and patterns of self-generated thought. ..................................................87 
Figure 5.1. The effects of participants' native Language (English, French) and their age 
group (Young, Middle-age, Old) on mind-wandering frequency measured by the DDFS.
 ................................................................................................................................ 111 
Figure 5.2. The effect of interaction between future-self thoughts (FST) specificity 
(Clarity, Frequency) and participants’ age group (Young, Middle-age, Old). ............ 113 
xii 
 
Figure 5.3. Effects of culture and age on rumination and reflection scores. ............ 115 
Figure 5.4. Structural equation model predicting mind-wandering frequency with self-
related, negative and attentional constructs and age. .............................................. 118 
Figure 5.5. Structural equation model predicting mind-wandering frequency with 
different constructs in a population of native English speakers (left) and native French 
speakers (right). ...................................................................................................... 120 
Figure 6.1. Illustration of the 0-Back task used. ...................................................... 140 
Figure 6.2. Determining different type of self-generated thoughts and their occurrence 
depending of the task condition and the age group. ................................................ 143 
Figure 6.3. Determining different type of self-generated thoughts and their evolution 
depending on intervention condition and the age group........................................... 158 
  
xiii 
 
Published work 
Chapter 5 is published as: 
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. Frogs’ Legs versus Roast 
Beefs: How culture can influence mind-wandering episodes across the 
lifespan. Europe’s Journal of Psychology (In press)  
Chapter 2 is submitted for publication as:  
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., McGann, D., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. The 
disentanglement of the neural and experiential complexity of self-generated 
thoughts: A users guide to combining experience sampling with neuroimaging 
data. NeuroImage. (Submitted) 
Chapter 4 is submitted for publication as: 
Martinon, L. M., Riby, L. M., Poerio, G., Wang, HT., Jefferies, B., Smallwood, J. Patterns 
of ongoing thought in older age are associated with changes in functional 
connectivity between temporal and prefrontal regions. Cortex (Submitted) 
Part of the data from Chapter 3 is submitted for publication as: 
Martinon, L. M., Moulin, C. J. A., Riby, L. M. Behavioural and frontal delta band 
indicators of spontaneous future thought in young and older adults. Special 
Issue on “Spontaneous Future Cognition” in Psychological Research (Under 
review) 
 
The following scientific communications have also arisen from this project: 
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Mitchell M., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (Jul. 2018). 
Compassion-based meditation influences thought content in both young and 
xiv 
 
older adults. Poster presentation at the International Conference on 
Mindfulness (IMC), Amsterdam, Netherlands.  
Martinon, L. M. (Jun. 2018) “Mind Wandering in Ageing.” Paper presentation to the 
‘Mind Wnadering & Mindfulness’ conference, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK. 
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Mitchell M., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (Jul. 2017). Mind-
wandering in ageing: Can mindfulness change our thoughts? Poster 
presentation at the European Summer Research Institute, ESRI 2017, 
Exploring Experience Chiemsee, Germany 
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (Jul. 2017) Do we think 
differently when we get older? An EEG study. Paper presentation at PsyPAG 
Annual Conference, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK.  
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (Jun. 2017) Frogs ‘legs versus 
Roast beef: How Culture can Impact our Mind-Wandering Experiences across 
the Life Span. Paper presentation at Journées de Printemps de la Société de 
Neuropsychologie de langue Française, Anosognosie et Etats de Conscience, 
Grenoble, France  
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (May. 2017) Frogs ‘legs versus 
Roast beef: How Culture can Impact our Mind-Wandering Experiences across 
the Life Span. Paper presentation at the University of York, UK.  
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (Jul. 2016). Patterns of brain 
activity associated with mind-wandering among young and older adults: An 
EEG study. Poster presentation at the 6th International Conference on 
Memory, ICOM-6, Budapest, Hungary  
Martinon, L. M., Smallwood, J., Hamilton, C., Riby, L. M. (Mar.2016). Do we think 
differently as we grow older? An EEG study. Meeting of the British and French 
Neuropsychological Societies (BNS/SNLF), London, UK  
xv 
 
Acknowledgments 
 Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors for their 
guidance, patience, and support through this journey. Specifically, I wish to thank my 
principal supervisor Dr Leigh Riby, for trusting me at each stage of this journey and for 
giving me such great opportunities along the way; Dr Jonathan Smallwood for his 
priceless comments and advice; and Dr Colin Hamilton for his perpetual reassuring 
attitude. Importantly, I acknowledge each and every one of the participants that took 
part in the research that formed this PhD. I am particularly grateful to individuals in the 
older adult group for their interest, enthusiasm, and kindness.  
 Next, I would like to thank the Coco family for being such a weird, fun, and 
supporting bunch of human beings. I am particularly thankful to Dr Sarah Allen for being 
my reference in this journey; to Dr Joanna Greer for being my EEG sister; to Audrey 
Linden for supporting me in various ways; to Dr Mia Campbell for her lovely craziness; 
to Kamila Irvine for the 2nd and 3rd year hugs; to Dale Metcalfe for always helping me 
on the big and small issues that have paved this journey, and for the entertaining crazy 
stories; to Amy Newman for proofreading every word of this PhD, for her kindness, and 
for her passion regarding dogs and babies. Last, but not least, I wish to thank Dr Kris 
McCarty for his technical and mental support, for believing in me, for reviving my 
motivation, and especially for sharing his whisky on Fridays. Eventually, thank you all 
for the not so original, but beautifully racist jokes that have enlightened this adventure. 
Thank you for making me feel at home in the North East.  
 I am extremely grateful for my family and friends back in France whom have 
never given up on me, nor missed an opportunity to come and visit. Special thank you 
to my mom for being so understanding, even when she does not understand a thing. 
To Julie Morizot for supporting my decision of going abroad once again, despite the 
costs. To Dr Alexandra Ernst Mulenbach for showing me the way and being an amazing 
xvi 
 
cheerleader. To Prof Chris Moulin and Dr Céline Souchay for opening the doors of 
research to me.  
 Finally, my deepest thanks go to Valentin Chiono for taking care of both the 
house and me during these three years. Thank you (1) for changing countries with me, 
(2) for always making me smile and laugh, and (3) for being the constant positive in my 
life.  
 To Dyslexia, I won.   
 
 
  
xvii 
 
Authors’ declaration  
 
I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other 
award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges 
opinions, ideas and contributions from the work of others. 
 
Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this thesis has been approved. 
Approval has been sought and granted by the Faculty of Health and Life Sciences ethics 
committee at the University of Northumbria in Newcastle. 
 
I declare that the word count of this thesis is 48 939 words. 
 
SIGNED: 
 
DATE:  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I was trying to daydream but my mind kept wandering.”  
Steven Wright 
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Chapter 1. General introduction 
 This first chapter will introduce the concept of mind-wandering experiences and 
provide a comprehensive review of the literature pertaining to their complex behavioural 
and neural nature. Mind-wandering experiences are numerous by their content, form, 
or outcomes but also by the neural activity supporting their occurrence. Additionally, 
several factors can modulate such experiences. This chapter will stress the importance 
of exploring older adults as a key population to inform the mind-wandering and ageing 
literature. The aims and objectives of this thesis project as a whole are proposed, and 
outlines of each of the studies are provided. 
1.1. Conceptualizing mind-wandering experiences. 
 The investigation of an individual’s stream of consciousness has long been a 
topic of interest for psychologists and philosophers (William James, The principles of 
psychology 1890). For example, in his book Psychology, Briefer Course (1984), William 
James states that “The states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her 
work with. Metaphysics or theology may prove the Soul to exist; but for psychology the 
hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous” (p.181). 
Understanding the dynamic flow of thoughts occurring in the conscious mind is a sine 
qua non condition for a comprehensive grasp of the human condition. Accordingly, in 
the past decade, interest in these ever changing thoughts faced an exponential growth 
with over 180 articles published referring to “mind-wandering”, “task-unrelated 
thoughts” or “daydreaming” in 2017, compared to 24 in 2007.  
However, to date, limited consensus has been found regarding the definition of 
these introspective thoughts. While some refer to mind-wandering experiences as task-
unrelated thoughts, excluding task-free thoughts (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), others 
focus on the intentionality of their occurrence (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-
Hanna, 2016; Seli, Risko, & Smilek, 2016; Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016). 
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Alternatively, some researchers refer to self-generated thoughts to capture the intrinsic 
and active nature of such experiences, as well as their relative independence from 
immediate sensory input (Andrews‐Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013). Recently, a family-resemblance perspective was 
suggested to regroup all of these definitions (Seli et al., 2018). Therefore, mind-
wandering is now considered as an umbrella term covering related, and often 
overlapping, experiences. To enhance clarity and effective comparisons, an outline of 
the features of mind-wandering under study should be reported at the beginning of any 
body of work. Here, mind-wandering is merely conceptualised as self-generated 
thoughts and defined by an attentional decoupling from the environment in favour of 
any internal thoughts or feelings. A typical example would be reading to the end of a 
paragraph only to realise that one’s thoughts were drifting and therefore having to start 
over.  
 Despite incongruities in definitions, the literature is unanimous regarding the 
central part of mind-wandering experiences in human cognition. Accordingly, research 
exploring their occurrence, content, benefits, consequences, variability, and neuro-
correlates have been encouraged.  
1.2. The characteristics of mind-wandering experiences.  
 A plethora of research has explored mind-wandering experiences, showing that 
a third to half of our waking life is spent on such mental activity (Kane et al., 2007; 
Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Song & Wang, 2012). Neuroimaging investigations 
demonstrated the importance of the default mode network (Mason et al., 2007), while 
behavioural studies exposed the costs, benefits, and content of these experiences (for 
a review see Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013).  
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1.2.1. The default mode network and mind-wandering experiences. 
 Research has explored the neuro-correlates underlying mind-wandering 
experiences and highlighted different patterns of brain activity in different contexts. 
Findings from this literature are flourishing and will be further detailed in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, here, the components of the default mode network in relation to self-
generated thoughts will be explored. The default mode network (DMN) is primarily 
engaged during rest, under conditions of relaxation, and when little to no perceptual 
processing is required (for review see Raichle, 2015; Figure 1.1). This network is 
particularly active during tasks involving autobiographical memory, semantic 
processing, planning of the personal future, imagination, theory of mind, and self-
reflection, which all share features with mind-wandering experience (Andrews-Hanna, 
2012; D’Argembeau et al., 2014; Spreng & Grady, 2009; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2008; for 
a review of DMN functions see Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). Core 
regions of this network, namely the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC), and angular gyrus, have been proven to support the processing of 
personal information (Hu et al., 2016), a central aspect of mind-wandering experiences 
(Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). However, the dorsal medial subsystem, 
composed of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), the temporoparietal junction, 
the lateral temporal cortex, and the anterior temporal lobe, is associated with more 
social thoughts and reflections, which is in line with behavioural findings characterising 
mind-wandering experiences (Baird et al., 2011). Finally, the medial temporal 
subsystem, composed of the hippocampus, parahippocampus, retrosplenial cortex, 
posterior inferior parietal lobe, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), is 
associated with episodic past and future thinking, elements consistently associated to 
mind-wandering experiences (Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der 
Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011; for more details see Andrews‐Hanna et al., 2014). 
Therefore, although the precise features and functions of the network are still under 
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investigation, their nature and integrity are clearly related to a number of cognitive 
functions including mind-wandering experiences. 
Figure 1.1. Brain regions composing the Default Mode Network.  
Spatial localisation of brain areas composing the DMN generated using Neurosynth 
software (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Essen, & Wager, 2011). Presentation of reverse 
inference statistical maps for meta-analyses corresponding to each brain areas 
reported. Core network [red]: Angular Gyrus (AG; data from 231 studies), Posterior 
Cingulate Cortex (PCC; data from 726 studies) and medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC; 
data from 764 studies). Dorsal medial subsystem [green]: Temporoparietal Junction 
(TPJ; data from 130 studies), Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL; data from 154 studies), 
Lateral Temporal Cortex (LTC; data from 97 studies), and dorsomedial Prefrontal 
Cortex (dmPFC; data from 131 studies). Medial temporal subsystem [blue]: Inferior 
Parietal Lobe (IPL; data from 930 studies), Rostrosplenial Cortex (RSC; data from 101 
studies), Hippocampus (H; data from 822 studies), Parahippocampus (PH; data from 
63 studies) and ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC; data from 250 studies). 
 
1.2.2. The costs of mind-wandering experiences 
 From a behavioural perspective, mind-wandering experiences come at a great 
cost during an array of tasks. Implications of such experiences on reading 
comprehension is well documented (Franklin, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Reichle, 
Reineberg, & Schooler, 2010; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008; Schooler, 
Core network 
PCC mPFC 
AG 
PCC 
Dorsal medial 
dmPFC 
ATL/LTC 
TPJ 
ATL/LTC 
Medial temporal 
HF/PH 
RSC 
IPL 
dmPFC 
HF/PH 
RSC 
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2004) and has been further extended to difficulties in encoding perceptual information 
(Smilek, Carriere, & Cheyne, 2010). Additionally, the intrinsic relationship between 
mind-wandering experiences and attentional control has been shown to come at a cost 
during sustained attentional tasks, working memory tasks, and general measures of 
fluid intelligence (Mrazek et al., 2012). For example, consequences on sustained 
attention tasks were chiefly observed in terms of increased error rates, variability in 
reaction times, omissions, and anticipations (Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, 
2009). In the same line, mind-wandering experiences seem to have a negative impact 
on learning and education (Pachai, Acai, LoGiudice, & Kim, 2016). For example, mind-
wandering leads to poorer comprehension of university lectures and ultimately poorer 
performance (Lindquist & McLean, 2011; Risko, Anderson, Sarwal, Engelhardt, & 
Kingstone, 2012; Szpunar, Moulton, & Schacter, 2013; Wammes, Seli, Cheyne, 
Boucher, & Smilek, 2016). Moreover, mind-wandering experiences increase dangerous 
driving behaviours (Galéra et al., 2012; He, Becic, Lee, & McCarley, 2011; Martens & 
Brouwer, 2013; Qu et al., 2015). Costs are also found in health with short-term adverse 
consequences like increased heart rate, difficulty falling asleep and poorer sleep quality 
(Carciofo, Du, Song, & Zhang, 2014; Ottaviani & Couyoumdjian, 2013).  
 According to these findings, mind-wandering experiences are portrayed as a 
detrimental activity that should be reduced to a minimum. However, from an 
evolutionary perspective and given their frequency, it is somewhat unlikely that such 
experiences are solely negative and exempt from benefits. Critically, mind-wandering 
experiences are very eclectic in nature, suggesting different underlying neural systems 
(H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018; H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018) and behavioural 
outcomes depending on the content or intentionality of the thoughts.  
1.2.3. The content of mind-wandering experiences. 
 Key experiential features have been outlined while attempting to capture the 
functionalities of self-generated thoughts. Firstly, the central characteristic is 
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temporality, with a large proportion of future-oriented and personal thoughts, followed 
by past-oriented and social thoughts (Baird et al., 2011; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van 
der Linden, 2011; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & 
D’Argembeau, 2013). Future-oriented thoughts mostly take the form of inner speech 
and are personally relevant, realistic, concrete, and part of structured sequences of 
thoughts (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). Recent evidence suggests that future-
oriented thoughts enable the refinement of goals and are supported by strong 
connectivity between the hippocampus and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Medea 
et al., 2016). Additionally, the medial prefrontal cortex has been shown to be key during 
the processing of personal goals, in both mind-wandering experiences and episodic 
future thinking (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). Critically, future-oriented thoughts 
tend to reduce negative mood (Engert, Smallwood, & Singer, 2014) as well as predict 
a more positive mood (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013).  
 On the other hand, past-related thoughts are associated with rumination 
(Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005) and negative mood (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 
2013). An influential study looking at mind-wandering frequency in daily-life 
demonstrated the negative impact of mind-wandering experiences on mood 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). This finding was extended elsewhere with 
demonstrations of the mediating role of thoughts’ temporality, with higher levels of 
unhappiness associated with past-oriented thoughts (Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et 
al., 2013). Interestingly, the negative valence of self-generated thoughts seemed to 
worsen the previously observed costs of mind-wandering experiences on working 
memory and sustained attention (Banks, Welhaf, Hood, Boals, & Tartar, 2016). Mind-
wandering experiences have been reported to increase major cognitive vulnerabilities 
(e.g., rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive reactivity) in individuals 
with stable trait of negative affectivity or transitorily ones like stress (Marchetti, Koster, 
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Klinger, & Alloy, 2016). Overall, thoughts directed toward the past and the future are 
frequent, engage different neural networks, and have opposing effects on mood, with 
past thoughts being related to more negative consequences.  
1.2.4. The form of mind-wandering experiences. 
 When considering the form of the thoughts, a bias towards verbal thoughts has 
been uncovered along with the influence of intention. Mind-wandering experiences 
seem to be merely in the form of inner speech (Delamillieure et al., 2010; Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008; Song & Wang, 2012), which may be a consequence of the prospective 
bias previously outlined. Indeed, future thoughts are described as largely verbal and 
compose a substantial amount of mind-wandering experiences (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et 
al., 2013). Further evidence portrays mind-wandering experiences as verbal, intrusive, 
and detailed (Karapanagiotidis, Bernhardt, Jefferies, & Smallwood, 2017; Medea et al., 
2016; Smallwood et al., 2016).  
 Importantly, intentionality has been outlined as a critical feature of self-
generated mind-wandering experiences. Self-generated thoughts have long been 
considered as mainly unintentional. In laboratory settings, it is expected that 
participants aim to focus on the task to the best of their ability. However, during boring 
and undemanding tasks, participants largely intentionally engage in mind-wandering 
(for a review see Seli, Risko, Smilek, et al., 2016). Conceptually, unintentional thoughts 
require limited conscious cognitive control and awareness compared to intentional 
thoughts. This has been further illustrated by a stronger integration between the DMN 
and the control network for intentional compared to unintentional mind-wandering 
experiences (Golchert et al., 2017). Experientially, intentional thoughts tend to be more 
future-oriented and more detailed than unintentional thoughts (Seli, Ralph, Konishi, 
Smilek, & Schacter, 2017). Finally, some evidence suggests more short-term 
consequences on academic performance for intentional mind-wandering experiences, 
and more long-term impacts for unintentional thoughts (Wammes et al., 2016). 
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However, other results showed equivalent costs on task performance for both 
unintentional and intentional thoughts (Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015), 
highlighting the need for further investigation of this eclectic phenomenon.   
1.2.5. The benefits of mind-wandering experiences. 
 Self-generated thoughts are heterogeneous in terms of experiences and neuro-
correlates. Beyond the negative consequences of their occurrence, mind-wandering 
experiences promise to be highly valuable. Future-oriented thoughts have proven 
beneficial to alleviate negative mood, lower cortisol levels following social stress (Engert 
et al., 2014), and to predict a more positive mood (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 
2013). The role of prospective thoughts in the refinement of personal goals suggests 
that one of the main functions of self-generated thoughts lies in the planning of 
personally relevant future goals (Baird et al., 2011; Medea et al., 2016). Elsewhere, 
mind-wandering experiences enhance ones’ creativity (Baird et al., 2012; Smeekens & 
Kane, 2016) and social problem-solving abilities (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 
2013). Additionally, such experiences tend to alleviate loneliness (Poerio, Totterdell, 
Emerson, & Miles, 2015, 2016), foster psychosocial adaptation (Poerio et al., 2016), 
and a more patient style of making decisions (Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013). 
Ultimately, a functionality for such thoughts could be the relief of boredom, since mind-
wandering experiences are known to assist a mechanism by which dishabituation can 
occur (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013, 2016; Schooler et al., 2011). Importantly, recent 
work demonstrated how different patterns of content have different functional 
associations (H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). 
 From these investigations, mind-wandering experiences can be described as 
largely self-related with a tendency toward future thoughts and predominantly 
supported by the DMN. Importantly, while these lapses of attention can come at some 
cost (e.g. errors, negative mood), they also seem to present numerous benefits to life. 
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In response to such heterogeneity, the modelling of a theory conceptualising these 
experiences is ever more important. 
1.3. The process account of mind-wandering experiences 
 One difficulty when trying to grasp the mind-wandering state is accounting for 
the vast array of potential experiences that can occur. This section will present details 
of the underlying processes that, together, explain the diversity of mind-wandering 
experiences. In particular, the component process account of mind-wandering 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) assumes that different types of thoughts and feelings 
arise through the flexible combination of a smaller number of underlying processes. 
Smallwood and Schooler (2015) identify three important aspects of mind-wandering 
occurrences using the component process account of mind-wandering, and in Chapter 
2, how neuroimaging may help to understand these features will be explored more fully. 
The first process involves the temporally evolving attentional state, where there is 
decoupling from the processing of information in the external environment in favour of 
internal thought. The second process refers to the generation of the thought content, 
while the third considers the ‘executive’ processing operations, enabling the 
coordination, monitoring, and regulation of the self-generated thoughts.   
1.3.1. How does attention become internally focused? 
 When self-generated thoughts emerge, there is a release from the processing 
of task-relevant information extracted from the external environment. One of the 
potential roles of perceptual decoupling is its necessity for a coherent internal train of 
thought to emerge (Kam & Handy, 2013; Smallwood, 2013). The flexible decoupling 
and reorganisation of processes would be key to facilitate a conscious focus on self-
generated information. Another possibility is that perceptual decoupling is related to the 
availability of limited cognitive resources (Franklin, Mrazek, Broadway, & Schooler, 
2013). In this case, perceptual decoupling simply reflects the fact that attention 
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resources are no longer being directed to the task at hand but have been diverted to 
maintain inner thoughts. However, recent evidence does not support this latter theory. 
Individuals with high mind-wandering rates were found to do better at memory tasks, 
and worse on executive tasks (Poerio et al., 2017).  
1.3.2. How do people self-generate task-unrelated mental content?  
 Self-reports on the content of thoughts during mind-wandering episodes reveal 
the recurrence of past and future-oriented thoughts (Baird et al., 2011). It is proposed 
that the direction of this mental time travel is heavily dependent on episodic memory 
processes (Tulving, 2002). Evidence supports the proposal that the episodic memory 
system plays a role in self-generated mental content of mind-wandering experiences, 
emphasising the role of the DMN (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Accordingly, by linking 
connectivity measures to cognitive task performance, Poerio et al. (2017) demonstrated 
the implication of memory and the DMN in the generation of content of self-generated 
thoughts. Elsewhere, the DMN and the link between self-generated thought and 
episodic memory ability has been uncovered in neuropsychological populations (e.g. 
amnestic mild cognitive impairment; Dunn et al., 2014). In addition to the temporal 
make-up of mind-wandering content, affect and mood has dominated the literature. 
However, the relationship between the temporal orientation and valence of mind-
wandering thought needs to be explored further. It is possible that a reciprocal 
relationship exists whereby the emotional valence of self-generated thought depends 
on its temporal direction, and additionally, that affective processes play a key role in 
determining the temporal content of self-generated thought during mind-wandering. 
1.3.3. How do people coordinate and/or regulate mind-wandering experiences? 
 Currently, evidence suggests that executive functions play a key role in the 
context regulation of self-generated thoughts. Individuals with high levels of executive 
functioning limit their mind-wandering occurrence in demanding tasks (Kane & McVay, 
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2012). However, they also report more mind-wandering episodes in undemanding 
tasks, suggesting that cognitive control enables the maintenance of mind-wandering 
(Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). Thus, high levels of executive functioning 
seem to enable individuals to exert more flexibility into whether or not they allow their 
mind to wander or focus, and this may be modified depending on task demands 
(Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). This suggests that executive control not only permits the 
occurrence of mind-wandering episodes but also enables a more flexible adjustment of 
mind-wandering to situational demands. These data mirror general experimental work 
on dual-tasking, known as the context regulation hypothesis, where coordination of the 
task at hand and self-generated thoughts can be considered primary and secondary 
tasks (Huang & Mercer, 2001). 
 A related body of research also suggests that meta-cognitive processes play a 
role in the regulation of thought content. Meta-cognition refer to the knowledge one has 
about its own cognitive processes and cognitive processes in general (Flavell, 1979). 
Those with greater levels of meta-cognition regarding the content of their thoughts 
during a task tend to show greater variability in their attention between on-task and off-
task states (Allen et al., 2013). Furthermore, evidence suggests that increasing 
awareness of mind-wandering states through meditation practice leads to reductions in 
these off-task thoughts (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013).  
1.4. Influencing factors of mind-wandering experiences. 
 Building upon the component process account of mind-wandering, and to further 
comprehend the complexity of mind-wandering experiences, it is essential to consider 
influencing factors. Negative mood and meditation have already been mentioned, 
however many other factors can be considered. Here, characteristics originating from 
pathologies, the environmental context, and individual differences will be reported.  
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1.4.1. Pathologies  
 Many pathologies present distinct features on functions highly related to mind-
wandering. Whether it is the integrity of the DMN, attentional processes, executive 
function, or working memory capacity, pathologies such as Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, depression, Autism Spectrum Disorder or schizophrenia, 
all present neurocognitive characteristics indicative of different mind-wandering 
experiences. However, research is limited and has only focused on attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder and depressive patients. 
1.4.1.1. Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
 Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterised by a reduced 
ability to exert and maintain cognitive control of behaviour. Individuals present 
persistent symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity (DSM-V). Multiple 
neurocognitive deficits have been evidenced in this population, which includes aspects 
of executive functioning such as response inhibition (Alderson, Rapport, & Kofler, 2007; 
Lijffijt, Kenemans, Verbaten, & van Engeland, 2005), working memory (Martinussen, 
Hayden, Hogg-johnson, & Tannock, 2005; Rhodes, Coghill, & Matthews, 2005), 
attentional shifting, and planning (Kempton et al., 1999; Rhodes et al., 2005). Given this 
unusual behavioural and cognitive profile, the study of this disorder can inform the 
attentional component in theories of spontaneous thought processes. Shaw and 
Giambra, (1993) showed that individuals with ADHD are more inclined to mind-wander 
than healthy controls during a vigilance task. While performing a boring and 
undemanding cognitive task, participants diagnosed with ADHD experienced more 
task-unrelated-thoughts and false alarms, illustrating their higher levels of non-
conscious processing and poor inhibitory control. Elsewhere, the frequency and 
negative consequences of mind-wandering have been positively associated with ADHD 
symptomology (Franklin et al., 2016). Interestingly, ADHD was positively correlated with 
both the frequency of mind-wandering and a lack of awareness of mind-wandering. 
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Meta-awareness is an essential component of the mind-wandering process, as it 
enables one to be aware and conscious of the wandering mind. A lack of such 
awareness and monitoring of one’s consciousness thus leads to the inability to control 
the occurrence of mind-wandering episodes. Therefore, these findings support the role 
of executive control in mind-wandering and further stress the importance of self-
monitoring and meta-awareness in mind-wandering occurrence.  
 Additionally, considering the difficulties that ADHD individuals have with 
cognitive control and the lack of awareness of that failure, one would expect a difference 
in intentionality rate of mind-wandering. Critically, ADHD individuals were found to exert 
a different ratio of intentionality than controls, specifically with less intentional than 
unintentional mind-wandering (Seli, Smallwood, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2015). Exploring 
these potential changes in relation to the neuro-cognitive patterns of this population 
contribute, therefore, to the refining of theories regarding the regulation of both the 
disengagement from the task and the generation of mind-wandering episodes.   
1.4.1.2. Depression  
 In a similar vein, depression is associated with cognitive deficits and a distinctive 
pattern of self-generated thoughts. Symptoms in depression are predominately related 
to mood, but also include intrusive thoughts, ruminations, and deficits in executive 
function and attention (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001). Indeed, a meta-analysis 
illustrated that depression severity was positively correlated with cognitive performance 
in the domains of episodic memory, executive function, and processing speed 
(McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009). Thus, cognition in depression shows similarities with 
mind-wandering experiences. For instance, both are implicated in shifting attention 
away from the here and now, and both are related to attention and executive functions. 
This is further supported by the success of mindful therapies for depression (Marchand, 
2012). In these therapies, the focus is on maintaining attention on the here and now. 
Moreover, mindfulness has been shown to reduce mind-wandering frequency (Mrazek 
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et al., 2013). A strong and positive correlation between dysphoria (i.e., sub-clinical 
depression) and mind-wandering occurrence has been found, emphasising their 
relation (Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2005). A later study also demonstrated that 
dysphoria is associated with more accessible mind-wandering experiences 
(Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2007). As mentioned earlier, sadness 
tends to precede mind-wandering occurrence, especially when the experience is 
retrospective (Poerio et al., 2013). Overall, these examples from the literature 
emphasise how explorations in this population are a great asset in evaluating the role 
of affect in experiences of mind wandering, thus enabling a deeper understanding of 
what may trigger the generation of such thoughts. 
 The investigation of self-generated thoughts in the context of different 
neurocognitive profiles is highly valuable. Importantly, looking closer at specific 
populations will help refine theories of mind wandering, giving more strength to a rising 
field. Ultimately, by understanding these neurocognitive profiles and patterns of mind-
wandering experiences, such investigations will be beneficial to the design of strategies 
and interventions improving patients’ lives.  
1.4.2. Context-dependent characteristics  
 Beyond the investigation of pathologies, more transient factors are known to 
influence mind-wandering experiences. Within context-dependent characteristics, the 
length of the activity at hand has been repeatedly reported as a factor encouraging 
mind-wandering experiences. Research shows that the more time spent on a task, the 
more frequently self-generated thoughts occur (Risko et al., 2012; Smallwood, 
Obonsawin, & Reid, 2002; Szpunar et al., 2013). The environment and the material 
used in the task can also influence mind-wandering frequency rates. One example is 
the number of changes presented (e.g. audiovisual features), where the fewer the 
changes, the higher the frequency of mind-wandering experiences (Faber, Radvansky, 
& D’Mello, 2018). Participants’ interest in the presented material is equally important, 
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as motivation tends to increase focus, and therefore decreases mind-wandering rates 
(Lindquist & McLean, 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013). 
This has been further corroborated by experimental manipulation of participants’ 
motivation to perform a task (Seli, Schacter, Risko, & Smilek, 2017). Low motivation to 
perform well at an activity has been associated with more intentional than unintentional 
self-generated thoughts, compared to when motivation is high (Seli, Cheyne, et al., 
2015). Together, these factors corroborate the proposition that one of the purposes of 
mind-wandering is to relieve boredom. 
1.4.3. Individual differences and other factors 
 Extrinsic characteristics, such as the consumption of alcohol (Sayette, Reichle, 
& Schooler, 2009), nicotine craving (Sayette, Schooler, & Reichle, 2010), sexual 
arousal, and acute hunger (Rummel & Nied, 2017), have shown increases in the 
number of mind-wandering experiences. While only alcohol consumption and cigarette 
craving reduced participants’ awareness, acute hunger and sexual arousal altered 
thoughts content with more thoughts about the near future (i.e. food-related and sex-
related thoughts, respectively). These findings particularly relate to the implication of 
current concerns in the generation of mind-wandering experiences. For example, 
inducing the anticipation of a negative event (i.e. concern) showed a subsequent 
increase in negative affect predicting the frequency of mind-wandering experiences 
(Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). Similarly, stress inductions increase negative affect 
and mind-wandering frequency (Vinski & Watter, 2013). More negative, past-oriented, 
and social thoughts are associated with biological markers of stress (e.g. cortisol and 
alphaamylase levels; Engert et al., 2014). In a similar vein, stereotype threats tend to 
increase mind-wandering rates (Schuster, Martiny, & Schmader, 2015). As for 
personality traits, mind-wandering experiences are predicted by neuroticism in 
laboratory settings and openness to experience in everyday life (Kane et al., 2017). 
16 
 
 Working memory capacity is another influencing factor driving individual 
differences in mind-wandering. Indeed, working memory capacity and cognitive 
resources have clear implications for internal and external information flow. For 
instance, individuals with high working memory capacity can adjust their mind-
wandering experience in relation to task demands, with low rates in demanding tasks 
and higher rates in easy tasks (Kane & McVay, 2012; Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014; 
Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). Conversely, mind-wandering experiences negatively affect 
participants’ performance in working memory tasks (Mrazek et al., 2012). Overall, 
increasing ones’ working memory capacity and ability to focus is a promising avenue to 
control mind-wandering experiences. Work from the mindfulness literature is 
informative regarding working memory capacity. This approach is the most documented 
in increasing cognitive resources, including working memory capacity, for example, a 
two-week mindfulness intervention improved participants working memory capacity and 
reduced mind-wandering rates (Mrazek et al., 2013). For participants with initially high 
mind-wandering rates, the increased working memory capacity was mediated by the 
reduction of mind-wandering experiences. Notably, even interventions as short as 8 
minutes have proven significant in reducing the frequency of mind-wandering (Mrazek 
et al., 2012).  
 Together, the literature on working memory suggests that examining 
populations with reduced cognitive resources and known working memory impairments 
will be enlightening. Critically, a wealth of work has documented the cognitive changes 
of the ageing population, showing declines in episodic memory, working memory, and 
executive control abilities (Braver & West, 2008). Based on this work, a lack of cognitive 
control was suspected to increase older adults’ experiences of mind wandering. 
Nevertheless, robust findings outline an age-related decrease in mind-wandering 
experiences (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson, Weinstein, & Balota, 
2013; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013; 
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Shake, Shulley, & Soto-Freita, 2016; Staub, Doignon-Camus, Bacon, & Bonnefond, 
2014; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). Investigating mind-wandering experiences 
in a population presenting both attentional and memory deficits will undoubtedly inform 
the generation and control processes of mind-wandering experiences. In the following 
section, an overview of the research investigating this counterintuitive finding will be 
provided, with an emphasis on older adults’ experiential, cognitive and neural 
characteristics.  
1.5. Mind-wandering during the ageing process  
1.5.1. Older adults’ experiential and cognitive features.  
 The age-related decrease of mind-wandering frequency has been reported 
using different measures, such as retrospective questionnaires (Giambra, 1989, 2000) 
and online experience sampling methods (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; 
Jackson et al., 2013; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). Initial evidence was 
introduced by Giambra, using both longitudinal (Giambra, 2000) and cross-sectional 
comparisons (Giambra, 1973, 1993), and has been corroborated by recent research 
(Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson et al., 
2013; Krawietz et al., 2012; McVay et al., 2013; Shake et al., 2016; Staub et al., 2014; 
Zavagnin et al., 2014). Moreover, a decrease was found for both intentional and 
unintentional mind-wandering experiences at a trait and state-level (Seli, Maillet, 
Smilek, Oakman, & Schacter, 2017). This can be informative regarding the implication 
of cognitive control and motivation in the ageing population. Additionally, older adults 
have more difficulty in recoupling their attention to the task after a mind-wandering 
experience, leading to heavier consequences on task performance (Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Zavagnin et al., 2014). A number of avenues have been explored to explain this 
unexpected finding, such as older adults’ lack of awareness, higher motivation, change 
in personal concern, or other dispositional factors like memory deficits, lower negative 
affect, and higher mindful abilities.  
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 Despite older adults having relatively intact meta-cognitive skills, they tend to 
not always use monitoring effectively to control learning and cognition (Hertzog & 
Hultsch, 2000). Hence, the validity of older adults’ report of mind-wandering 
experiences has been questioned. Research has demonstrated that older adults tend 
to be less able to catch themselves mind-wandering (Einstein & Mcdaniel, 1997; 
Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014). However, using 
eye tracking, Frank et al., (2015) were able to predict older adults’ reports of task-
unrelated thought by using eye movement patterns. Thus, support for self-report as a 
valid measure of mind-wandering frequency was provided for both young and older 
adults.  
 After validating older adults’ reports, the implication of their increased task 
engagement (potentially driven by older adults’ higher conscientiousness) has been 
explored. Indeed, motivation is known to reduce mind-wandering activities (Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013), by helping the maintenance of executive control and the level of 
performance during an activity (Thomson, Besner, & Smilek, 2015). Critically, a 
mediation effect of motivation on the age-related mind-wandering decrease has been 
reported (Frank et al., 2015; Krawietz et al., 2012). Therefore, older adults’ task 
engagement explained their mind-wandering rates. Yet, in each case, motivation scores 
were collected after participants had completed the task, leading to a potential bias 
toward their perceived performance at the task.  
 Earlier behavioural work focused on the distinction between task-related 
interferences (TRI) and task-unrelated thoughts (TUT) to explore older adults’ mind-
wandering experience. Crucially, older adults present significantly larger rates of TRI 
compared to young adults (Frank et al., 2015; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 
2014). TRIs are not directly supporting task activity; instead, they are evaluative of one’s 
performance (e.g. accuracy, time left). Interestingly, the ageing stereotype, illustrated 
by the belief that older adults cannot be successful at cognitive tasks, was found to 
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increase the occurrence of TRI and negatively affected task performance (Jordano & 
Touron, 2017). It was hypothesised that older adults’ high rates of TRI would overcome 
their low mind-wandering rates. Nevertheless, older adults still report more on-task 
thoughts than young adults (McVay et al., 2013), indicating that TRI rates did not 
compensate for small mind-wandering rates.  
 Alternatively, interpretations of the age-related decrease in mind-wandering 
experiences have focused on older adults’ change in personal concerns. Older adults’ 
emotional goals and regulation are known to evolve (Carstensen & Charles, 1998), 
meaning that they may experience fewer personal thoughts because of less anxiety 
regarding everyday life issues. In this context, laboratory settings may induce a bias 
with a lack of cues relevant to older adults’ concerns to trigger self-generated thoughts 
(McVay et al., 2013). This brings the question of whether these findings will transfer to 
real life experiences. Interestingly, studies using more ecologically valid settings 
present conflicting results. While Giambra (2000) showed a decrease in mind-
wandering experiences (i.e. retrospective questionnaire), Gardner & Ascoli, (2015) 
reported a surprising increase in future-oriented thoughts in older adults using 
experience sampling (i.e. diary study). Therefore, it might be the case that, as in the 
prospective memory literature, mind-wandering decreases in experimental settings, but 
increases, or remains unchanged in ecological settings (Bailey, Henry, Rendell, Phillips, 
& Kliegel, 2010; Rendell & Craik, 2000).  
 Nonetheless, with a laboratory approach, several elements of older adults’ 
neurocognitive profile can inform the age-related decrease of mind-wandering 
frequency. Indeed, mental time travelling abilities seem to change in ageing. Mental 
time travel comprises the capacity to re-experience events from the personal past, and 
to pre-experience future anticipated events through imagination (Wheeler, Stuss, & 
Tulving, 1997), and is one of the most recurrent form of mind-wandering experiences. 
Studies have revealed poorer ability for imagining future than a-temporal experiences 
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for older adults (Rendell et al., 2012). Additionally, the frequency of involuntary future 
thoughts decreases with age, whereas the frequency of involuntary memories does not 
(Berntsen, Rubin, & Salgado, 2015). Therefore, older adults seem to have more 
difficulties thinking about the future. Preliminary evidence from the mind-wandering 
literature suggests a reduction of future directed thoughts in favour of more a-temporal 
thoughts (Jackson et al., 2013). However, Gardner and Ascoli (2015) reported a 
paradoxical increase in future-oriented thoughts in older adults (e.g. in diary studies). 
By prompting participants randomly during their normal daily activities, the authors 
demonstrated higher probability for older adults to recall a thought somewhat related to 
their personal future (e.g. formation of an intention, recollection of an intention, and 
musings of possible future events). Together, these findings strongly suggest that 
spontaneous thoughts are subject to changes when age increases.  
 Furthermore, older adults report more positive affect, less negative affect, and 
greater life satisfaction as compared to young adults (Carstensen & Charles, 1998; 
Grühn, Kotter-Grühn, & Röcke, 2010). These characteristics may act as protective 
features preventing older adults from continually engaging in mind-wandering activities. 
In a laboratory context, positive, but not negative affects were found as a mediating 
factor for older adults’ lower mind-wandering rates (Frank et al., 2015). Similarly, older 
adults’ greater mindfulness abilities (Splevins, Smith, & Simpson, 2009) may reduce 
the occurrence of both negative affect and mind-wandering experiences. Mindfulness 
meditation is reported as a strong factor reducing mind-wandering activities (Mrazek et 
al., 2013; Mrazek, Mooneyham, & Schooler, 2014) and negative mood (Lane, 
Seskevich, & Pieper, 2007), while increasing life satisfaction (Kong, Wang, & Zhao, 
2014). Nevertheless, one study, which briefly explored this possibility, failed at 
demonstrating any mediating effects (Frank et al., 2015).  
 In summary, multiple hypotheses have aimed to explain the unexpected finding 
of a decrease in mind-wandering experiences during ageing. Older adults’ poor 
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awareness, increased task engagement, change in personal concerns, memory 
deficits, positive bias, and mindful abilities have all been considered. From these 
investigations, it is evident that a combination of factors, as opposed to one, could 
explain older adults’ self-generated thoughts. Critically, older adults’ neurocognitive 
profile and the heterogeneity of self-generated thoughts have both been largely 
overlooked. In younger populations, multiple facets of mind-wandering experiences 
have been investigated, and are highly informative. However, studies in ageing merely 
focused on the frequency of thoughts, leaving aside priceless information about older 
adults’ experiences, and how this may drive self-generated thoughts. Additionally, older 
adults’ general cognitive experiences are not without grounding from structural and 
functional brain changes. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, no study has directly 
investigated the impact of these changes on older adults’ self-generated thoughts.  
1.5.2. Older adults’ neural activity 
 Starting with an electrophysiological approach, undeniable changes in brain 
activity are found in ageing. Studies have documented a decrease in lower frequency 
bands (i.e. delta and theta) and an increase of higher frequencies (i.e. beta; Cummins 
& Finnigan, 2007; Duffy, Albert, McAnulty, & Garvey, 1984; Duffy, McAnulty, & Albert, 
1993). Higher frequency bands are typically recruited during attentional tasks. Thus 
their increase most likely reflects the need for more task engagement from this 
population to carry out a more difficult task (Deiber et al., 2015).  
 Similarly, neural changes have been documented in older adults’ brain 
structure. Older adults present an overall shrinkage of brain volume (e.g. Tisserand & 
Jolles, 2003) with significant consequences on brain regions overlapping with the DMN 
(Raichle et al., 2001). A large body of literature has outlined the frontal lobes as being 
particularly vulnerable in ageing (Rabbitt, 2005; Robbins et al., 1998) and this has 
driven the hypothesis by which frontal atrophy is responsible for the functional decline 
observed. Typical frontal-executive abilities are reported to show impairment in ageing 
22 
 
include working memory, inhibition control, planning and decision making (see 
Greenwood, 2000; West, 2000; West, 1996 for discussion of the frontal ageing 
hypothesis). The vulnerability of the ageing brain also includes the temporal lobes (Fjell 
et al., 2009; Pfefferbaum et al., 2013; Naftali Raz, Ghisletta, Rodrigue, Kennedy, & 
Lindenberger, 2010), and the hippocampus (Du et al., 2006; Fjell et al., 2009). Indeed, 
a link between hippocampal volume and explicit memory has been found in later life 
(Raz, Gunning-Dixon, Head, Dupuis & Acker, 1998). Largely, research investigating the 
medial-temporal lobes highlights deficits in the episodic memory domain particularly 
when performance is measured during memory recall rather than recognition. The 
deterioration of these central areas of the brain will inevitably affect the integrity and 
functionality of the DMN, and provides important clues regarding age difference in self-
generated thought. 
 Despite discoveries of functional reorganisation and compensation in ageing 
(Greenwood, 2007; Reuter-Lorenz & Cappell, 2008; Reuter-Lorenz & Lustig, 2005), 
research has revealed a functional impairment of the DMN in this population 
(Damoiseaux et al., 2008). Decreased activity was found in the middle frontal gyrus, 
posterior cingulate cortex, middle temporal gyrus, and the superior parietal regions. 
Critically, connectivity between the temporal poles and the posterior cingulate cortex is 
predictive of both greater mental time travelling involving social agents, and unpleasant 
task-unrelated-thoughts (Smallwood et al., 2016). Additionally, heightened connectivity 
from the hippocampus to the posterior cingulate cortex predicts greater specificity of 
thoughts (Smallwood et al., 2016). As such, evidence from the ageing brain implies 
changes in mind-wandering experiences for older adults. Research has demonstrated 
lower functional connectivity between regions of the DMN in ageing (Damoiseaux, 
2017). This was associated with poorer performance on cognitive tasks involving 
memory and executive functions (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2007; Damoiseaux et al., 
2008; L. Wang et al., 2010). Evidently, this confirms the hypothesis in which older 
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adults’ compromised neural activity (e.g. DMN), will interfere with their ability to self-
generate thoughts (e.g. evidenced by different thoughts’ content and frequency). An 
additional argument for this proposition is the investigation of Alzheimer’s patients. 
Alzheimer's disease is a progressive dementia illustrated by memory difficulties, but 
also deficits of executive function. Recently for the first time, an article has reported a 
further decrease in mind-wandering frequency in this population compared to healthy 
older adults (Gyurkovics, Balota, & Jackson, 2018). Interestingly, a resting-state fMRI 
study showed decreased activity in the DMN in Alzheimer’s patients compared with 
age-matched healthy controls (Greicius, Srivastava, Reiss, & Menon, 2004). Thus, both 
mind-wandering frequency and the DMN appear affected by ageing and aggravated 
further by Alzheimer’s disease.  
1.6.  Project overview and rationale 
 Overall, mind-wandering experiences are portrayed as heterogeneous by their 
content, form and outcome. According to recent imaging work, these characteristics, as 
well as other cognitive functions, are largely supported by the DMN, with distinct 
patterns of activity and connectivity depending on the nature of the experience. 
Numerous variables can influence the frequency and the nature of self-generated 
thoughts. Among these variables, age seems to be a crucial avenue to examine 
because of the counterintuitive finding displaying reduced frequency. Older adults 
present impairment in multiple functions that are key to the generation and control of 
mind-wandering experiences, namely the functional activity and connectivity of the 
DMN, memory processes, and executive functions. While the decreased frequency of 
mind-wandering experiences in ageing is appropriately documented (in laboratory 
settings), limited considerations have been made regarding the nature of the 
experience, or the implication of the neural changes reported.  
 This thesis aims to examine self-generated mind-wandering experiences in 
ageing using convergent methods. The strategy of triangulation whereby self-reports, 
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behavioural measures, and neurocognitive measures are used in tandem will help to 
explain and explore a phenomenon often difficult to grasp. Importantly, thoughts’ 
heterogeneity and associated neural activity will be at the centre of this thesis. Hence, 
this project promises to be highly beneficial to the understanding of both self-generated 
thoughts and normal ageing. An original contribution to knowledge will be provided by, 
(i) investigating the implications of the ageing neurocognitive profile onto the complex 
experience of mind-wandering, and by (ii) exploring the impact of influencing factors 
such as one’s sociocultural context, mindful abilities and meta-awareness on the overall 
mind-wandering experience in ageing.  
 Starting with a methodological approach, Chapter 2 will argue for the use of 
convergent methods (e.g. imaging) in the investigation of self-generated thoughts. 
Building on these recommendations, Chapter 3 will use electrophysiology to untangle 
the implication of older adults’ neuro-cognitive profile on their limited mind-wandering 
experiences. The ongoing and temporal measures of mind-wandering experiences will 
provide supplementary information about their underlying neural activity. Investigation 
of older adults’ neurocognitive profile and its implication on self-generated thoughts will 
be further pursued in Chapter 4, with the use of functional connectivity magnetic 
resonance imaging. Chapter 5 will explore the influence of culture on the experiences 
of mind-wandering across different age groups. The assumption that mind-wandering 
experiences are identical in different cultures is hazardous: social norms and language 
are strong factors that could potentially change the nature of these experiences. Finally, 
Chapter 6 will firstly consider the influence of meta-awareness on thoughts content and 
secondly will attempt to manipulate experimentally the content of mind-wandering 
experiences in a population of young and older adults. As such, this will document the 
role of both thought content and meta-awareness in the age-related decrease of mind-
wandering experiences.  
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Chapter 2. Convergent methods  
 When evaluating internal states such as mind wandering, it is restricting to rely 
only on one measure. Instead, it is essential to use converging methods as they provide 
different points of view on otherwise covert states of mind. Specifically, while self-report 
measures disclose the heterogeneous nature of these thoughts, imaging techniques 
can target when and where they arise. The high temporal precision of the 
electroencephalogram and event-related potentials can uncover the temporal dynamics 
of mind wandering. Additionally, techniques such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) enable the processes behind these experiences to be pinpointed in 
neural space. Furthermore, functional and structural connectivity measures (e.g. 
electroencephalogram - EEG coherence; diffuse tensor imaging – DTI) expose the 
neural communication behind the generation and maintenance of internal states. In this 
chapter, emphasis will be plced on the need for converging operations in studying self-
generated experience, and will evaluate the strengths of each technique in addressing 
specific aspects of the wandering mind.  
2.1. Why use converging methods to study mind-wandering?  
 By nature, mind-wandering is a private and continuous evolution of thought 
patterns across time (Smallwood, 2013). These internal and temporal aspects of the 
experience make the combination of self-report measures and neuroimaging 
techniques fundamental to the comprehension of self-generated thoughts. Although 
self-report and behavioural studies alone are leading to great strides in developing our 
understanding of how and why the mind wanders (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015), the 
aim here is to explore how combining these methods with neuroimaging can accelerate 
this understanding, and reveal the temporal patterns and neural processes that 
underpin these experiences. While techniques such as experience sampling 
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(Csikszentmihalyi & Larsen, 1987) have made it possible to estimate participants’ 
thoughts and feelings as they occur, providing an ‘online’ measure of mind-wandering, 
this data relies on subjective self-reports, rather than objective recordings. By 
comparison, behavioural studies of mind-wandering may be considered less subjective 
as they generate measures of the observable consequences associated with 
performing dull, monotonous tasks. Yet, the occurrence of mind-wandering during these 
slips of action (i.e. errors, omissions) is nevertheless something that has to be inferred. 
Studies have shown that lapses in performance can have different features than self-
reports of off-task thought (Konishi, Brown, Battaglini, & Smallwood, 2017). The 
limitations of these approaches make it a challenge to establish complete scientific 
accounts of internal trains of thought associated with mind-wandering. The ability to 
make inferences about internal states is argued to be improved through the strategy of 
triangulation, whereby self-reports, behavioural measures, and neurocognitive 
measures are used in concert (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). In this context, 
neuroimaging tools are important for understanding internal states because they: (i) 
provide insight into the nature of the neural processes that underpin different attentional 
states, and (ii) they help shed light on the temporal dynamics that internal states can 
have. To date, tools such as the electroencephalogram and event-related potentials 
have already proven to be effective measures of the timely occurrence of self-generated 
thoughts, whereas functional magnetic resonance imaging tools reveal the contribution 
of key brain areas.   
 Contemporary accounts of the mind-wandering experience argue that ongoing 
thoughts are heterogeneous regarding both their content and relationship to functional 
outcomes (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). The literature illustrates a range of 
things that people think about when their mind wanders, reflecting variables such as 
temporal focus, affective state, and interest (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; see Chapter 
1). Since different patterns of thought are likely to have distinct cognitive profiles, this 
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diversity of experiences suggests that an important element in the study of mind-
wandering is the assessment of multiple experiential factors. In addition, evidence 
suggests that mind-wandering episodes are not only different in terms of content, but 
also variable in terms of patterns of associated functional outcomes. While some 
studies have shown that mind-wandering occurrence has a negative impact on mood 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and cognitive task performance (Mrazek, Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2012; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008), others have revealed the 
positive effects of task-unrelated thought (Baird et al., 2012, 2011; Medea et al., 2016; 
Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2013).  
 In this context of multiple patterns of experiences reflecting distinct functional 
outcome, neuroimaging can help move forward our understanding of patterns of 
ongoing thought. For example, it could help determine which cognitive and neural 
processes are common to multiple different types of experience, as well as identifying 
those processes that are distinct to specific patterns of experience. Combined with 
behavioural measures of mind-wandering, neuroimaging techniques would provide a 
layer of more objective data related to this subjective state, which is otherwise only 
accessible by self-reports. Neuroimaging techniques provide covert measures of 
underlying cognitive processing, thus helping to determine whether variable mind-
wandering frequency, content, and outcomes are associated with parallel physical 
differences in the brain. Moreover, advances in machine learning offer the potential to 
infer the heterogeneity of different experiential states directly from the combined 
decompositions of neural and self-reported data (Vatansever et al., 2017; H.-T. Wang, 
Bzdok, et al., 2018; H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018).  
 This chapter will first outline self-report and behavioural methods of measuring 
mind-wandering. This will be followed by an analysis of how neuroimaging tools could 
augment our understanding when used in combination with these methods. Lastly, 
recent discoveries about mind-wandering, which have been achieved with neural 
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connectivity measures, will be reviewed. Together, the process of triangulation will be 
highlighted through which different self-report and behavioural methods are combined 
with the available neuroimaging techniques.  
2.1.1. Self-report methods 
 There are three basic forms of experience sampling that are used in studies of 
ongoing thought: online experience sampling, retrospective experience sampling 
estimation, and dispositional measurement. Online experience sampling involves 
gathering self-reports regarding a participant’s ongoing experience ‘in the moment’ 
while they are completing other activities (Csikszentmihalyi & Larsen, 1987; Kahneman, 
Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Typically 
in the literature, the probe-caught method is employed in which participants are 
intermittently interrupted and asked to describe the content of their experience 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). This method has been used in both ecological (e.g. 
Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and laboratory settings (e.g. Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011). In the former context, participants are prompted randomly as they go by 
their daily life via a text message on the phone. Using this paradigm, participants report 
the content of their experience and the nature of their activity at the time (e.g. Song & 
Wang, 2012). In laboratory settings, participants only report their internal experience 
while carrying out a mundane task. An important issue here is the duration between the 
probes. Indeed, it has been evidenced that greater reports of off-task thought come with 
larger gaps between probes (Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013; Smallwood et al., 2002). 
Additionally, the phrasing used to probe participants’ thoughts should be considered. 
That is, the use of an ‘on-task’ frame (e.g. ‘To what extent were your thoughts on task 
during the previous activity?’) results in lower mind-wandering frequency compared to 
a ‘mind-wandering’ frame (e.g., ‘To what extent were you mind-wandering during the 
previous activity?’) (Weinstein, Lima, & Zee, 2017).  
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The second type of online experience sampling is the self-caught method where 
participants are asked to spontaneously report their mind-wandering episodes at the 
moment they occur (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Similar to the probe-caught method, 
the self-caught method depends on the participants’ capacity to reflect upon their 
experience while performing another task, as well as their levels of meta-cognitive 
awareness (Schooler et al., 2011). In such paradigms, participants are informed to 
press a button when noticing that their mind has drifted away from the task. On multiple 
occasion, the combined use of the probe and self-caught method has enabled the 
distinction between mind-wandering frequency and meta-awareness of mind-
wandering experiences (Sayette et al., 2009, 2010). For example, alcohol intoxication 
(Sayette et al., 2009) and cigarette craving (Sayette et al., 2010) tend to increase the 
probability of mind-wandering experiences (probe-caught) while decreasing the 
probability of noticing them (self-caught). 
 End of task estimations of ongoing thought also depend on self-reports but, 
unlike the experience sampling method, data is gathered retrospectively at the end of 
a task or after a block of trials, rather than in the moment. Smallwood and Schooler 
(2015) refer to this as retrospective sampling as it involves gathering estimations of 
experiences immediately after the task. The advantage of this method is that it 
preserves the natural time course of the mind-wandering task, as participants do not 
need to be interrupted to report their experience. Retrospective end of task estimations 
of mind-wandering may be gathered via a single question at the end of a task, via 
questionnaires (e.g. the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire, DSSQ; Matthews, Joyner, 
Gilliland, & Campbell, 1999), using the New York Cognition Questionnaire (Gorgolewski 
et al., 2014; H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018), or through open-ended questions. 
Smallwood and Schooler (2015) refer to the latter as the open-ended method. Here, 
participants are asked to describe in their own words what they experienced during the 
previous task, which has the advantage of enabling a broader range of responses since 
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participants are not constrained by the categories imposed by specific questions. 
Retrospective measures have the advantage that they do not interrupt the dynamics of 
cognition. Thus, combining retrospective experience sampling with the acquisition of 
online measures of neural function provides a promising way to understand the broader 
temporal dynamics of experience, using techniques that exploit temporal changes in 
neural signals such as functional connectivity (Biswal, Deyoe, & Hyde, 1996). However, 
a weakness of the retrospective approach is that this method relies on memory recall, 
making it impossible to relate self-reported data to a specific moment in time.  
 An innovative extension to experience sampling, which will be used throughout 
this thesis, is the simultaneous exploration of multiple dimensions of experience 
(Golchert et al., 2017; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; Konishi et al., 2017; Medea et al., 
2016; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; 
Smallwood et al., 2016; H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018; H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 
2018). This Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling (MDES; Shrimpton, McGann, & 
Riby, 2017; Smallwood et al., 2016) allows the experimenter to simultaneously capture 
different aspects of experience, allowing their heterogeneity to be empirically evaluated. 
This may be especially useful when used alongside neuroimaging methodology, as this 
can identify whether the distinct patterns of experience observed at the level of self-
reports is mirrored at the neural level.  For example, Smallwood et al. (2016) found that 
multiple different aspects of experience - thoughts related to different temporal periods, 
off-task thoughts, and thoughts with vivid detail were associated with stronger 
connectivity at rest between regions of the temporal lobe and the posterior cingulate 
cortex. 
 It is also possible to measure dispositional differences in patterns of ongoing 
thought using questionnaires that map traits linked to different types of experience. For 
example, the Imaginal Processes Inventory (SIPI; Huba, Singer, Aneshensel & 
Antrobus, 1982), the Mind-Wandering Questionnaire (MWQ; Mrazek, Phillips, Franklin, 
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Broadway, & Schooler, 2013), and the Mind-Wandering Deliberate and Spontaneous 
scale (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013; Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015) are all individual 
difference measures, which ask participants to assess the characteristics of their 
daydreams or mind-wandering experiences in the context of their daily functioning. 
Similar to end of task estimation measures, this method relies on retrospective 
judgements concerning previous mind-wandering experience rather than online 
reporting. However, when these measures are used, participants have to think back 
over a longer period of time when reporting their experience, and this presents a greater 
risk of error due to misremembering and biases in reporting.  
 These different types of experience sampling enable researchers to investigate 
the role of individual differences in laboratory-based mind-wandering tasks and gather 
information regarding general tendencies to mind-wander in real-life situations, making 
them more ecologically valid. While each approach has weaknesses, in combination 
they offer the potential to refine our understanding of the nature of ongoing thought. For 
example, Shrimpton et al. (2017) argued strongly for the combined use of typical mind-
wandering style measures and experience sampling, giving insight about the 
association between temporal focus and self-related thoughts. Elsewhere, this 
methodology enabled the verification of differences in spontaneous and deliberate 
mind-wandering both through associations with ADHD (Seli, Smallwood, et al., 2015) 
and in the brain (Golchert et al., 2017). 
2.1.2. Behavioural Methods 
 Owing to issues of misremembering and the response bias associated with self-
reports, researchers usually aim to corroborate self-reports of mind-wandering with 
measurements of the behavioural consequences. Often this involves examining 
performance on the very task that is designed to encourage the onset of mind-
wandering in the first place. Examining the consequence of a particular state in this 
manner has a long history in psychology where direct measurement is not possible. For 
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instance, when examining the cost of dual tasking on everyday memory, measures are 
not only made on the secondary task, but also on the primary task. Here, one can 
consider the ongoing activity of self-generated thoughts as a primary task, which will 
impact on secondary task performance. As such, by measuring the secondary task, one 
can indirectly measure the primary task, namely self-generation of thoughts. A typical 
computer-based paradigm for examining mind-wandering experiences in the laboratory 
involves engaging participants on a relatively mundane task that nevertheless requires 
sustained attention. Episodes of poorer performance on this secondary task, for 
example in terms of accuracy, false alarms, or reaction time variability are assumed to 
signal the occurrence of mind-wandering.  
 A task that has frequently been used to both encourage and measure mind-
wandering is the Sustained Attention Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, 
Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). This requires participants to respond as quickly as 
possible to frequent and relevant stimuli (e.g., ‘press the space bar when the letter X 
appears’), while inhibiting their responses to infrequent stimuli (e.g. ‘do nothing when 
the letter Y appears’). One advantage of this method is that researchers may use it to 
manipulate the prevalence of mind-wandering by varying the demands of the task. For 
example, in an investigation into the effect of glucose on mind-wandering, Birnie, 
Smallwood, Reay, and Riby (2015) found that probed self-reports of mind-wandering 
were associated with false alarms on the SART (i.e., erroneously pressing the response 
key to the infrequent stimuli). Furthermore, this association was stronger on easier trials 
of the SART, supporting the inference that mind-wandering is more prevalent when the 
demands of the ongoing tasks are low. The SART has been used extensively and has 
uncovered important mind-wandering consequences, such as increased reaction times 
before errors and decreased reaction time after errors, which is particularly true in 
ageing (Jackson & Balota, 2012). This reflects changes in attentional focus with the 
reengagement of attention on the task after an error. Such patterns have been 
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replicated using a modified version of the SART which used the auditory modality (Seli, 
Cheyne, Barton, & Smilek, 2012). Additionally, Seli et al. (2013) developed the 
metronome task, which involves responding synchronously (via button presses) with a 
continuous rhythmic presentation of tones, and demonstrated behavioural variability in 
the responses as a marker of mind-wandering. 
 Although sustained attentional tasks such as the SART have been used 
extensively in the mind-wandering literature, they have received recent criticism 
regarding their precision in measuring both sustained attention and the likelihood of 
mind-wandering (Dillard et al., 2014). Problematically, the SART does not include any 
control condition or baseline, therefore preventing researchers from generating strong 
conclusions regarding the variation in mind-wandering rates (see paradigm from 
Konishi, McLaren, Engen, & Smallwood, 2015). Thus, a variant of the cognitive task 
used by Konishi et al. (2015) has received great interest and was used in this program 
of work to both encourage and measure mind-wandering experiences. In this n-back 
paradigm, participants alternate between blocks of trials in which they either make 
decisions about the location of shapes, which are currently available to the senses (0-
back) or with respect to their location on a prior trial (1-back). Like the SART, the N-
back task makes it possible to manipulate the demands of the task, with an increase in 
working memory load during the 1-back trials, but it also makes it possible to 
simultaneously investigate the role of perceptual input during mind-wandering, and 
thereby test separate hypotheses regarding the role of the DMN during mind-
wandering.  
2.2. Neuroimaging Tools 
 The array of subjective and behavioural indicators of mind-wandering provide 
important lines of insight into the psychological features of ongoing thought, however, 
in isolation may struggle to provide the high levels of detail needed to refine our 
understanding of this important psychological state. It is proposed that neuroimaging 
35 
 
measures add a further layer of objectivity to the experimental toolkit when exploring 
patterns of self-generated thought. To date, studies using Event-Related Potentials 
(ERPs) and Electroencephalogram (EEG) have provided important support for the view 
that periods of ongoing thought can become perceptually decoupled from external 
events. Furthermore, functional Magnetic Resonance Imagery (fMRI) has enabled the 
identification of spatially separable cognitive processes, allowing researchers to make 
inferences about the neural mechanisms underlying different aspects of self-generated 
thought. 
2.2.1. ERPs and EEG 
 ERPs have proven to be a particularly valuable tool for evaluating the level of 
perceptual engagement. Before the implementation of more complex attentional 
abilities, sensory information is processed relatively fast, within 150 to 200 milliseconds, 
and described by components known as the P1 and N1. While N1 has been found to 
be sensitive to auditory stimuli type and presentation predictability, P1 may reflect the 
“cost of attention” (Luck, Heinze, Mangun, & Hillyard, 1990). Elsewhere, P1 and N1 
have been used to indicate respectively, the attentional filtering and categorisation of 
perceptual information before integrating semantic knowledge (Klimesch, 2011, 2012), 
and the discrimination process when judgements about the stimuli are needed. 
Interestingly, these components are found to be attenuated following reports of task-
unrelated-thought (Kam et al., 2010). Therefore, the reduction of their amplitude is 
suggestive of a reduction of brain-evoked response to sensory input, and a shift to the 
processing of self-generated thoughts (Baird, Smallwood, Lutz, & Schooler, 2014). 
Together, the examination of early components has shown that during certain mental 
states, the processing of perceptual descriptions of events in the external environment 
is reduced.   
 The study of a later component, the P3 (occurrence between 250 and 500 
milliseconds post-stimulus), is assumed to reflect the engagement of attentional 
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processes. Studies have shown that this is linked to a reduction in amplitude during 
mind-wandering compared to being task focused (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 
2011; Kam et al., 2010, 2012; Kam & Handy, 2013; Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, & 
Handy, 2007). Given the well-documented role of the P3 in attentional processes, these 
data suggest that periods of off-task thought are associated with changes in attentional 
distribution. However, studies have shown that this process reflects a switch away from 
the task, rather than a failure to inhibit task-irrelevant information. Barron et al. (2011) 
used a 3-stimulus oddball paradigm to understand whether off task thought was linked 
to lower processing of task events, regardless of their relevance to the task, or whether 
the attenuation was specific to task-relevant information. The 3-stimulus oddball task 
typically comprises the presentation of task-relevant infrequent targets (requiring a 
response) in a train of frequent stimuli that generates an ERP component called the 
P3b, while additional rare task-irrelevant stimuli are presented, which generates a 
component known as the P3a. Barron and colleagues demonstrated a reduction of both 
the P3a and P3b, linked to off-task reports suggesting that the processing of all stimuli 
in the environment is reduced, rather than just those that are important to the task. 
 Further evidence in favour of the decoupling hypothesis has been provided by 
analysis of the EEG signal. In these studies, EEG signals are captured in a 5 to 10 
seconds epoch before self-reports of particular types of experience, and during a similar 
epoch afterwards. In this approach, the pre-period is considered representative of the 
neural processes relevant to the particular state, while the post-period is thought to 
represent the reengagement of task focus since attention has been redirected toward 
the task. Using this paradigm, Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) demonstrated an 
increased activity of lower frequencies such as theta (4-7 Hz) and delta (2-3.5 Hz), and 
a decrease of higher frequencies, namely alpha (9-11 Hz) and beta (15-30 Hz), during 
mind-wandering as compared to breath focus (mindful condition). Delta power has been 
associated with poor cognitive ability (Harmony, 2013), and also linked to a lower state 
37 
 
of vigilance (Roth, 1961). Thus, the authors suggest that their findings highlight a 
reduction of alertness to the task during mind-wandering experience. In a similar vein, 
Baird et al. (2014) observed significantly more pronounced reductions in spectral power 
during mind-wandering, compared with task focus over frontal scalp regions in the alpha 
and beta band. Enhanced alpha activity is mostly found during wakeful relaxation and 
reflects inhibition of task-irrelevant cortical areas (Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 
2007). In contrast, beta band activity is related to active concentration and maintenance 
of current cognitive states (Engel & Fries, 2010), together enabling the efficient 
treatment of external input. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the functional 
significance of the frequency bands is still unclear, as it is sometimes difficult to 
associate cognitive functions in a unique and direct way with frequency bands. Thus, a 
given frequency band is unlikely to underly a single cognitive function in the brain (For 
an overview of the frequency bands functional significance see Britton et al., 2016). 
 The appeal of electrophysiological studies is that EEG and ERPs can also 
capitalise on both time and frequency. Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) used Mismatch 
Negativity (MMN) as a marker of brain response to the sensory detection of a sudden 
auditory change (Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007). The amplitude of MMN 
is thought to represent the focus of one’s attention (Sabri, Liebenthal, Waldron, Medler, 
& Binder, 2006). Thus, findings of lower amplitude of the MMN during periods of off-
task thought reflect a disengagement of attention from external stimuli being processed. 
Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) also outlined an additional layer of analyses by 
considering the impact of meta-cognitive processes. The moment where participants 
consciously realise their mind has been wandering is central, as it allows the redirection 
of attention toward the task. Findings revealed that this process of refocusing was 
related to an increase of the alpha peak frequency and a long-lasting increase in alpha 
power. Considering that peaks of alpha frequency are thought to represent a state of 
“cognitive preparedness” (Angelakis, Lubar, Stathopoulou, & Kounios, 2004), and that 
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alpha power has been linked to working memory (Jensen, Gelfand, Kounios, & Lisman, 
2002), the authors suggest that together the peak of alpha and its general increase in 
power may be markers of attention, being transferred from self-generated information 
to information relevant to the external task. Together, these EEG and ERP findings 
generate strong evidence for the decoupling hypothesis and provide information 
regarding the contribution of meta-awareness during mind-wandering episodes. 
 Using ERPs and EEG alongside behavioural and self-report measures has 
unravelled evidence in support of the perceptual decoupling hypothesis. Off-task 
thought is linked to reductions in the cortical processing of the environment at a very 
early stage, and both task-relevant and unrelated sensory information is processed in 
less detail. Additionally, the processing of an external input is less stable, and this is 
accompanied by a decrease in the neural efficiency of task-related actions. Collectively, 
this suggests that when people are off-task their cortex is responding less to 
environmental input. The combination of self-reports with electrophysiological 
measures is therefore highly valuable in disentangling internal from external processes. 
In addition, when used alongside fMRI described below, such methods can contribute 
significantly to understanding the heterogeneous nature of thought content.  
2.2.2. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging  
 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a critical tool for the 
identification of brain areas and neuro-cognitive networks implicated in various 
cognitive processes, including self-generated thoughts. A large proportion of previous 
fMRI research has focussed on the DMN (see Chapter 1; for review see Raichle, 2015). 
Studies have shown that the DMN can be more active during off-task thought. Using 
experience sampling, Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, and Schooler (2009) 
demonstrated activation of the DMN along with executive network regions during mind-
wandering. This basic observation has been replicated by two independent research 
groups (Allen et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011). In 
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general, the executive and default networks are thought to act in opposition to each 
other, so that when the executive network becomes activated, the default network is 
deactivated or actively suppressed (Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006). 
However, there are psychological phenomena where one might predict co-activation. 
For example, co-activation of those networks is similar to neural recruitment observed 
during creative thinking (Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Beaty et al., 2018; 
Kounios et al., 2008, 2006), autobiographical planning (Spreng et al., 2010), during 
naturalistic film viewing (Golland et al., 2007), immersive simulative mental experiences 
(Mar & Oatley, 2008), and periods when information from memory can guide decision 
making (Konishi et al., 2015; Murphy et al., 2017). What is common about these 
examples is the requirement that goal relevant cognition must rely on information from 
memory.  
 A straightforward approach to the neural processes of mind-wandering is the 
comparison of the brain activity of self-generated experiences that are produced 
spontaneously, and as part of a task. A recent example is the use of multivariate pattern 
analysis (MVPA) by Tusche, Smallwood, Bernhardt, and Singer (2014) to identify 
similarities between spontaneous and task-related examples of positive and negative 
thoughts. In their research, the authors compared brain activity associated with specific 
emotional content, which was either self-generated or externally-generated by a task. 
They found similar patterns of activation (i.e. medial orbitofrontal cortex; mOFC) for both 
the task-generated and task-free affective experiences, which suggests commonalities 
in the nature of thoughts regardless of the way they have been initiated. Ultimately, the 
use of MVPA enables researchers to draw parallels between task-induced and naturally 
occurring affective experiences, and to test important features of contemporary 
accounts of how patterns of self-generated thought emerge.   
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2.2.3. Functional and Structural Connectivity 
 The high spatial definition of fMRI also allows the relationship between the 
organisation of neural function and patterns of self-generated thought to be 
investigated. These approaches depend on connectivity analyses that estimate the 
connections between different brain regions, which can be derived from both the 
functional (i.e. the BOLD signal) and the structural domain (i.e. white matter 
connections, for a comprehensive review see Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). Emerging 
studies are beginning to pinpoint the neural architecture underlying mind-wandering 
episodes. Karapanagiotidis et al. (2017) assessed whether individual variability in the 
content of their thoughts related to markers of structural connectivity. Structural 
connectivity using DTI identified a temporo-limbic white matter region, highly connected 
to the right hippocampus in people who spontaneously engaged in more mental time 
travel. Functional connectivity analyses revealed a temporal correlation of the right 
hippocampus with the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, a core region of the DMN, which 
was modulated by inter-individual variation in mental time travel. Therefore, 
spontaneous thoughts experienced during mind-wandering, especially those linked to 
mental time travelling, seems to be particularly associated with the hippocampus and 
its integration with the DMN. This assumption has been highlighted by evidence that 
individuals with hippocampal amnesia are less likely to experience off-task episodes 
with rich experiential content (McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2018).  
 Similarly, Smallwood et al. (2016) explored whether individual differences in the 
functional architecture of the cortex predicted the nature of spontaneous thoughts. 
Results illustrated that the functional connectivity of the temporal poles with the 
posterior cingulate cortex was predictive of both greater mental time travel involving 
social agents and unpleasant task-unrelated-thoughts. Heightened connectivity from 
the hippocampus to the posterior cingulate cortex predicted greater specificity to 
thought, thus giving further insight into the key role that the hippocampus seems to be 
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playing when related to specific nodes of the DMN. Additionally, findings support the 
hypothetical role of DMN subsystems in contributing to different qualities of 
spontaneous thought. Furthermore, this study highlights that, to generate spontaneous 
thoughts, the posterior regions of the DMN are crucial elements integrating information 
from both the medial and anterior aspects of the temporal lobe. Another study using 
functional connectivity evidenced the integrity of the hippocampus to the DMN by 
investigating the underlying neural processes of goal concreteness during mind-
wandering experience (Medea et al., 2016). These authors first demonstrated that our 
capacity to develop more concrete descriptions of both goals and aspects of our 
knowledge is supported by brain networks centred on the hippocampus. A greater 
coupling between the hippocampus and more dorsal medial frontal regions, including 
the pre-supplementary motor area, was a specific predictor of the generation of more 
concrete goals. The authors speculate that connectivity between each region supports 
a process in which goal states are evaluated, refined, and encoded for further 
evaluation. Thus, adding further upon the role of the hippocampus in the integration of 
DMN nodes. Finally, Golchert et al. (2017) looked at another potential aspect of mind-
wandering experiences, namely intentionality. Analysis demonstrated that the 
intentionality of the mind-wandering state depends on integration between the 
executive and default networks, with more intentionality being associated with greater 
integration between these systems. Thus, suggesting that the linkage between the 
executive and default networks is important, and allows one to deliberately guide a self-
generated train of thought, in line with specific goals. The combined use of functional 
and structural connectivity highlights further the heterogeneity of mind-wandering 
experiences, as specific characteristics are consistently associated with variations in 
neural recruitments.   
 Altogether, connectivity measures based on MRI enabled the discovery of 
important key brain network properties. Notably, the hippocampus has been related to 
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the DMN, evidencing the importance of this area. Nevertheless, each study has 
revealed a link to different areas of the DMN (i.e. ACC, PCC, dmPFC), most certainly 
reflecting the diversity of mind-wandering experiences. This clearly illustrates how the 
high variability of mind-wandering experiences relates to disparate neural recruitment. 
A more recent study demonstrated that states of mind-wandering elicited positive 
functional connectivity between regions of both the executive and default networks 
(Mooneyham et al., 2016). Here the use of dynamic functional connectivity enabled the 
identification of different states of functional connectivity across known networks. This 
measure is based on the principle that functional connectivity relationships between 
brain regions and networks are dynamically influenced by time, and reflects changes in 
cognitive states (Calhoun, Miller, Pearlson, & Adalı, 2014; Hutchison et al., 2013). As 
such, it is not only the links binding different brain areas that are interesting, but also 
how this binding changes over time. Thus, beyond the co-activation of the executive 
and default networks, dynamic functional connectivity measures suggest that these 
networks are synchronised in their activity during mind-wandering experiences. This 
highlights how they may work in a complimentary way during periods of off-task thought, 
mirroring patterns of evidence from other examples of memory-driven thought. 
 Finally, neuroimaging methods hold promise for understanding the dynamics of 
experience. One important metric is phase locking of neural processes. Brabroszcz and 
Delorme (2011) identified impaired phase-locking of theta frequency when participants 
were thinking about something unrelated to the task being performed when compared 
to periods of task-focus. Interestingly, mental training in focused attention (meditation) 
tends to increase theta band phase-locking (Slagter, Lutz, Greischar, Nieuwenhuis, & 
Davidson, 2009), and also reduces the occurrence of mind-wandering episodes 
(Mrazek et al., 2012). As such, this EEG based connectivity measure gives further 
indications toward a decreased alertness of participants when engaged in mind-
wandering experiences.  
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On the other hand, coherence measures have been widely used to investigate 
connectivity within the DMN. Coherence is a measure of “coupling” and of the functional 
association between two brain regions (Thatcher, 2010). EEG phase differences are 
used to measure the directional flow of information between two EEG electrodes sites. 
Using mean phase coherence, Berkovich-Ohana, Glicksohn, and Goldstein (2014) 
exerted that DMN deactivation during a task, compared to resting states, was illustrated 
by a lower gamma and increased alpha mean phase coherence. The authors suggest 
that this reflects a control/executive system coupling transition. A lower gamma band 
would reflect the decoupling of the control/executive system with the DMN, whereas the 
increase in the alpha band could reflect the coupling of this system with task-activated 
network. Therefore, this illustrates the dynamic changes in coupling/decoupling of the 
default and executive networks in relation to mind-wandering. Additionally, a recent 
study investigated the neuronal differences between thoughts triggered either internally 
or externally by using correlation coefficient measure, which is similar to coherence 
measures (Godwin, Morsella, & Geisler, 2016). Findings revealed increased functional 
connectivity over parietal areas within the alpha band for internal compared to external 
thoughts. According to the authors, this could reflect neural mechanism enabling the 
suppression of attention directed toward the external environment to favour internally-
directed processes. As such, connectivity measures seem to confirm the decoupling 
process account previously outlined.  
 In conclusion, the use of neuroimaging tools and converging methods has 
proven to be informative in the study of mind-wandering. Supporting the perceptual 
decoupling hypothesis, ERP methodologies revealed that, when mind-wandering, ones’ 
perceptual processing is attenuated. The use of EEG acknowledged that mind-
wandering is associated with less alertness and cognitive processing, and requires 
more neural processing to reach task demand and re-couple attention to the task. fMRI 
studies have provided evidence that activity in both the default and executive networks 
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are necessary to generate mind-wandering experiences, which was further highlighted 
by connectivity measures. An increasing number of researchers argue strongly for 
converging methods, including recent developments in the neurosciences and 
traditional behavioural techniques to clarify the variation in the neural recruitment 
underlying the occurrence of multiple mind-wandering experiences. Particularly, this 
thesis will use this approach to converge toward an understanding of the mind-
wandering experience in ageing. This will be carried out both within studies and across 
this project. The joint use of self-report and brain activity (EEG) or brain connectivity 
(fMRI) measures will help refine the theory of mind-wandering in ageing. The EEG work 
will target the effect of age-related change in brain activity on self-generated thoughts. 
This will be extended to brain connectivity as measured by fMRI. Additionally, thought 
heterogeneity in ageing will be explored with the triangulation of different 
methodological context (i.e. culture, meta-awareness, meditation) to further endorse 
existing theories. Individually each methodological approach will inform the initial 
question of thought content in ageing. Nevertheless, the combination of the three will 
also bring substantial knowledge about the versatile nature of mind-wandering 
experiences. Ultimately, focusing on the ageing population will be beneficial to both the 
understanding of mind-wandering experiences and the neurocognitive profile of older 
adults more generally.  
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Chapter 3. Understanding mind-wandering experiences 
in young and older individuals using electrophysiology.  
 Previous chapters have outlined the heterogeneity of mind-wandering 
experiences, the influence of age, and the critical need for converging methods. 
Although age-related decreases in off-task thought are now well documented, a clear 
neuro-cognitive account of what underlies this change in self-generated thought is 
lacking. This Chapter will aim to (i) describe the link between age-related changes in 
brain electrophysiology and age-related changes in self-generated thought, as well as 
(ii) define neural patterns underlying specific self-generated thoughts. Multi-dimensional 
experience sampling was used to measure thought heterogeneity, in combination with 
online and resting state measures of electrophysiology in young and older adults. 
Results showed that in young adults, beta power over centro-parietal right area enabled 
the flexible adjustment of mental time travelling to match task demands, a pattern not 
found in older adults. Furthermore, general increases in alpha and beta power were 
indicative of the involvement of the default mode network in off-task thoughts. Delta 
power was found essential to mental time travelling experiences by lowering 
concentration and supporting memory processes. Interestingly, hemispheric 
differentiation in gamma power was representative of thought modality, with the left 
hemisphere supporting verbal rehearsing during a demanding task.  
3.1. Introduction  
 Numerous research studies have outlined an age-related reduction in off-task 
thoughts (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; McVay et al., 
2013); yet consideration of older adults’ neurocognitive profile is lacking. Cognitively 
older adults are known to present deficits in features essential to the generation and 
control of mind-wandering experiences, namely episodic memory and attentional 
control (Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008; 
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Schmitter-Edgecombe, Vesneski, & Jones, 2000; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Such 
behavioural changes have been linked to the age-related reorganisation of brain activity 
and connectivity (e.g. Fjell & Walhovd, 2010). Accordingly, neurocognitive changes in 
ageing should also impact mind-wandering experiences regarding content and 
frequency. Therefore, this study aimed to document thought content in ageing, and 
identify the role that age-related changes in brain activity play in self-generated 
thoughts. Additionally, by combining the temporal precision of the 
electroencephalogram to online measures of self-generated thoughts, neural patterns 
underlying different thoughts will be identified.  
 Mind-wandering experiences are eclectic and largely portray future and 
personally-relevant thoughts (Baird et al., 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Smallwood, 
Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011) with a tendency toward verbal, intrusive, or 
detailed features (Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 
2016). In the case of older adults, evidence suggests an increase of task-related 
interferences (i.e. thoughts about ones performance or strategy; Frank et al., 2015; 
McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et al., 2014) and a-temporal thoughts (i.e. imaginary 
thoughts that do not belong to either the past or the future; Jackson et al., 2013; Rendell 
et al., 2012). Outside of the mind-wandering literature, older adults present difficulties 
at imagining future experiences, with fewer occurrences (Berntsen et al., 2015), as well 
as fewer details (Rendell et al., 2012). Some evidence suggests that involuntary past-
related thoughts remain stable across life (Berntsen et al., 2015), however laboratory-
based studies have demonstrated difficulties for older adults at retrieving detailed 
autobiographic memories (Schacter, Gaesser, & Addis, 2013). Overall, this profile is 
suggestive of changes in, not only the frequency but also, the nature of mind-wandering 
experiences. Further support for this claim is the age-related decline of neural networks 
underlying mind-wandering experiences (e.g. prefrontal cortex, parietal regions and 
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medial and lateral temporal; Andrews‐Hanna et al., 2014; Biswal et al., 2010; 
Damoiseaux, 2017; Damoiseaux et al., 2008).   
 Recent advances in the neuroscience literature have been influential in 
documenting age-related changes in brain activity and connectivity. Particularly, fMRI 
work has identified vulnerabilities in the frontal lobes (Rabbitt, 2005; Robbins et al., 
1998; see also details of the frontal ageing hypothesis West, 2000; Greenwood, 2000; 
West, 1996), as well as reduced activity and connectivity in the DMN (Biswal et al., 
2010; Damoiseaux, 2017; Damoiseaux et al., 2008), which is largely active during mind-
wandering experiences (Fox, Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; 
Mason et al., 2007). Particularly relevant to the present chapter is evidence suggesting 
resting state measures of brain activity influence EEG age-related decreases in activity 
in lower frequency bands (i.e. delta and theta), and increased activity in higher 
frequency bands, specifically the beta band (Cummins & Finnigan, 2007; Duffy et al., 
1984, 1993). Enhanced recruitment of higher frequency bands is also found when 
online measures are used with increased alpha and beta activity evident during the 
completion of demanding attentional tasks (Deiber et al., 2015). Therefore, older adults’ 
brain activity tends to shift toward frequency bands related to higher order processing 
to support performance.  
 Importantly, older adults’ changes in spectral power are tapping into frequency 
bands related to off-task thoughts (i.e. theta and beta band). An influential study 
(Braboszcz & Delorme, 2011) assessed the neuro-correlates of mind-wandering during 
a breathing focus task where participants pressed a button when noticing a mind drift. 
Analyses of a 10 second epoch before a button press evidenced increased theta power 
and decreased occipital alpha and fronto-lateral beta power during mind-wandering 
compared to breath focus. The contribution of the alpha and beta band was later 
confirmed (Baird et al., 2014), suggesting a reduction of alertness to the task during 
mind-wandering experiences. Indeed, higher alpha and beta power are mostly 
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associated with inhibition of task-irrelevant cortical areas (Klimesch et al., 2007) and 
maintenance of current cognitive states (Engel & Fries, 2010) respectively; together 
enabling the efficient treatment of external input. Overall, evidence to date suggests 
older adults’ changes in brain activity (i.e. theta and beta band) may underlie age-
related changes in mind-wandering experiences.  
 The present study will document further the neural characteristics underlying 
different self-generated thoughts, an approach that is yet to be taken with EEG. Recent 
fMRI research has demonstrated links between variability in thought content and 
patterns of brain activity and connectivity (Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016; 
H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018). For example, experiences characterised by high 
‘personal importance’ were associated with reduced functional connectivity within the 
attention and control systems (H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018). However, such 
investigations are still lacking input from the temporal precision of EEG. Mind-
wandering experiences can be considered as a simplistic dichotomy between on- and 
off-task. Off-task thoughts have shown to increase theta power and decrease alpha and 
beta power (Baird et al., 2014; Braboszcz & Delorme, 2011). Nevertheless, studies 
combining EEG and fMRI report positive correlations between increased alpha and beta 
power at rest and activity in the default and self-referential networks (Mantini, Perrucci, 
Gratta, Romani, & Corbetta, 2007). Bearing in mind the undeniable contribution of the 
DMN in self-generated thoughts (Fox et al., 2015; Mason et al., 2007), increases of 
alpha and beta band activity should be expected during off-task thoughts. Therefore, 
alpha and beta band are clearly involved in off-task thoughts. Yet, the direction of this 
effect may vary depending on the methodology used (e.g. online versus resting states 
measures, or simplistic off-task versus more complex off-task thoughts). Moving 
towards more specific types of self-generated thoughts, the research is very limited. 
However, an early study measuring thoughts and spectral power during rest, has 
reported links between visual imagery (without goal orientation or emotional load) and 
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frequencies between 4-7 Hz (theta band), 10-13 Hz (upper alpha band), and 18-23 Hz 
(beta band; Lehmann, Grass, & Meier, 1995). Other findings suggest links between 
future-oriented thoughts and both the alpha (7-9 Hz; Lehmann et al., 1995) and the 
gamma band (i.e. reduced activity; Lavallee & Persinger, 2010). Further, voluntarily re-
experiencing an event was linked to more theta power and less delta power (Lavallee 
& Persinger, 2010).   
 Overall, the objectives of the present study are to, (i) link general age-related 
changes in brain activity to changes in thought content in ageing, and to (ii) define the 
neural patterns underlying different self-generated thoughts. Multi-dimensional 
experience sampling will be used to measure thought heterogeneity, and combined with 
online and resting state measures of electrophysiology in young and older adults. 
Principal component analyses will be conducted to identify core patterns variance in 
self-reported data. Replication of previous work reporting on-task thoughts, mental time 
travelling and the modality of the thoughts is hypothesised (Karapanagiotidis et al., 
2017; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood et al., 2016). A decrease in off-task thoughts is 
predicted for older adults (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; 
McVay et al., 2013). However, no clear hypotheses can be formed regarding the impact 
of age on the temporality or modality of the thoughts. Older adults are expected to 
display reduced power in lower frequency bands and increased power in higher 
frequency bands at rest (Cummins & Finnigan, 2007; Duffy et al., 1984). Such patterns 
of change, particularly in the theta and beta band, are hypothesised to underly age-
related changes in self-generated thoughts (Baird et al., 2014; Braboszcz & Delorme, 
2011; Mantini et al., 2007). Lastly, using linear mixed modelling, it is expected that 
participants’ focus will be predicted by alpha and beta band activity, either showing 
increased (Mantini et al., 2007) or decreased activity (Baird et al., 2014; Braboszcz & 
Delorme, 2011; Mantini et al., 2007). As for mental time travelling and thought modality, 
53 
 
the lack of research prevents the description of clear hypotheses; this part of the 
analyses will be exploratory.  
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
 The older adult group consisted of 18 women and 7 men (M = 70.08 years, 
range = 61–87) recruited using opportunity sampling. The younger adult group 
consisted of 16 women and 9 men (M = 21.68 years, range = 19–29) who were 
undergraduate students in Psychology at Northumbria University. All participants 
received financial compensation for their time and travel. The inclusion criteria were to 
be a fluent English speaker and have normal or corrected vision and hearing. Exclusion 
criteria were the presence or history of a neurological or psychiatric disorder, or current 
use of  antidepressants. Older participants completed the Mini-Mental State 
Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) to ensure absence of 
dementia or mild cognitive impairment (threshold:  score ≥26/30) (see Table 3.1.). 
Participants were seen for a minimum of one hour and thirty minutes to two hours in the 
EEG laboratory. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Health and Life Sciences of Northumbria University. The investigation was conducted 
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and participants 
provided written informed consent. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. Means (Standard Deviations) of participants’ characteristics 
as well as probe count.  
Measures Young (SD) Old (SD) 
N 25 25 
N Probes 387 371 
M age 21.68 (3.47) 70.08 (6.38) 
Woman % 64 72 
NART (errors) 20.36 (5.17) 6.16 (3.27) 
Years of Education 21.68 (3.47) 18.08 (2.64) 
MMSE - 29.16 (0.8) 
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3.2.2. Procedure  
 At the beginning of the session, demographic questions were asked, followed 
by the NART (National Adult Reading Task; Nelson, 1982) and the MMSE (older adults 
only). EEG was recorded during an Eyes Closed/ Eyes Open resting state procedure. 
Both conditions lasted 2 minutes, and the order was randomised. EEG was also 
recorded during a working memory task, where participants performed an N-back task 
previously developed by Konishi, McLaren, Engen and Smallwood (2015). Every 
participant completed a practice run before performing the task. After electrodes were 
removed, participants were given a debriefing sheet.  
3.2.3. N-back working memory task 
 The task was developed using PsychoPy (Pierce, 2007) and featured a 0-Back 
and a 1-Back condition that continuously switched from one another throughout the 
experimental session. In both conditions, participants saw different pairs of shapes 
(non-targets) appearing on the screen divided by a vertical line; the pairs could be: a 
circle and a square, a circle and a triangle, or a square and a triangle, with a total of 6 
possible pairs (two different left/right configurations for each). The pairs never had 
shapes of the same kind (e.g. a square and a square). In both tasks, a block of non-
targets was followed by a target requiring participants to make a manual response. The 
target was a small stimulus presented in the centre of the line, in blue if in the 0-Back 
condition and in red if in the 1-Back condition. In the 0-Back condition, the target was 
flanked by two shapes and participants had to indicate, by pressing the left or right 
arrow key, on which side was the same shape as the target shape. In the 1-Back 
condition, the target was flanked by two question marks and participants had to respond 
depending on which side the target shape was on the prior trial (see Figure 3.1.).  
 Each block lasted between 40 to 120 seconds before switching to the other 
condition; the change of condition was signalled by a message (“SWITCH”) that 
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remained on screen for five seconds. On each trial, the number of non-targets 
preceding the Targets varied between two and six, the number of trials per block varied 
between two and five, and the total number of blocks was eight for each condition. The 
whole task lasted approximately 30 minutes. The total number of targets varied between 
10 and 21 per condition. In order to sample the participants’ ongoing experiences, a 
probe-caught, Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling method was used (MDES; 
Smallwood et al., 2016). The task was built so that there was a 50% chance of a thought 
probe being presented in place of a Target in a condition block. The thought probe 
consisted of an on-screen prompt for the participants to rate their focus level (‘My 
thoughts were focused on the task I was performing.’) on a visual analogue continuous 
scale from 0 (‘Not at all’) to 1 (‘Completely’), responses were given using a computer 
mouse. This prompt was followed by 12 questions regarding characteristics of their 
thoughts immediately prior to the probe (Table 3.2.). Every presentation of non-targets, 
targets, probes, and SWITCH screens were separated by a fixation cross. The fixation 
crosses, non-targets, and targets were respectively presented for 1.5, one, and two 
seconds and a response from participants did not end the target presentation.  
Figure 3.1. Illustration of both 0-Back and 1-Back conditions included in 
the working memory task used. 
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3.2.4. EEG acquisition and processing  
 Within the resting states and the cognitive task, EEG was recorded from 32 
channels using an electrode cap (Biosemi) based on the international 10–20 system 
(Jasper, 1958). The montage included four midline sites (FZ; CZ; PZ; OZ). Based on 
previous work (Riby & Orme, 2013), and to allow for the analysis of both hemisphere 
and region, eight distinct regions were created with the remaining electrodes. These 
were Frontal left (FP1; AF3; F7), Frontal right (FP2; AF4; F8), Fronto-Central left (F3; 
FC1; FC5), Fronto-Central right (F4; FC2; FC6), Centro-Parietal left (C3; CP1; CP5), 
Centro-Parietal right (C4; CP2; CP6), Parieto-Occipital left (P7; P3; PO3; O1), and 
Parieto-Occipital right (P8; P4; PO4; O2). T7 and T8 were not included in the analysis. 
To assess eye blinks, electrodes were placed above and below the right eye to record 
the electrooculogram. All signals were digitized at a rate of 2048 per second, with a 
recording epoch of four to six second epochs extending backwards from experience 
sampling prompts. Although it is not currently possible to determine the precise onset 
Table 3.2. Questions and scales used in Multidimensional Experience Sampling. 
Measures Probe questions Scale (0 → 1) 
Task 
Focus  
My thoughts were focused on the task I 
was performing. 
Not at all → Completely 
Future My thoughts involved future events. Not at all → Completely 
Past My thoughts involved past events. Not at all → Completely 
Self My thoughts involved myself. Not at all → Completely 
Other My thoughts involved other people. Not at all → Completely 
Emotion The content of my thoughts was: Negative → Positive 
Images My thoughts were in the form of images. Not at all → Completely 
Words My thoughts were in the form of words. Not at all → Completely 
Vivid My thoughts were vivid as if I was there Not at all → Completely 
Detailed My thoughts were detailed and specific. Not at all → Completely 
Habit 
This thought has recurrent themes 
similar to those I have had before. 
Not at all → Completely 
Evolving 
My thoughts tended to evolve in a series 
of steps 
Not at all → Completely 
Deliberate My thoughts were: Spontaneous → Deliberate 
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of spontaneous attentional shifts to unrelated thoughts (Smallwood, 2013), five to ten 
second time windows have been used in previous studies (Baird et al., 2014; Braboszcz 
& Delorme, 2011; Christoff et al., 2009; Qin, Xu, & Yao, 2010). Manual eye-blink 
correction, removal or replacement of bad electrodes and artefact rejection were 
conducted offline using NeuroScan Edit 4.3. Due to too many artefacts in the cognitive 
task, 24 epochs out of the 758 recorded (Young = 387, Old = 371), had to be removed 
from the analyses (Young = 3, Old = 21), which included all data from one participant 
in the older adult group (14 epochs). Data from this participant was also removed from 
the resting states analyses due to too many artefacts. Frequency bands extracted were 
Delta (0-4 Hz), Theta (5-7 Hz), Alpha (8-12 Hz), Beta (13-29 Hz) and Gamma (30-50 
Hz). 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling  
 To analyse the MDES, the set of questions was decomposed using principal 
component analysis (PCA), applying varimax rotation (for prior examples of this 
approach see Konishi et al., 2017; Poerio et al., 2017; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 
2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013). This allowed the core patterns of 
variance within the self-reported data to be characterised in a smaller set of underlying 
dimensions. Three factor solutions were selected with eigenvalues >1, and the loadings 
that describe these dimensions are presented in the form of a heat map in Figure 3.2: 
Component One - Deliberate On-Task – described deliberate and detailed thoughts 
about the task in the hand with high positive valance and accounted for 28.13% of the 
variance. Component Two - Mental Time Travelling (MTT) – described episodic 
thoughts (past and future) with high loadings on the self and other, and accounted for 
18.23% of the variance. Component Three - Thought Modality (Images or words) – 
described thoughts that varied in their modality between representations in images or 
those with verbal features and accounted for 8.99% of the overall variance. These 
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patterns of ongoing thought revealed by the current decomposition are consistent with 
prior studies. For example, prior PCA decompositions have emphasised the distinction 
between task focus and episodic mental time travel (i.e. Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017;  
Smallwood et al., 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In order to identify how these patterns of thoughts varied across the two task 
conditions and age groups, 2 (Age; Young, Old) by 2 (Task; 0-Back, 1-Back) repeated 
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Words    
Images    
Figure 3.2. Determining patterns of self-generated thought and their relationship to 
ongoing task and age group. 
(Left) Heat map illustrating the loading of the different questions on the three factors 
resulting from the principal component analyses (PCA). Varimax rotation was applied 
to the data set. (Right) The effects of Age (Young, Old) on mean regression scores for 
Deliberate On-Task, Mental Time Travelling (MTT) and Thought Modality. Scores for 
each task condition (0-Back, 1 -Back) are presented for completeness. Note. * p <.05; 
Error bars are Standard Errors. 
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measure Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on participants’ mean 
regression scores for each factor. For the Deliberate On-Task component, a main effect 
of age was found, indicating that older adults were more deliberately on-task than young 
adults, F (1, 48) = 5.78, p = .020, ηp
2 = .11. Analyses of Thought Modality revealed a 
main effect of age, with older adults presenting more visual thoughts than younger 
adults, F (1, 48) = 5.50, p = .023, ηp
2 = .10. A main effect of task was marginally 
significant, suggesting that the 0-Back condition tended to foster thoughts in the form 
of images as opposed to words, F (1, 48) = 3.81, p = .057, ηp
2 = .07. Finally, analyses 
on the MTT component showed no significant effects (all ps > .05) (Figure 3.2.). 
3.3.2. Brain activity in ageing and relation to the task  
 The first neural analysis on resting state brain activity (i.e. eyes closed) identified 
frequency bands over scalp areas where spectral power showed age-related changes.  
Multivariate Analyses of Variances (MANOVAs) were conducted on each frequency 
band separately. Due to multiple comparison analyses on the electrophysiological 
measure, alpha levels were Bonferroni corrected to .01. Results evidenced age 
differences on Delta power over Parieto-Occipital scalp areas [Left, F (1, 47) = 8.42, p 
< .01, ηp
2 = .15; Right, F (1, 47) = 12.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20], Theta power [Fronto-
Central Left, F (1, 45) = 10.05, p < .01, ηp
2 = .18; Parieto-Occipital Left, F (1, 45) = 
11.12, p < .01, ηp
2 = .20; Parieto-Occipital Right, F (1, 45) = 12.42, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22], 
and on Beta power over Centro-Parietal scalp areas [Left, F (1, 47) = 9.98, p < .01, ηp
2 
= .18; Right, F (1, 47) = 10.97, p < .01, ηp
2 = .19]. These analyses display decreased 
activity in low frequency bands (delta and theta) and increased activity in higher 
frequency bands (beta) with age (See Figure 3.3.). No other results were significant (all 
ps > .05).  
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Next, correspondences between age-related changes in the patterns of ongoing 
thought and changes in the intrinsic neural function identified in prior analyses were 
Figure 3.3. Significant effects of Age (Young, Old) on spectral power for delta, theta and 
beta bands. 
(Left) Illustration of the effects of Age on spectral power for the relevant brain areas; 
(Right) head maps of Delta, Theta and Beta power for young and older adults. 
Note: FC = Fronto-Central; CP = Centro-Parietal; PO = Parieto-Occipital; Error bars are 
Standard Errors. 
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explored. Before performing these analyses, all data were z-scored separately for old 
and young individuals. This step assured that gross differences in intercepts across 
conditions and age group were minimised, allowing relationships between the variables 
to be visualised more transparently. These data were analysed using a mixed ANOVA. 
The model had two within-participant factors: Task (0-Back, 1-Back), and Component 
(Detailed On-Task, Mental Time Travel, Thought Modality). Age groups (Young, Old) 
was included as between group variable. The spectral power scores for all of the 
significant effects (Delta PO Left and Right, Theta FC left, and PO left and right, and 
Beta CP left and right) were also included as covariates. The main effects of all 
variables (including covariates) were modelled as well as two way, three-way, and four-
way interactions between task, age group, brain activity, and each PCA. Interaction 
terms describing the relationship between each PCA component were not included. 
 This analysis revealed two significant four-way interactions, Task X Age Group 
X Component X Beta Centro-Parietal left, F (2, 64) = 3.29, p = .044, ηp
2 = .09, and Task 
X Age Group X Component X Beta Centro-Parietal right, F (2, 64) = 3.17, p = .049, ηp
2 
= .09. Effects were found for variation in patterns of Mental Time Travelling: Task X Age 
Group X Beta Centro-Parietal left, F (1, 32) = 6.62, p = .015, ηp
2 = .17, and Task X Age 
Group X Beta Centro-Parietal right, F (1, 32) = 8.46, p = .007, ηp
2 = .21. To understand 
this, the relationship between Beta Centro-Parietal activity (left and right) and how 
Mental Time Travelling thought changed across task was plotted separately in each 
age group (Figure 3.4). It can be seen that in younger adults, higher beta power over 
the Centro-parietal right scalp area is linked to more mental time travelling in the 0-Back 
task and less in the 1-Back, F (1, 17) = 4.66, p = .046, ηp
2 = .22, this was not found for 
the left hemisphere, F (1, 17) = 2.84, p = .110, ηp
2 = .14. No such patterns were found 
for older adults [left, F (1, 15) = 3.65, p = .075, ηp
2 = .20; right, F (1, 15) = 4.11, p = .061, 
ηp
2 = .22]. 
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3.3.3. Neuronal characteristics underlying self-generated thought  
 The second aim of the current study was to identify the neural features 
underlying the occurrence of each of the three components outlined previously. Linear 
mixed modelling was used to account for the hierarchical structure of the data. Firstly, 
all variables, dependant and independent, were grand mean centred to gain clarity in 
the interpretation of the findings. All linear mixed models included one random effect 
(the intercept for each Subject) to control for the dependency arising due to repeated 
Figure 3.4. Effect of interaction between Beta power in the Centro-Parietal left and 
right areas of the scalp and the difference of Mental Time Travelling thoughts 
occurrence between the two conditions (0-Back - 1-Back). 
(left) localisation of the age-related difference in beta power. (right) illustration of the 
relationship between beta power over the centro-parietal areas and the variation in 
Mental Time Travelling states across tasks in the Younger and the Older participants. 
Note. * p <.05 
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sampling of data within subjects. An exploratory approach was taken in this analysis as 
only limited research has used spectral power to investigate the neural signature of 
different types of self-generated thoughts. The procedure was identical for each of the 
three components under investigation; Deliberate On-Task, Mental Time Travelling, 
and Modality of thoughts. 
 The MIXED procedure in SPSS 24.0 (Peugh & Enders, 2005) with Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation was used. First, three null models were run on the dependent 
variables. In these null models, the intercept was allowed to vary randomly across 
participants. Next, the same set of predictor variables were added to each model. The 
predictor variables consisted of participants’ age (as a continuous variable), task 
difficulty, and spectral power, corresponding to each of the probes from every frequency 
band and scalp area. The strategy applied across the analyses was to first remove 
predictor variables that presented a p-value higher than .20. After running these new 
models, the second step was to remove every predictor variable with a p-value above 
.10. Finally, the last step was to remove predictor variables that were not significant (p-
value above .05), until achieving a model where each predictor variable significantly 
contributed to the model (see Table 3.3. for details of each model computed).  
 As recommended by Burnham and Anderson (2004), both the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) were 
used to guide model selection. Differences between the previous best model were 
calculated on both indicators. The models emerging as best fit for Deliberate On-Task, 
Mental Time Travelling, and Modality of thought were composed of four, three, and five 
predictors respectively. After the selection of these models, each parameter estimate 
was bootstrapped for further inspection by drawing 1991 stratified resamples. To 
bootstrap the confidence interval, a Bias-Corrected Accelerated method was applied. 
This is a non-parametric procedure - unlike the reported p-values, it does not require a 
normality assumption (Davison & Hinkley, 1997). 
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 Overall, results suggested that Deliberate On-Task thoughts are positively 
related to age and task difficulty, while negatively related to alpha power over Parieto-
Occipital left and Beta power over Fronto-Central left areas. Mental Time Travelling was 
negatively related to Delta power over Frontal left areas, and Gamma power over 
Parieto-Occipital left areas, but positively related to Delta power over Centro-Parietal 
right areas. The Modality of thought was negatively related to Beta power over Frontal 
left areas and Gamma Centro-Parietal right, while positively related to task difficulty and 
Gamma power over Frontal and Centro-Parietal left areas. Table 3.4. provides an 
overview of the estimates of the final models selected after bootstrapping.  
 
Table 3.3. Summary of linear mixed models computed and their BIC and AIC 
indicators with maximum likelihood estimation. 
Model No.  BIC Diff. AIC Diff. 
Deliberate On-Task 
Null  1662.094  1648.202  
OnT1 42 1788.108 -126.014 1581.545 66.657 ** 
OnT2 11 1620.968 41.466 ** 1556.608 24.937 ** 
OnT3 7 1603.628 17.34 1557.643 -1.035 
OnT4 4 1598.962 4.666 1566.762 -9.119 
Mental Time Travelling 
Null  1391.941  1378.049  
MTT1 42 1561.301 -169.360 1354.738 23.311 
MTT2 10 1372.987 18.954 * 1313.277 41.461 ** 
MTT3 6 1355.958 17.029 ** 1314.596 -1.319 
MTT4 3 1345.198 10.76 * 1317.607 -3.011 
Thought Modality 
Null  1706.346  1692.454  
TM1 42 1834.297 -127.951 1627.733 64.721 * 
TM2 10 1656.111 50.235 ** 1596.366 31.367 ** 
TM3 8 1649.157 6.954 1598.589 -2.223 
TM4 5 1637.957 11.200 * 1601.180 -2.591 
Note: Diff. = corresponds to the difference between the indicators from the previous 
lowest model and the new model; No. = number of estimated parameters for model; 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; * p < .05, 
** p < .01. 
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3.4. Discussion  
 A myriad of research has documented the behavioural consequences of age-
related changes in brain functionality (Fjell & Walhovd, 2010). Additionally, not all self-
generated thoughts are equal, both at a behavioural and neural level (Baird et al., 2011; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; Medea et al., 2016; Smallwood 
et al., 2016, 2011; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018; H.-
T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). The present study aimed to (i) understand how age-
related differences in self-generated thoughts could be linked to age-related changes 
in brain activity, as well as to (ii) describe spectral power underlying different self-
generated thoughts. Multi-dimensional experience sampling findings confirmed older 
adults’ tendency to be more deliberately on-task than young adults (Giambra, 1989; 
Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; McVay et al., 2013) and revealed a 
tendency to think more in images than words. Analyses of resting state spectral power 
Table 3.4. Estimates of final models, after bootstrapping. 
Model Parameters Estimates (SE) 
OnT4 Intercept -.2437 (.0713) *** 
 Age .0106 (.0451) *** 
 Task Difficulty .1683 (.0022) *** 
 Alpha – Parieto-Occipital left -.0206 (.0098) * 
 Beta – Fronto-Central left -.1930 (.0775) * 
   
MTT4 Intercept .0218 (.0187) 
 Delta – Frontal left -.0082 (.0024) *** 
 Delta – Centro-Parietal right .0110 (.0049) * 
 Gamma – Parieto-Occipital left -.3866 (.1248) ** 
   
TM4 Intercept -.1975 (.0735) ** 
 Task Difficulty .1495 (.0462) ** 
 Beta – Frontal left -.3499 (.0986) *** 
 Gamma – Frontal left .2516 (.0770) *** 
 Gamma – Centro-Parietal left .2730 (.1256) * 
 Gamma – Centro-Parietal right -.3943 (.1527) ** 
Note: SE = Standard Error; OnT4 = Final model for Deliberate On-Task 
thought; MTT4 = Final model for Mental Time Travelling thought; TM4 = 
Final model for Thought Modality; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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replicated previous findings of age-related decrease activity in lower frequency bands 
(i.e. theta and delta) and increased activity in higher ones (i.e. beta; Cummins & 
Finnigan, 2007; Duffy et al., 1984, 1993). Importantly, evidence suggests that age-
related change in Centro-Parietal beta power was linked to mental time travelling. 
Ultimately, distinct patterns of brain activity have been identified for each of the three 
types of thoughts evidenced at a behavioural level.   
 Age-related changes in brain activity have repeatedly been found to mediate 
cognitive deficits in older adults, such as executive functions or episodic memory (Fjell 
& Walhovd, 2010). Accordingly, variations in neural features are suspected to underlie 
age-related changes in self-generated thoughts. Results have highlighted that for young 
adults, beta power over Centro-Parietal right scalp area was linked to more mental time 
travelling in the easier condition (0-Back) and less in the harder condition (1-Back). This 
association was not present in older individuals. In previous research, beta band activity 
was thought to represent motor control, where higher beta power enables the 
maintenance of a steady-state contraction, while reduction of such activity was 
observed during voluntary movement (Baker, 2007; Klostermann et al., 2007). More 
recently, beta band activity was found to enable the maintenance of cognitive states 
(for a review see Engel & Fries, 2010). That is, beta band activity decreases when the 
current setting is disrupted by a novel, unexpected event. Also, increases in activity are 
thought to reflect the prioritisation of the status quo over new signals (Engel & Fries, 
2010; Siegel, Warden, & Miller, 2009). Elsewhere, increases of beta band activity have 
been related to more endogenous top-down activities, while decreases of beta power 
accompanied by increases of gamma power are found during exogenous bottom-up 
activities (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001; Pfurtscheller, Stancák, & Neuper, 1996). 
Nonetheless, overactivation of the beta band induces difficulties in attentional control 
and cognitive flexibility, as found in Parkinson’s patients (Engel & Fries, 2010; Engel, 
Moll, Fried, & Ojemann, 2005). Considering the present findings, the literature suggests 
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that young adults presenting high beta band activity are prioritising endogenous top-
down activities, such as mental time travelling, when task difficulty allows it. On the 
other hand, in the context of a demanding task, they seem able to flexibly adjust their 
cognitive state. This pattern was not evident in older adults. A possibility is that older 
adults’ overall higher beta band activity jeopardises the detachment from the ongoing 
task when task demand permits it. Thus, they remain largely on-task and disregard any 
mental time travelling experiences in both conditions. While being very promising, more 
work is required to clarify the role of age-related changes in beta band activity in mind-
wandering experiences. It is worthwhile noting that the mixed findings and difficulties in 
interpretation are due to general difficulties in attributing function to EEG bands.  
 Subsequent analyses have successfully characterised three distinct types of 
self-generated thoughts, using spectral power data. Deliberate on-task thoughts were 
related to increased age and task difficulty reproducing previous findings (Giambra, 
1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; Konishi et al., 2017; Seli, Risko, 
Smilek, et al., 2016; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009), while spontaneous off-task thoughts 
were associated with increased alpha power over left posterior areas and beta power 
over fronto-central left areas. Previous work demonstrated a positive correlation 
between both alpha and beta power and activity in the default and self-referential 
networks, and a negative correlation with dorsal attention network activity (Mantini et 
al., 2007). Increases of alpha power are merely representative of the inhibition of task-
irrelevant brain areas (Klimesch et al., 2007), while beta power reflects endogenous 
top-down processes (Engel & Fries, 2010). In the present study, the increase of alpha 
power over posterior areas suggests less processing of visual information during off-
task thoughts. Such reduction of task processing may reduce exogenous bottom-up 
processes and give rise to endogenous top-down processes illustrated by an increase 
of beta power. Together, results confirm that spontaneous off-task thoughts are 
supported by activity in the DMN (Fox et al., 2015; Mason et al., 2007), and suggests 
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links with less perceptual information, and the processing of endogenous top-down 
information. Nevertheless, research comparing spectral power between on- and off-
task reported different findings, namely decreases of occipital alpha and fronto-lateral 
beta during off-task thoughts (Baird et al., 2014; Braboszcz & Delorme, 2011). Such 
striking differences may be the result of methodological differences. Firstly, the nature 
of the thoughts under investigation were different. The present study went beyond a 
simple on-task/ off-task dichotomy and instead considered the full complexity of these 
experiences. Secondly, in their study, Braboszcz and Delorme (2011) operationalised 
on-task thoughts as the period following a mind drift. Therefore, one may argue that 
such periods are representative of participants’ re-engagement to the task and require 
an increase in attentional processes (reflected by increases in both alpha and beta 
bands). In addition, the nature of the ongoing tasks was very different (i.e. breathing 
focus versus working memory task), making any comparison difficult. Ultimately, as 
briefly stated above and in Chapter 2, it is difficult to pin down the functional significance 
of a frequency band as it is unlikely that one will support a single cognitive function in 
the brain. Therefore, although this thesis argues strongly for converging methods one 
also needs to be mindful of the drawbacks of the individual techniques. 
 Mental Time Travelling experiences were predicted by an increase of delta 
power over centro-parietal right and a decrease of both delta frontal left and gamma 
parieto-occipital left scalp regions. Previous work on voluntary mental time travelling 
has yielded links between pre-experiencing events and reduced gamma band activity, 
and between re-experiencing an event and decreased delta power (Lavallee & 
Persinger, 2010). While this study focused on the distance of the events (e.g. close 
future versus the distant future), it seems that both frequency bands are playing an 
important role in mental time travelling. The gamma band merely represents higher 
order processing of information (Fries, 2009; Jensen, Kaiser, & Lachaux, 2007). 
Gamma power often increases during the performance of complex tasks. Specifically, 
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spectral power of this nature is evident when an activity requires the coordination and 
binding of information (Fries, 2009). Accordingly, the reported decrease in gamma 
power may reflect a lack of information binding due to disengagement from the task 
with a switch to mental time travelling. Much evidence suggests delta being implicated 
in attentional processes, decision-making, and signal detection (for reviews see 
Güntekin & Başar, 2016; Harmony, 2013; Knyazev, 2012). Furthermore, greater 
cognitive demands generate increases in delta activity (Güntekin & Başar, 2016), 
located over frontal areas during concentration (Harmony, 2013). As such, the observed 
decrease of frontal delta may represent a drop in concentration when participants 
engage in mental time travelling. This is further supported by the inhibiting role of delta 
in reducing interference from other thoughts and processes that may affect task 
performance (Harmony, 2013). Interestingly, increases in delta power were found over 
the centro-parietal right area. The localisation of this increased activity may be 
representative of a different function of delta. Previous research has found a high 
correlation between delta power within the DMN and the parahippocampal gyrus 
(Neuner et al., 2014). Importantly, the parahippocampal gyrus has repeatedly been 
linked to episodic memory (Strien, Cappaert, & Witter, 2009), and little evidence 
suggests that delta power may be associated with memory processes too (Ekstrom & 
Watrous, 2014). Future work should consider source localisation analyses to 
differentiate the role of localised delta power during mental time travelling.  
 Finally, thought modality was predicted by multiple factors. Verbal thoughts 
were predicted by increased difficulty, as well as increased gamma band activity over 
frontal and centro-parietal areas of the left hemisphere. As mentioned above, the 
gamma band is associated with the binding of information (Fries, 2009; Jensen et al., 
2007). Therefore, verbal thoughts may represent strategically applied thoughts where 
verbalisation of the task is used and combined with perceptual information to complete 
a difficult working memory task. Visual thoughts were found to be more dominant in the 
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easier task and were accompanied by increased gamma activity over the centro-
parietal right area. This hemispheric differentiation between verbal and visual thoughts, 
although somewhat of an over-simplification, has previously been reported with verbal 
processing being typically related to the left hemisphere (Vigneau et al., 2006), while 
the right hemisphere is found more active in the processing of spatial or non-verbal 
information (Bryden, 2012; Durnford & Kimura, 1971). Visual thoughts were also linked 
to increased beta power over the frontal left scalp area. As previously stated, beta 
power is linked to the maintenance of a cognitive state and expecting or perceiving new 
signals tends to reduce such activity (Engel & Fries, 2010). Interestingly, visual thoughts 
were predominant in the undemanding task where the anticipation of new signals is less 
needed. Accordingly, beta power during visual thoughts can be interpreted as the stable 
treatment of perceptual information. To some extent, this is in line with earlier work on 
spontaneous thoughts in a task-free context. Lehmann et al. (1995) found that visual 
imagery without any goal orientation (or emotional load) was correlated with the beta 
band activity (18-23 Hz). 
    Having outlined the findings, it is worthwhile considering some limitations that 
may have influenced the results. Firstly, while the use of multi-dimensional experience 
sampling is now considered a very efficient means of measuring thought heterogeneity, 
there are drawbacks. The great number of questions may increase the difficulty of 
introspection, potentially leading to answers that are less representative of ones’ state 
of mind. Also, anecdotal evidence suggested that the older adults found the probing 
method problematic (i.e. answers to the probes were collected via mouse click). 
Secondly, self-generated thoughts were measured in association with spectral power 
from 4 to 6 seconds prior to the probes. A number of researchers have used a similar 
approach based on the assumption that brain activity before a probe is representative 
of the self-reported thoughts’ characteristics (Baird et al., 2014; Braboszcz & Delorme, 
2011; Christoff et al., 2009; Qin et al., 2010; Smallwood, 2013). Although one can be 
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fairly confident when using this assumption, caution must be taken considering the lack 
of evidence supporting (or dismissing) it. Two avenues should be considered in tackling 
this problem. Firstly, efforts should be made to identify the onset of mind-wandering 
experiences. A possibility is to use machine learning to identify signs of mind drift based 
on real-time EEG recording of brain activity. Secondly, comparing spectral power 
between experimentally-generated and self-generated thoughts should disentangle the 
role of different frequency bands during such experiences. This approach has been 
successfully used with fMRI (Tusche et al., 2014).  
 Overall, the present study replicated previous findings, both at a behavioural 
and neural level, while providing a deeper understanding of the repercussions of age 
and brain activity on the occurrence and nature of self-generated thoughts. New insight 
has been revealed regarding older adults’ neurocognitive profile by documenting age-
related changes in mind-wandering experiences. Specifically, it appears that 
substantially high beta power may reduce older adults’ ability to flexibly adjust mental 
time travelling to the demand of a task. Regardless of age, it is worthwhile noting here 
that EEG power is often reported as having an optimal level related to efficient cognitive 
ability. Results showed that general increases in alpha and beta power were indicative 
of the involvement of the default mode network in off-task thoughts. Delta power was 
found essential to mental time travelling experiences, reducing concentration, and 
fostering memory processes. Finally, the neural activity underlying thought modality 
demonstrated a tendency toward the maintenance of visual processing during an 
undemanding task, as opposed to more complex and verbal treatment of information 
during the difficult task. Owing to the need for converging methods, the next chapter 
will use functional connectivity measures to clarify further the implication of older adults’ 
functional architecture in self-generated thoughts.  
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Chapter 4. Understanding mind-wandering experiences 
in young and older individuals using functional 
connectivity magnetic resonance imaging.  
 Following on from the electrophysiological findings in Chapter 3, this chapter will 
be investigating the possibility that age-related changes in off-task thinking are 
correlated with changes in the intrinsic organisation of the brain, using functional 
connectivity measures. Given the importance of executive control and memory in 
coordinating and generating the content of self-generated thoughts, those regions 
underlying such processes are the focus. A similar approach to Chapter 3 has been 
applied. Laboratory measures of self-generated thought were recorded in both old and 
young individuals, who also participated in a resting state functional magnetic 
resonance imaging experiment to describe their neurocognitive architecture. In younger 
participants, reductions in the strength of connectivity between the left temporal pole 
and prefrontal DMN regions was linked to a greater shift towards off-task thoughts when 
task demands decreased. In older adults, this pattern was not observed. These data 
suggest that the reductions in off-task thought seen in older participants may be linked 
to age-related changes in communication between temporal and prefrontal DMN 
regions. In addition, they raise the possibility that the decline in off-task thought as we 
age may, in part, occur because of neural changes related to how self-generated 
thought is flexibly organised with respect to changing environmental demands. 
4.1. Introduction  
 Although the link between ageing and reduced off-task thought is well 
documented in the literature, a clear neuro-cognitive account of this age-related decline 
is currently lacking. This chapter will therefore pursue preliminary investigations carried 
out in the previous chapter (Chapter 3). Component process accounts of self-generated 
thoughts emphasise the importance of both processes linked to memory, to produce 
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the mental content that is not related to the external environment, and control 
processes, which are important for the regulation of these experiences (see Chapter 1; 
Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Broadly, these accounts propose that 
the generation and representation of self-generated thoughts are subserved by memory 
representation processes whereas the control of self-generated thought occurrence is 
subserved by executive control processes (McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013). From a theoretical perspective, age-related declines in mind-
wandering may emerge from declines in the integrity of neurocognitive processes either 
related to memory, control, or both. To investigate these possibilities, this study 
combines laboratory measures of self-generated thought patterns in old and young 
individuals, with measures of intrinsic neural organisation provided by resting state 
functional magnetic resonance imaging. While the literature is merely focusing on the 
relationship between off-task thought and ageing, studying the full spectrum of self-
generated thought can aid the understanding of the age-related decrease in off-task 
thought. The aim here is to identify the underlying neural changes linked to age-related 
changes in off-task thinking and, therefore, provide valuable information with regards to 
age related changes in patterns of self-generated thought. 
 According to contemporary theory, memory processes provide representational 
information upon which the content of self-generated experiences are based (Baird et 
al., 2011; Poerio et al., 2017; Tulving, 2002) and it is well known that changes in 
conceptual and episodic knowledge occur with age (Addis et al., 2010, 2008; Schmitter-
Edgecombe et al., 2000). Evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that memory 
processes are linked to temporal lobe structures, including both anterior regions of the 
lateral temporal cortex, and regions on the medial surface such as the hippocampus 
(Davey et al., 2016; Ellamil et al., 2016; Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017). 
At rest, these regions show increased functional connectivity with medial and lateral 
regions in posterior and anterior cortical regions, and collectively form what is known 
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as the DMN (Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle, 2015; Spreng et al., 
2008). In ageing, a clear reduction of both activity and connectivity of the DMN have 
been reported (Biswal et al., 2010; Damoiseaux et al., 2008; Damoiseaux, 2017). 
Regions closely allied to the core DMN also change with age, including both regions of 
the temporal cortex (Fjell et al., 2009; Raz, Rodrigue, Head, Kennedy, & Acker, 2004) 
and the hippocampus (Allen, Bruss, Brown, & Damasio, 2005; Du et al., 2006; Raz, 
Ghisletta, Rodrigue, Kennedy, & Lindenberger, 2010). In healthy young adults, 
connectivity of the hippocampus is related to changes in spatial, episodic, and semantic 
memory (Persson, Stening, Nordin, & Söderlund, 2018; Sormaz et al., 2017), along with 
age-related changes in this domain can mediate cognitive abilities such as episodic 
memory (Fjell & Walhovd, 2010). 
 As well as processes important for generating off-task experiences, 
contemporary accounts emphasise the need to understand how they are regulated 
(Andrews‐Hanna et al., 2014; McVay & Kane, 2010). It is generally assumed that the 
regulation of task unrelated states depends, in part, upon executive control processes 
(Kane & McVay, 2012; Levinson et al., 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). Neural studies 
suggest that important aspects of executive control are linked to processes in regions 
of lateral frontal and parietal cortex that show elevated activity across a wide range of 
task domains (Duncan & Owen, 2000; Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 2013). 
Critically, in younger adults the connectivity between regions important for executive 
control predicts working memory performance and intelligence (Finn et al., 2015), 
whereas older adults display altered connectivity patterns between frontal and parietal 
areas (Meunier, Achard, Morcom, & Bullmore, 2009; Wu et al., 2012).  
 In younger adults, experience sampling studies in conjunction with fMRI, have 
shown that both the default mode and fronto-parietal networks (i.e. executive network) 
are active during periods of mind-wandering experiences (Allen et al., 2013; Christoff, 
Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Studies have 
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also examined individual variation in mind-wandering experience and how they relate 
to the organisation of neural functioning. Smallwood et al. (2016) found that variation in 
regions of both the temporal pole and the hippocampus were related to variations in 
different patterns of experience, including episodic quality, detail, and relationship to an 
ongoing task. Regions of the frontal parietal cortex are also important in the off-task 
state. Studies suggest that the connectivity of the DMN and fronto-parietal network is 
stronger for individuals who spend more time off-task (Mooneyham et al., 2016), 
especially when mind-wandering is deliberate (Golchert et al., 2017).   
 In the present study, a combination of experience sampling and resting state 
fMRI was used to explore whether age-related neural changes are associated with 
changes in patterns of self-generated thought. Groups of young and old participants 
performed a simple cognitive task, during which Multi-Dimensional Experience 
Sampling was used to measure patterns of thoughts and explore differences between 
older and younger participants. Participants also partook in a resting state functional 
connectivity scan that allowed the description of each individual in terms of their intrinsic 
architecture at rest. For the connectivity analyses, one set of seed regions was selected 
from the temporal lobe linked to memory - the left and right hippocampus and anterior 
temporal lobe (Tulving, 2002). Regions in the left and right pre-frontal cortex linked to 
processes of cognitive control within the memory domain were also selected – the 
inferior frontal gyrus (Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon Ralph, 2013). Using these 
regions as seeds in a functional connectivity analysis, regions in the cortex whose 
connectivity varied between the older and younger individuals were identified. Next, an 
examination of whether any differences in neural connectivity were associated with age-
related changes in self-generated thought was carried out.  
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4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
 The older adult group comprised of 22 women and 17 men (M age = 66.08 years, 
range = 55–87) recruited using opportunity sampling. The younger adult group 
consisted of 32 women and 9 men (M age = 19.73 years, range = 18–23) who were 
undergraduate students in psychology at the University of York. All participants 
received financial compensation for their time and travel. The inclusion criteria were to 
be a native English speaker, to be right-handed, and to have normal or corrected vision 
and hearing. The exclusion criteria were the presence or history of a neurological or 
psychiatric disorder. Older participants completed the Mini-Mental State Examination, 
(MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975) to ensure that they did not have dementia or mild cognitive 
impairment (threshold: score ≥ 26/30) (see Table 4.1.). Participants were seen for two 
hours on two consecutive days. The University of York Neuroimaging Centre ethics 
committee approved this study. All investigation was conducted according to the 
principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and participants provided written 
informed consent. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2. Procedure  
 At the beginning of the first session, demographic questions were asked. Those 
over 55 years old also completed the MMSE. Participants then underwent an N-back 
task previously developed by Konishi et al. (2015). Every participant did a practice run 
Table 4.1. Means (Standard Deviations) of participants’ characteristics 
and probe count. 
Measures Young (SD) Old (SD) 
N 41 39 
N Probes 924 981 
M age 19.73 (1.34) 66.08 (6.65) 
Female % 78 56.4 
MMSE - 29.03 (1.24) 
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before performing the task. Following this, participants carried out a number of other 
cognitive tasks as part of a wider ongoing project, which will not be the focus of this 
thesis. The next day participants were asked to perform again the N-Back task, followed 
by more cognitive measures, which included the NART (National Adult Reading Task; 
Nelson, 1982) and the DSST (Digit Symbol Substitution Test; Wechsler, 1997). Data 
from fMRI resting state scanning were gathered on a different day. Finally, a debriefing 
sheet was provided to each participant.  
4.2.3. N-back working memory task 
 The task used in the present study was the same as the one reported in the 
previous chapter, for a detailed description, please refer to Chapter 3. Nonetheless, a 
few modifications have been applied. The task was built so that there were 12 probes 
per conditions. The thought probe was answered on a four-point Likert scale from 1 
(‘Not at all’) to 4 (‘Completely’), using numbers on the keyboard.  
4.2.4. Additional behavioural measures 
 Prior studies have found associations between patterns of self-generated 
thought and poor performance on tasks of intelligence and working memory (e.g. 
McVay & Kane, 2009; Mrazek et al., 2013; H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018), and better 
performance on tasks that measure creativity and problem solving (Baird et al., 2012; 
Smeekens & Kane, 2016; H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). Therefore, in this study, 
working memory capacity (backward digit span; Wechsler, 1997) and fluid intelligence 
(Raven’s Matrices; Raven, 1983) were also measured. In the backward digit span, 
participants had to repeat out loud numbers in the inverse order of presentation. The 
task started with two numbers and ended after two consecutive errors. Raven’s matrix 
consists of 60 multiple-choice questions, listed in order of difficulty. In each test item, 
participants were asked to identify the missing element that completed a pattern. 
Participants had 6 minutes to answer a maximum of questions. Creativity was 
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measured using the Unusual Uses Test (UUT, Guilford, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1958). 
Here, participants were asked to generate within 2 minutes, as many unusual uses for 
an object as possible (e.g. newspaper). Then, for each of the three objects used, two 
independent reviewers generated a uniqueness score. Additional measures were taken 
to control for basic differences in psychomotor speed (Digit Symbol Substitution Task, 
DSST; Wechsler, 1997) and premorbid IQ (National Adult Reading Task, NART; 
Nelson, 1982). The DSST is a paper and pencil task were participants are presented 
with symbols associated with numbers. Participants were asked to write down the 
corresponding symbol under each digit as fast as possible. The number of correct 
symbols within the allowed time (90 seconds) was measured. In the NART, participants 
were requested to read 50 words out loud, one by one. The difficulty progressively 
increased, and the number of errors was measured. All participants performed these 
tasks in the same sessions in which patterns of self-generated thought were measured. 
The task measures were always performed after the assessment of self-generated 
thought.  
4.2.5. Neuroimaging 
4.2.5.1. MRI acquisition  
 MRI functional and structural parameters for the resting state fMRI scans were 
acquired using a 3T GE HDx Excite MRI scanner, utilising an eight-channel phased 
array head coil (GE) tuned to 127.4 MHz at the York Neuroimaging Centre, University 
of York. Structural MRI acquisition in all participants was based on a T1-weighted 3D 
fast spoiled gradient echo sequence (TR = 7.8 s, TE = minimum full, flip angle= 20°, 
matrix size = 256 x 256, 176 slices, voxel size = 1.13 x 1.13 x 1 mm). Resting-state 
functional MRI activity was recorded from the whole brain using single-shot 2D gradient-
echo-planar imaging (TR = 3 s, TE = minimum full, flip angle = 90°, matrix size = 64 x 
64, 60 slices, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3 mm3, 180 volumes). A FLAIR scan with the same 
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orientation as the functional scans was collected to improve co-registration between 
subject-specific structural and functional scans.  
4.2.5.2. MRI pre-processing 
 Functional and structural data were pre-processed and analysed using FMRIB’s 
Software Library (FSL version 4.1, http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FEAT/). Individual 
FLAIR and T1 weighted structural brain images were extracted using Brain Extraction 
Tool (BET). Structural images were linearly registered to the MNI-152 template using 
FMRIB's Linear Image Registration Tool (FLIRT). Functional data were pre-processed 
and analysed using the FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). The individual subject 
analysis involved: Motion correction using MCFLIRT; slice-timing correction using 
Fourier space time-series phase-shifting; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 
FWHM 6mm; grand-mean intensity normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single 
multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares 
straight line fitting, with sigma = 100s); and Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with 
sigma = 2.8s. 
4.2.5.3. Region of Interest (ROI) Mask Creation  
 For the purpose of this study, the following regions of interests were selected. 
The hippocampus masks were obtained from a previously published study (Sormaz et 
al., 2017). The inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) were extracted from bilateral frontal regions 
in the 12th network from Yeo’s 17 parcellations (Yeo et al., 2011). The overlaps between 
the extracted clusters and the anatomical frontal pole in Harvard-Oxford Cortical 
Structural Atlas (Desikan et al., 2006; Frazier et al., 2005; Goldstein et al., 2007; Makris 
et al., 2006) were excluded to create the final ROI mask. Left and right anterior temporal 
lobe (ATL) were assembled from visually selected clusters in Craddock (2011) 
parcellations (K = 12) (Craddock, James, Holtzheimer, Hu, & Mayberg, 2012). The 
assembled masks were upsampled from 1mm to 2mm space. The interim 2mm masks 
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were smoothed with a gauss kernel of 1 mm and then binarised. The overlap between 
the hippocampus ROI masks and the anatomical temporal lobe in Harvard-Oxford 
Cortical Structural Atlas were excluded. The spatial distribution of these ROIs is 
presented in Figure 4.1.  
4.2.5.4. MRI first level analysis 
 After calculating the average activity within each ROI along the time series, a 
functional connectivity analysis was performed for each subject separately. The 
resulting maps were compared at the group level using FMRIB’s Local Analysis of 
Mixed Effects. These maps were thresholded at a Z = 3.1 to define contiguous clusters, 
and then significant clusters of voxels were extracted at p < 0.05 with family-wise error 
correction. The resulting connectivity maps for both age groups are presented in Figure 
4.1., the individual maps for both groups were used to investigate age differences in 
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Figure 4.1. Thresholded spatial maps displaying functional connectivity of the seed 
region separately for younger and older participants. 
The upper grey panel shows the spatial distribution of the regions used as seeds in the 
functional connectivity analyses. Different columns present the data for each seed 
region. Maps were thresholded at Z = 3.1 and were corrected for the family wise error 
in terms of the number of voxels in the brain, the two tailed nature of our tests and the 
number of seed regions. Regions of overlap across Age Groups are indicated in yellow. 
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connectivity and how it relates to thoughts occurrence (see 4.3.3. Brain connectivity in 
ageing and relation to the task, p.84).   
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Behavioural performance 
 Simple age differences in performance for each of the measures relevant to this 
analysis were calculated. These comparisons used a Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA), and revealed group differences for all measures except the Unusual Uses 
Test (Digit symbol substitution test, F (1, 65) = 29.54, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31; National Adult 
Reading Task, F (1, 65) = 54.75, p < .001, ηp
2 = .46; Ravens Progressive Matrices, F 
(1, 65) = 35.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35; Unusual Uses Test, F (1, 65) = .375, p = .542, ηp
2 = 
.01; Backwards Digit Span, F (1, 65) = 4.07, p = .048, ηp
2 = .06. Overall, older adults 
were slower, had better premorbid IQ, poorer fluid intelligence and working memory 
capacity, than younger adults, see Table 4.2 for descriptive data for these comparisons. 
 
4.3.2. Multi-Dimensional Experience Sampling  
 To analyse the MDES data, the set of questions was decomposed using 
principal component analysis (PCA), applying varimax rotation (for prior examples of 
this approach see Konishi et al., 2017; Poerio et al., 2017; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics, means (standard deviations), of young and 
older adults on cognitive measures. 
 
Young (SD) 
N = 35 
Old (SD) 
N = 32 
DSST *** 50.23 (12.45) 35.13 (10.03) 
NART (errors)*** 20.23 (6.38) 8.84 (6.20) 
Ravens Matrices *** 10.40 (2.90) 6.56 (2.31) 
UUT – Total uniqueness score 11.31 (6.22) 12.13 (4.35) 
Backwards Digit Span (proportion of 
correct) * 
.74 (.09) .70 (.09) 
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001 
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al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013). This allowed the core patterns of 
variance within the self-reported data to be characterised by a smaller set of underlying 
dimensions. Three-factor solutions were selected with eigenvalues > 1, and the 
loadings that describe these dimensions are presented by the heat map in Figure 4.2: 
Component One - Deliberate On-Task – described deliberate, detailed and positive and 
accounted for 27.20% of the variance. Component Two - Mental time travelling (MTT) 
– described episodic thoughts (past and future) with high loadings on the self and other, 
and accounted for 17.76% of the variance. Component Three - Thought Modality 
(Images or words) – described thoughts that varied in their modality between 
representations in images or words and accounted for 9.56% of the overall variance. 
These patterns of self-generated thought revealed by the current decomposition are 
consistent with Chapter 3 and prior studies.   
 In order to identify how these patterns of thoughts varied across the two task 
conditions and age groups, 2 (Age; Young, Old) by 2 (Task; 0-Back, 1-Back) mixed 
ANOVAs were conducted on participants’ mean regression scores for each factor. For 
the Deliberate On-Task component a main effect of task indicating lower scores in the 
0-Back condition than in the 1-Back condition was found, F (1, 78) = 83.58, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .52. The main effect of age indicated that young adults had less thoughts 
deliberately directed toward the task than older adults, F (1, 78) = 133.89, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .63. The interaction between task and age was also significant, F (1, 78) = 11.62, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .13 (see Figure 4.2.). Decomposition of this interaction showed less 
Deliberate On-Task thought for younger adults compared to older adults in both the 0-
Back, F (1, 78) = 139.77, p < .001, ηp
2 = .64, and the 1-Back, F (1, 78) = 89.82, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .54. To formally compare these discrepancies, the difference in Deliberate 
On-Task loadings across the 0-Back and 1-Back tasks were calculated, and a univariate 
ANOVA including age group as a single categorical variable was conducted. This 
revealed a significant effect of age group, F (1, 79) = 11.6, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13.  This 
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indicates that younger individuals tended to decrease the amount of Deliberate Task 
Focus in the 0-Back relative to the 1-Back tasks, to a greater degree than older 
individuals did. Analysis of the Mental Time Travelling component revealed a 
significant interaction between task and age, F (1, 78) = 16.77, p < .000, ηp
2 = .18 (see 
Figure 4.2.). Decomposition of this interaction showed no effect of age in the 0-Back 
condition, F (1, 78) = .006, p = .937, ηp
2 = .00, but a significant main effect of age in the  
1-Back condition, F (1, 78) = 4.95, p = .029, ηp
2 = .06, indicating less MTT for younger  
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Figure 4.2. Determining patterns of self-generated thought and their relationship to 
ongoing task and age group. 
(Left) Heat map illustrating the loading of the different questions on the three factors 
resulting from the principal component analyses (PCA). Varimax rotation was applied to 
the data set. (Right) The interaction between Age (Young, Old) and Task difficulty (0-Back, 
1-Back) for the mean regression weights for On Task and MTT types of thoughts, along 
with the main effects of Age (Young, Old) and Task difficulty (0-Back, 1-Back) on mean 
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adults compared to older adults in the more demanding task context. Finally, analysis 
of Thought Modality revealed a main effect of task indicating more visual experiences 
in the 0-Back condition (M = .09; SD = .74), and more verbal experiences in the 1-Back 
condition (M = -.10; SD = .78), F (1, 78) = 12.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .14. The main effect of 
age indicated that young adults (M = -.26; SD = .59) had less thoughts in the form of 
images than older adults (M = .26; SD = .76), F (1, 78) = 11.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13. 
4.3.3. Brain connectivity in ageing and relation to the task 
 The first neural analysis identifyed regions whose patterns of functional 
connectivity from the selected regions of interest showed age-related changes. 
Analyses consisted of a series of group level multiple regressions, in which spatial maps 
describing the functional connectivity of these seeds were the dependent variables and 
Age group was included as an explanatory variable. These analyses generally found 
regions of decreased functional connectivity with age (see Figure 4.3.). For both the 
left and right ATL, younger individuals had stronger connectivity with a region of 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. These patterns were generally limited to the same 
hemisphere as the seed region; however, a small area of overlap was apparent in the 
right hemisphere. The left ATL also had stronger connectivity to a cluster of Left lateral 
prefrontal cortex in younger individuals. Examination of both of these patterns of 
connectivity showed that both the seed regions and the subsequent destination regions 
fall within the DMN (see Figure 4.4.). The connectivity of the left IFG seed with a region 
of left anterior insula was stronger for younger relative to older individuals. This pattern 
of connectivity was associated with increased changes between the fronto-parietal 
network and the ventral attention network (see Figure 4.4.). Finally, no differences were 
found in the connectivity of the Hippocampus across age groups. Previous research 
has reported conflicting findings, with the posterior but not the anterior hippocampus, 
showing less functional connectivity in ageing (Damoiseaux, Viviano, Yuan, & Raz, 
2016).  
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 Next, correspondences between age-related changes in the patterns of self-
generated thought and changes in the intrinsic neural function identified in prior 
analyses were explored. Three outliers have been identified, based on the visualisation 
of boxplot generated in SPSS 24.0, and removed in the following analyses; two older 
adults (connectivity measures) and one younger adult (behavioural measures). A 
similar strategy to Chapter 3 was used. Accordingly, all data were z-scored separately 
for old and young individuals. This step assured that gross differences in intercepts 
across conditions and age group were minimised, allowing the relationships between 
the variables to be visualised more transparently. These data were analysed using a 
mixed ANOVA. The model had two within-participant factors: Task (0–Back, 1-Back), 
Figure 4.3. Significant effects of Age (Young, Old) on brain connectivity from the left 
ATL, the right ATL and the left IFG. 
The left hand grey panel shows the regions used as seed regions in each analysis. 
Each row corresponds to the results of a whole brain analysis on each seed. Brain 
areas indicated as red in the centre panel showed greater connectivity with the seed 
region for Younger than Older Adults. The bar graphs in the right hand panel 
summarise the beta weights of the effects as generated by the model for Younger and 
Older participants. Abbreviations: ATL = Anterior Temporal Lobe; IFG = Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus. Maps were thresholded at Z = 3.1 and were corrected for the family wise error 
in terms of the number of voxels in the brain, the two tailed nature of our tests and the 
number of seed regions. Note. Error bars are Standard Errors. 
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and Component (Detailed On-Task, Mental Time Travel, Modality). Age group (Young, 
Old) was included as between group variable. The normalised connectivity scores for 
all of the significant effects (Left ATL, Right ATL and Left IFG) were also included. The 
main effects of all variables were modelled, as well as both two-way and three-way 
interactions between task, age group, and each PCA component. Interaction terms 
describing the relationship between each PCA component were not included.   
 This analysis revealed a significant four-way interaction in Task X Age Group X 
Component X Left ATL Connectivity, F (2, 128) = 8.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12. The effect 
was found for variation in patterns of Deliberate On-Task thought only: Task X Age 
Group X Left ATL Connectivity, F (1, 64) = 10.99, p = .002, ηp
2 = .15. To visualise this 
interaction, the relationship between left ATL connectivity and how Deliberate On-Task 
Figure 4.4. Relationship between age-related changes in functional connectivity and 
large scale networks.  
The main panel describes the correspondence between regions showing age related 
changes and the relevant large scale network as described by Yeo, Krienen and 
colleagues (2011). The sub panel (coloured grey) shows the overlap between the seed 
regions (indicated in black) and the relevant network (in red). 
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thought changed across task separately in each age group was plotted (see Figure 
4.5.). In younger individuals, lower connectivity is linked to more off-task, spontaneous 
thought in the 0-Back task and a more deliberate on-task state in the 1-Back task. No 
such pattern of variation was apparent in the older individuals. There were no significant 
associations with any other pattern of experience, nor were there any significant Task 
X Age Group interactions for any task. 
 
4.3.4. Relationship to control tasks 
 The final analysis examined the relationship between age-related changes in 
performance on the behavioural tasks. This will enable general understanding of the 
consequences underlying neurocognitive changes in ageing. A series of univariate 
analyses on the measures of creativity, fluid intelligence, and working memory were 
performed. In these, age was included as between subject variable, and the normalised 
Figure 4.5. Association between patterns of age related difference in functional 
connectivity and patterns of self-generated thought.  
The left hand panel illustrates the regions with age related differences (green) in 
functional connectivity from the left ATL (blue). The right hand panel illustrates the 
significant relationship between left ATL connectivity and the variation in Deliberate On-
Task states across tasks in the younger but not the older participants. Note. *** p <.001 
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connectivity from each of the significant analyses was also included. The main effects 
of each factor and as well as the two-way interactions between age group and each of 
the connectivity patterns were modelled. These revealed an age by left ATL connectivity 
interaction related to performance on the UUT, F (1, 64) = 4.96, p = .029, ηp
2 = .07. 
Comparing the association between UUT performance and connectivity with left ATL 
separately in each age group demonstrated a significant association in older 
individuals, r = -.50, p < .01, but showed no association for younger participants, r = 
.01, p = .996. Thus, weaker connectivity was related to more creativity in older adults 
only.  
4.4. Discussion  
 The present study set out to understand whether age-related differences in 
patterns of self-generated thought could be linked to changes in the underlying 
functional architecture. Three regions were selected, each linked to different processes 
based on prior research: The hippocampi given their role in episodic memory, the 
anterior temporal lobes given their role in semantic processing, and the inferior frontal 
gyri given their role in the memory control. Group level analysis showed decreased 
connectivity between DMN regions in the anterior temporal cortex with regions of the 
same network in ventrolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Additionally, the left 
inferior frontal gyrus had decreased connectivity with the left anterior insula, suggesting 
age-related changes in how regions of the fronto-parietal network communicate with 
the ventral attention network. The experience sampling study confirmed prior work 
showing more deliberate on-task thoughts in older individuals, especially in the easier 
0-Back condition, and a bias toward thoughts in the form of images than words. They 
also reported experiences with more episodic features in the more demanding 1-Back 
task relative to the younger participants. 
 Results evidence that regions showing different patterns of ATL connectivity 
with the prefrontal regions of the DMN in older adults were linked to changes in the 
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ability to increase off-task thoughts when task demands decline. In the younger 
individuals, lower connectivity between these sets of regions was associated with more 
flexible adjustment of off-task thoughts, increasing off-task thoughts in the 
undemanding 0-Back task relative to the harder 1-Back task. This association was 
absent in older individuals, who changed their focus on the task less when task 
demands changed, than younger participants did. Therefore, the data shows age-
related changes in connectivity within the DMN occur in regions that are related to a 
flexible increase in off-task thought when task demands are low in younger participants. 
Balancing task focus in line with the demands of the task is a well-documented feature 
of cognition in younger individuals (Konishi et al., 2017; Seli, Risko, Smilek, et al., 2016; 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009), and is assumed to reflect the ability to regulate the 
contents of self-generated thought in line with the demands of the environment 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Previous work reported related findings with 
strong connectivity between ATL and control regions (e.g. IFG) in young adults 
associated with poor performance on easy semantic tasks, and more mind-wandering 
(Vatansever et al., 2017. This was interpreted as a failure to regulate cognition.  The 
present study, therefore, suggests that reductions in off-task thinking as we age are 
linked to neural changes that may be disruptive to the ability to flexibly alter patterns of 
self-generated thought when external task demands change. 
 Importantly, results showed that older individuals with lower patterns of 
connectivity between the same set of temporal prefrontal regions, tended to perform 
better on a creativity task. Associations in older adults between performance on the 
Unusual Uses Task (UUT) and reduced connectivity from the left ATL, rules out simple 
interpretations of this age-related connectivity change as reflecting generally impaired 
cognitive processing. Instead, it seems that older adults who have a pattern of 
connectivity associated with preserved cognitive function on UUT are making more 
cognitive effort even when it is not needed (i.e. the undemanding 0-Back task). Prior 
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studies in younger individuals have found correlations between better creativity and 
patterns of off-task experience (Baird et al., 2012; Smeekens & Kane, 2016; H.-T. 
Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). If creativity and the off-task state share some underlying 
cognitive features, as many theorists assume, it is possible that their association with 
connectivity in older individuals is evidence of a certain degree of preservation of this 
latent factor. In support of this account, prior work showed an association between more 
spontaneous off-task thoughts, greater creativity, and lower within DMN connectivity 
(H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et al., 2018). Using independent data, but a similar experimental 
setup, this study used canonical correlation to identify a pattern of spontaneous off-task 
thought that was linked to reduced connectivity across regions of the DMN. This pattern 
was independently linked to better performance on tasks tapping a process of 
generation, such as the unusual uses task, self-reference, and measures of verbal 
fluency. The conceptual similarity between the current study with those H.-T Wang, 
Poerio, and colleagues (2018) provides independent support for the close association 
between creativity, spontaneous off-task thoughts and reduced connectivity within the 
DMN. Further corroborating evidence comes from a recent study using the same task 
paradigm, in which online experience sampling was combined with fMRI (Sormaz et al., 
2018). Using representational similarity analysis it was demonstrated that neural signals 
within certain regions of the DMN are important for momentary states of detailed task 
focus (Sormaz et al., 2018). This result is consistent with previous (i.e. H.-T. Wang, 
Poerio, et al., 2018) and current data, which show that in younger individuals, stronger 
coupling between regions of the DMN is linked to a preference for detailed on-task 
thinking. Based on this emerging literature, one may speculate that understanding the 
intersection between creativity and off-task thought in ageing, could be an important 
question for future work exploring the functions that the DMN plays in cognition. 
 While our study implicates the DMN in age-related changes in off-task thought, 
many questions remain unanswered. First, the use of a cross-sectional design to 
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examine age differences in cognition and brain function, while practical, confounds 
many factors that could have been addressed using a more complex longitudinal 
design. Studies suggest that declines in the tendency for off-task thought are consistent 
whether a cross-sectional or longitudinal design is used (Giambra, 1989; Shaw & 
Giambra, 1993), as are age-related changes in functional connectivity (Damoiseaux, 
2017). Building on these findings, future studies could benefit from a longitudinal design 
in which individuals across a range of ages are measured on multiple occasions, a 
design that may help provide a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying 
relationships. Secondly, this study used an individual differences approach to examine 
patterns of self-generated thought, and thus adopted a trait level perspective on a state. 
While a between participant approach is efficient in helping understand variation in the 
neurocognitive architecture linked to patterns of self-generated thought (Golchert et al., 
2017; Smallwood et al., 2016; H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018; H.-T. Wang, Poerio, et 
al., 2018), it lacks the precision that momentary experience sampling can provide (Allen 
et al., 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; Hasenkamp, Wilson-Mendenhall, Duncan, & 
Barsalou, 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Recent work has shown that MDES data can 
be successfully combined with measures of online neural function to identify links 
between experience and brain activity (Chapter 3; Sormaz et al., 2018). Building on 
the success of this work, it may be possible to compare measures of online neural 
activity across older and younger individuals. This would help determine neural patterns 
of activity during task performance and so could usefully constrain the interpretations 
that should be placed on these data. 
 To conclude, the present study set out to understand whether age-related 
changes in self-generated thought are linked to variation in the functional architecture 
that occur as we grow older. The focus was on brain structures supporting executive 
control and memory, in order to consider the coordination and generation of self-
generated thoughts. It was evidenced that connectivity between the left ATL and 
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ventrolateral / dorsomedial prefrontal cortex within the DMN was reduced in older 
individuals. In younger participants, this pattern of connectivity was related to the 
flexibility with which off-task thought is modulated. Importantly, in the older individuals, 
lower connectivity between the same two regions was linked to preserved performance 
on a creativity task, suggesting that age-related changes in this area are not linked to 
impairments in cognition across domains. Together these data provide converging 
evidence that one reason why self-generated thought becomes more focused on tasks 
as we age is related to changes in the connectivity of the DMN. Therefore, these results 
extend previous findings from Chapter 3, where spontaneous off-task thoughts were 
related to activity in the DMN as evidenced by alpha and beta power. This study 
suggests that in the future, understanding the role of the DMN in creativity and off-task 
thought may shed important light on an important aspect of how cognition changes as 
we age. 
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– Section B – 
Consideration of other factors 
influencing mind-wandering 
experiences in ageing.  
 
 The first two empirical chapters comprising this PhD thesis disentangled the 
implication of older adults’ brain activity in their changing experience of self-generated 
thoughts. Following this success, the next two empirical chapters will consider other 
methodological approaches to further understand mind-wandering experiences in 
ageing. Chapter 5 will use the perspective of cultural differences while Chapter 6 will 
observe the influence of both meta-awareness and meditation to unravel the 
heterogeneity of thought content in ageing.  
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Chapter 5. The implications of culture. 
 In this chapter, the influence of culture on the experience of mind-wandering 
across different age groups will be under investigation. A large-scale online 
questionnaire-based survey of 308 adults over 18 years of age, both in France and in 
the United Kingdom, examined the joint effects of culture and age. To capture a thinking 
style profile, self-report measures of mind-wandering frequency, mindfulness, mood, 
rumination, self-reflection, future thinking, depressive symptoms, and cognitive failures 
were gathered. Findings revealed an earlier decrease in mind-wandering frequency for 
French-speaking participants. Cultural effects were demonstrated on rumination and 
reflection rates across the lifespan, with, in general, more rumination and less reflection 
for English speakers. Overall, negatively toned thoughts were dominant for English 
compared to more expressive thoughts in general for French speakers. Confirmatory 
factor analyses featured different theoretical models to explain mind-wandering 
frequency in the French and British populations. This chapter provides clear evidence 
of experiential differences in mind-wandering as a function of culture and age.  
5.1. Introduction  
 Mind-wandering has been investigated across the globe; namely, China (Deng, 
Li, & Tang, 2012; Song & Wang, 2012), the United States of America (Levinson et al., 
2012), the United Kingdom (Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009), Belgium (Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011), and Germany (Tusche et al., 2014). Yet, limited 
investigations have focused on the impact of culture on the frequency, content, and 
consequences of mind-wandering across the lifespan.  
 In 1961, one large-scale questionnaire study exploring characteristics of adults’ 
daydreaming reported cultural differences in daydreaming frequency and content 
(Singer & McCraven, 1961). Afro-American and Jewish participants presented the 
highest daydreaming frequency compared to their British counterparts. Although the 
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nature of the variability was not specified, the authors argued that variations in family 
constellations (complex bonds and family relationships) and life experiences in general, 
drive such differences. Indeed, Jewish cultural values, such as the encouragement of 
self-reflection and open communication between family members, may play an 
important role in mind-wandering frequency and identity creation.  
Elsewhere, research has evidenced that mind-wandering scaffolds and 
maintains a continuous feeling of ‘self’ and identity (Smallwood et al., 2011; Song & 
Wang, 2012). Rather than explaining the pattern of findings in terms of relatively more 
positive aspects of daydreaming (self-reflection), for the Afro-Americans, negative life 
events (e.g. bullying) were suggested to give rise to a greater propensity for unpleasant 
thoughts and the likelihood of developing psychological problems associated with 
rumination (e.g. Depression, Erdur-Baker, 2009; A. West & Salmon, 2000). More 
recently, research showed that European-heritage students tend to mind wander more 
than Asian-heritage students or Japanese exchange students (Sude, 2015). Yet, others 
failed to demonstrate any cultural differences between Portuguese and Brazilian 
participants, regarding the frequency or content of mind-wandering experiences 
(Gonçalves et al., 2017). Nevertheless, their results suggested that Portuguese 
students used mind-wandering to their advantage more than Brazilian students. 
Together these studies point to the influence of culture on the occurrence and the 
characteristics of mind-wandering and provides the foundation for the chapter 
presented here.  
 Although the examination of cultural differences in mind-wandering has been 
neglected, data from the language domain are informative and may aid in the 
generation of hypotheses for future experimental work. Our thoughts and feeling during 
mind-wandering episodes are composed largely of inner speech rather than visual 
imagery (Bastian et al., 2017; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). Additionally, once 
internalised, language plays a crucial role in shaping cognitive processes and 
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organising thoughts (Vygotsky, 1962). According to Whorf (1956), certain properties of 
a given language affect the way people perceive and remember, and so through 
language, culture may influence individual’s self-generated and unconscious thought 
processes. For example, the differences in talking about the time between English and 
Mandarin speakers corresponds to discrepancies in how English and Mandarin 
speakers think about time (Boroditsky, 2001). Abstract thoughts involving time tend to 
be shaped and organised differently with vertical (Mandarin) and horizontal (English) 
metaphors driving how time is conceptualised. Therefore, considering that languages 
may impact on the nature of abstract thoughts differently, it is not unreasonable to 
suggest language will have a more universal impact on self-generated thoughts studied 
here.  
 The vast majority of studies investigating cultural differences on psychological 
phenomena often compare western and eastern populations, where differences that 
are more striking are expected. Comparison within European countries is rare, and due 
to geographic proximity, cultural similarities may be predicted. Nevertheless, some 
observations suggest clear cultural differences existing between French and British 
citizens. For example, the literature regarding the ‘Déjà vu’ experience suggests that 
French speakers describe their experience of such thoughts as more disturbing than 
English speakers (Fortier & Moulin, 2015).  
Additionally, a crucial element when investigating cultural discrepancies is the 
strong influence of the individuals’ educational background on the development of moral 
value, and the shaping of thought processes. The education system is considered to 
be a product of societal norms shared by the majority of the population (Hofstede, 
1984), and as such, the notable differences between the French and British educational 
system suggest divergent cultural values. The French educational system is mostly 
focused on knowledge and intellect, whereas the British system is mainly focused on 
the development of the individual (Mons, Duru-Bellat, & Savina, 2012). This difference 
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can be illustrated within disparate professions. For example, in the management 
environment, French managers show a tendency to be more control orientated, in 
contrast to their British counterparts that are more prone to delegation and trust 
(Gröschl & Barrows, 2003). Many more examples of divergent social and psychological 
styles (e.g. writing methods) between French and British individuals could be 
highlighted here, but overall one could expect fundamental differences in the nature of 
self-generated thoughts. 
 Regardless of the culture under investigation, the scientific community agrees 
that the content comprising self-generated thoughts is extremely varied (Seli et al., 
2018). The temporal dynamics of mind-wandering reveal a tendency for thoughts to be 
directed toward the future (Baird et al., 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Smallwood, 
Nind, et al., 2009), which are characterised by a verbal form, with a tendency to be 
realistic, concrete, structured, and more personally relevant (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 
2013). Future thinking has been related to recovery from negative responses such as 
stress (Engert et al., 2014), and is commonly associated with positive mood (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). Self-reflection is a core component of future thinking 
during mind-wandering, and self-generated thoughts are more often about the self than 
others (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011).  While the majority of spontaneous 
cognition is future-oriented, a smaller but significant proportion of off-task thoughts are 
directed to the past (Baird et al., 2011).  Negative mood induction procedures have 
consistently been found to induce greater past-related thoughts (Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011). In the absence of mood induction, it has been evidenced that sadness 
tends to precede mind-wandering occurrence, and having negatively toned thoughts 
during mind-wandering predicts subsequent sadness (Poerio et al., 2013).  Overall, 
thoughts directed toward the past tend to induce negative mood, while future and self-
related thoughts tend to improve mood.  
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A further key research endeavour is the exploration of mind-wandering 
outcomes.  If different mind-wandering styles occur across cultures, this may have 
some bearing on the positive and negative consequences of such episodes.  For 
instance, mind-wandering has deleterious effects on cognitive abilities, including 
working memory, sustained attention, and comprehension (for a review see 
Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Mirroring work on mind-wandering, data from the 
mindfulness and meditation literature is informative regarding impacts on task 
performance. Mindfulness reduces mind-wandering frequency with subsequent 
improvements on everyday activities (Mrazek et al., 2013), and is often associated with 
well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and increased cognitive abilities (Chiesa, Calati, & 
Serretti, 2011). However, mind-wandering also seems to benefit individuals. As mind-
wandering is partly goal oriented (D’Argembeau et al., 2011) and mostly refers to the 
self and the future, it has been argued that one of the primary functions of mind-
wandering is to enable the anticipation and planning of personally relevant future goals 
(Baird et al., 2011). Additional functions highlighting the adaptive value of mind-
wandering have been identified, including enhanced social problem solving (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013), the fostering of a more patient style of making 
decisions (Smallwood et al., 2013) and more creative processing whilst problem solving 
(Baird et al., 2012). 
Particularly relevant here is the consideration of how the ageing process 
modulates the frequency of mind-wandering. Given the widely reported executive 
function deficit in ageing (Riby, Perfect, & Stollery, 2004), past research has focused 
on the cognitive profile of older adults in order to comprehend the well documented age-
related decrease in mind-wandering frequency (Giambra, 1989; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Jackson et al., 2013; McVay et al., 2013). It is worth noting that the complexity of 
the thoughts and specific content of mind-wandering episodes has in the main been 
neglected. Characteristics that have been associated with the ageing process can give 
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clues to the specific components that influence the nature of mind-wandering episodes. 
For example, older adults are thought to be more mindful and present moment focussed 
(Splevins et al., 2009), and largely have more positive moods (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, 
& Charles, 1999). Regarding future thinking, Rendell et al. (2012) showed that older 
adults were worse at imagining the future than a-temporal experiences, thus, their 
frequency of future thoughts decreases (Berntsen et al., 2015). They also seem to 
experience more a-temporal than future directed mind-wandering (Jackson et al., 
2013). Overall, the nature of self-generated thoughts appear to be complex during mind-
wandering episodes as we age.  
 The purpose of this study was to identify broad discrepancies in mind-wandering 
by examining the differences in frequency between French (France) and English 
(United Kingdom) native speakers, in young, middle-aged, and older adults. To further 
characterise the joint effects of age and culture, a collection of seven questionnaires 
were used to capture key elements previously associated with the wandering mind in 
the literature. Namely, mindfulness abilities, mood, future thinking, self-attentiveness 
(rumination and reflection), cognitive failure, and depressive symptoms measures were 
gathered.  
 Unfortunately, the literature regarding the influence of culture on mind-
wandering is lacking, impeding the generation of precise hypotheses, particularly when 
it comes to two European countries. However, variables capturing the mood and 
emotional content (e.g. rumination vs reflection) established whether a previously 
identified bias for negatively toned thoughts in English speakers and more expressive 
thoughts for French speakers (e.g. work examining the 'Déjà vu' experience; Fortier & 
Moulin, 2015) is also observed for self-generated thought. Regarding the overall effects 
of age, a decrease in mind-wandering frequency, future thinking, and depressive 
symptoms was anticipated (Berntsen et al., 2015; Giambra, 1989; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Ahrens, 2002), alongside an increase in cognitive failures and mindfulness abilities 
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(Mecacci & Righi, 2006; Splevins et al., 2009). In addition, structural equation modelling 
will be used to generate an overview of the relationships linking mind-wandering 
experiences to the measures collected.  
 Conceptually, it is expected that measures of rumination, negative mood and 
depressive symptoms will compose a negative construct (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008; Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2005). Additionally, it is 
expected that the frequency of future-self related thoughts and self-reflection will 
comprise a self-related construct (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013; Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999), and that measures of mindfulness and cognitive failures will make an 
attentional construct (Chiesa et al., 2011; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Ultimately, it 
is hypothesised that the theoretical model, where mind-wandering frequency is 
predicted by age and the previously outlined constructs (self-related, negative and 
attentional) will fit the present data. However, the lack of research on the impact of 
culture on mind-wandering experiences prevents us from formulating clear hypotheses 
about the variations of the model in the two populations, yet differences are suspected 
(Gonçalves et al., 2017; Singer & McCraven, 1961; Sude, 2015).  
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
 A total of 471 volunteers completed an online survey, 283 in English and 188 in 
French. Fourteen participants were removed from the English dataset for not being 
native English speakers. One non-French native speaker was removed from the French 
dataset. Significant differences were found between the samples in terms of age [F (1, 
453) = 7.56, p = .006, ηp
2 = .02] and years of education [F (1, 451) = 4.56, p = .033, ηp
2 
= .01]. Therefore, the sample was matched on those two variables. The remaining data 
consisted of 154 native English speakers (M = 31.21, SD = 16.15, 132 female) and 154 
native French speakers (M = 32.32, SD = 15.96, 130 female). To be as inclusive as 
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possible, the inclusion criteria were to be 18 or over, and be native English or French 
speakers. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Health 
and Life Sciences of Northumbria University. The investigation was conducted 
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki, and for both 
populations, participants provided informed consent. 
5.2.2. Measures  
5.2.2.1. Mind-wandering 
The Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS; Giambra, 1993) is one of the 28 
scales comprising the Imaginal Process Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1963) and 
consists of 12 items assessing daydreaming frequency. Participants are asked to 
choose on a five-point Likert scale, the nature of thoughts which are appropriate for 
them. For example, ‘I lose myself in active daydreaming’ can be answered by either (1) 
Infrequently, (2) Once a week, (3) Once a day, (4) A few times during the day, or (5) 
Many different times during the day. The original 12 items of the DDFS were translated 
into French by Stawarczyk, Majerus, Van der Linden and D’Argembeau (2012) with a 
back-translation procedure. Cronbach’s alphas were computed on the English (α = .92) 
and French version (α = .92) of the questionnaire and revealed good reliability.  
5.2.2.2. Mindfulness 
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a 15-
item scale introduced by the following sentences: “Below is a collection of statements 
about your everyday experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your 
experience rather than what you think your experience should be.” Participants must 
rate the statements on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost always) to 6 
(almost never). For example, ‘I rush through activities without being really attentive to 
them’ or ‘I snack without being aware that I'm eating’. A higher score indicates more 
mindful abilities. The French version of the MAAS was translated by Stawarczyk et al. 
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(2012) with a back-translation procedure. Cronbach’s alphas have been computed on 
the English (α = .88) and French version (α = .82) of the questionnaire and revealed 
good reliability.  
5.2.2.3. Mood 
 The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) consists of two 10-items mood scales that respectively measure 
positive and negative affect, both as states and traits. Participants are asked to rate the 
extent to which they experience particular emotions right now concerning a five-point 
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very much). Examples of 
emotions would be as such, ‘distressed’ or ‘excited’. The French version of the PANAS 
was translated by Gaudreau, Sanchez and Blondin (2006) with a back-translation 
procedure. Cronbach’s alphas have been computed on the English (Positive affect, α = 
.90; Negative affect, α = .93) and French version (Positive affect, α = .85; Negative 
affect, α = .91) of the positive and negative subscales of the questionnaire and revealed 
good reliability.  
5.2.2.4. Future thinking 
The Future-Self Thoughts questionnaire (FST; McElwee & Haugh, 2010) 
consists of 11 items designed to assess two dimensions of thoughts about one’s future 
selves: (i) Frequency, the extent to which participants spontaneously think of 
themselves in the future, and (ii) Clarity, the vividness with which participants “see” 
themselves in the future. Participants are asked to rate the extent to which each 
statement describes how they think or act in their daily life, using a six-point Likert-scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all true for me) to 6 (completely true for me). For example, a 
question like ‘When I daydream, I often see myself as I may be in the future’, measures 
Future-self thoughts frequency, and questions like ‘My future seems vague and 
uncertain to me’ measures their clarity. The French version of the FST was translated 
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by Stawarczyk et al. (2012) with a back-translation procedure. Cronbach’s alphas have 
been computed on the English (Frequency, α = .91; Clarity, α = .58) and French version 
(Frequency, α = .82; Clarity, α = .57) of the Frequency and Clarity subscales of the 
questionnaire and revealed good reliability considering the number of items within each 
subscales (Frequency, 6 items; Clarity, 5 items). 
5.2.2.5. Self-attentiveness 
The Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999) consists of 24 items designed to assess reflection and rumination where 
participants are asked to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree to statements. 
Answers are given on a five-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 
(Strongly agree). According to Trapnell & Campbell (1999), rumination and reflection 
both involve heightened attention to self. Rumination is "self-attentiveness motivated by 
perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self"; reflection is "self-attentiveness 
motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self" (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, 
p.297). For example, ‘My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop 
thinking about’ for rumination and ‘I'm very self-inquisitive by nature’ for reflection. This 
questionnaire was translated to French by Fluckiger (2009). Cronbach’s alpha were 
computed on the English (Reflection, α = .86; Rumination, α = .91) and French version 
(Reflection, α = .82; Rumination, α = .87) of the Reflection and Rumination subscales 
of the questionnaire and revealed good reliability. 
5.2.2.6. Cognitive failures 
The Cognitive Failure Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald, & 
Parkes, 1982) consists of 25 items measuring self-reported failures in perception, 
memory, and motor function. Participants are told that the questions will be about minor 
mistakes which everyone makes from time to time, but some of which happen more 
often than others. They must rate how often these things have happened to them in the 
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last six months on a five-point Likert-scale from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). For example, 
‘Do you fail to notice signposts on the road?’. The French version used in the present 
study was translated by Fluckiger (2009). Cronbach’s alphas have been computed on 
the English (α = .91) and French version (α = .87) of the questionnaire and revealed 
good reliability. 
5.2.2.7. Depressive symptoms 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996) is a 
widely used tool for assessing the severity of depressive symptomatology. The 21 items 
are rated on a four-point Likert scale, from 0 to 3 points. Scores range from 0 to 63. For 
example, ‘Past failure’ can be answered by either (0) I do not feel like a failure, (1) I 
have failed more than I should have, (2) As I look back, I see a lot of failures or (3) I feel 
I am a total failure as a person. The French version used in this study was translated 
by Fluckiger (2009) and was validated in both clinical (depressed) and nonclinical 
samples. Cronbach’s alphas have been computed on the English (α = .94) and French 
version (α = .88) of the questionnaire and revealed good reliability. 
5.2.3. Procedure 
 Recruitment of the participants for this study was via social media and a poster 
campaign both in France and the United Kingdom (UK). Participants took part in this 
study online using Qualtrics’ survey software (qualtrics.com). All of the questionnaires 
(DDFS, MAAS, PANAS, FST, RRQ, CFQ and the BDI) were presented in a randomised 
order. Before the end of the session, participants completed demographic information 
– gender, age, number of years of education, native language, and country of 
residence. Participants took approximately 30 minutes to complete the questionnaires. 
The survey was completed anonymously and no compensation was given for 
participation.  
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5.3. Results 
 Pearson’s correlations were initially conducted between each measure for both 
language conditions (English, French). Analyses replicated previous findings by 
revealing the commonly found negative correlation linking mind-wandering to age, and 
positive correlations linking mind-wandering to mindfulness, cognitive failures, and 
depression scores (see Table 5.1.). 
5.3.1. Effect of native language 
 In order to investigate the differences between French and English native 
speakers, Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted on participants’ scores on 
the questionnaires (DDFS, MAAS, PA, NA, FST Clarity, FST Frequency, Rumination, 
Reflection, CFQ, and BDI). Regarding positive mood, an effect of native Language 
indicates that English speakers tended to have less positive thoughts than French 
speakers, F (1, 306) = 15.22, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05.  Considering rumination, results 
showed an effect of native language, indicating that English speakers tended to 
ruminate more than French speakers, F (1, 306) = 14.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05. Finally, 
results on the reflection measure revealed an effect of native language, indicating that 
English speakers tended to reflect less than French speakers, F (1, 306) = 19.70, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .06.  Mean and standard deviation scores for each measure are presented 
in Table 5.2. In summary, results demonstrated that French native speakers reported 
more positive emotions, ruminated less, and experienced more reflection than English 
native speakers. 
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Table 5.1. Correlations between variables for both English and French speakers individually and jointly. 
  1. Age 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
2. DDFS English -.26 *** -         
 French -.35 *** -         
 Total -.31 *** -         
3. MAAS English .16 * -.49 *** -        
 French .10 -.45 ** -        
 Total .13 * -.47 *** -        
4. PANAS 
Positive 
English .11 -.12 -.00 -       
French .02 -.13 .19 * -       
 Total .07 -.11 .10 -       
5. PANAS 
Negative 
English -.08 .24 ** -.36 *** -.02 -      
French -.04 .19 * -.37 *** -.09 -      
 Total -.06 .22 *** -.35 *** .04 -      
6. FST 
Clarity 
English .03 -.06 .24 ** .33 *** -.34 *** -     
French .06 -.27 *** .27 *** .26 *** -.27 *** -     
 Total .04 -.17 ** .25 *** .27 *** -.31 *** -     
7. FST 
Frequency 
English -.38 *** .35 *** -.33 *** .08 .15 .13  -    
French -.31 *** .37 *** -.37 *** -.05 .22 ** .09 -    
 Total -.35 *** .36 *** -.35 *** .02 .18 *** .10 -    
8. RRQ 
Rumination 
English -.31 *** .51 *** -.47 *** -.28 *** .41 *** -.18 * .32 *** -   
French -.12 .36 *** -.40 *** -.27 *** .47 *** -.23 ** .42 *** -   
 Total -.22 *** .41 *** -.44 *** -.31 *** .42 *** -.19 *** .36 *** -   
9. RRQ 
Reflection 
English .11 .21 *** -.16  .20 * .13 .09 .09 .13  -  
French -.06 .27 *** -.07 .13 -.04 .10 .24 ** .06 -  
 Total .03 .24 *** -.09 * .21 *** .06 .08 .16 *** .04 -  
10. CFQ English -.07 .42 *** -.74 *** -.10 .39 *** -.26 *** .19 * .45 *** .06 - 
 French -.15 .51 *** -.68 *** -.24 ** .37 *** -.25 ** .34 *** .39 *** .09 - 
 Total -.11 .46 *** -.71 *** -.18 ** .37 *** -.24 *** .26 *** .43 *** .05 - 
11. BDI English -.13 .39 *** -.53 *** -.33 *** .64 *** -.39 *** .22 ** .58 *** .11 .58 *** 
 French -.20 * .43 *** -.38 *** -.53 *** .54 *** -.37 *** .28 ** .55 *** -.08 .47 *** 
 Total -16 ** .40 *** -.46 *** -.40 *** .59 *** -.38 *** .24 *** .54 *** .03 .53 *** 
Note. * p < .05, **  p < .01, and ***  p < .001 
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5.3.2. Effect of Age and native Language  
 In order to investigate individual changes across the lifespan, both samples 
were divided into three age groups (Table 5.3.: Young: 18-35, Middle-aged: 36-54 and 
Older adults: 55+). 
 
Table 5.3. Age means, standard deviations, and number of participants for each 
defined age group for both the English and French native speaker samples. 
 English  French  Total 
 Mean SD N 
 
Mean SD N  Mean SD N 
Young 21.77 4.36 108 
 
22.55 3.92 105  22.15 4.16 212 
Middle-
age 
44.40 4.71 25 
 
46.03 5.72 31 
 
45.30 5.31 56 
Old 64.10 5.79 21 
 
65.72 5.72 18  64.85 5.48 39 
Total 31.21 16.15 154 
 
32.32 15.96 154  31.77 16.04 308 
Table 5.2. Mean scores, standard deviation and number of participants of pertinent 
measures. 
Measures English speakers French speakers 
 Mean SD N Mean SD N 
DDFS  3.46 .74 154 3.53 .83 154 
MAAS 3.98 .87 154 4.11 .77 154 
PANAS – Positive *** 2.57 .74 154 2.90 .73 154 
PANAS – Negative  1.79 .79 154 1.91 .83 154 
FST – Clarity 3. 610 1.11 154 3.46 1.20 154 
FST – Frequency 3.65 1.31 154 3.63 1.16 154 
RRQ – Rumination 
*** 
3.73 .85 154 3.36 .87 154 
RRQ – Reflection *** 3.27 .72 154 3.65 .78 154 
CFQ 1.84 .60 154 1.74 .62 154 
BDI 15.76 12.43 154 16.04 9.78 154 
Note. ***  p < .001 
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5.3.2.1. Mind-wandering 
 A 3 (Age; Young, Middle-Aged, Old) by 2 (Language; English, French) ANOVA 
was conducted on the DDFS daydreaming scores.  A main effect of age was significant, 
F (2, 302) = 12.63, p < .001, ηp
2 = .08, indicating that young adults (M = 3.62, SD = .73) 
and middle-aged adults (M = 3.38, SD = .81) tend to mind wander more frequently than 
older adults (M = 2.97, SD = .82), p < .001, p = .022. Young and middle-aged adults did 
not differ in their mind-wandering scores, p = .159.  
 The interaction between language and age was significant, F (2, 302) = 3.93, p 
= .021, ηp
2 = .03. The decomposition of this interaction revealed that in the English-
speaking group, the effect of age was significant, F (2, 151) = 8.69, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10, 
indicating that young (M = 3.53, SD = .73) and middle-aged adults (M = 3.62, SD = .54) 
were not different in their mind-wandering frequency. However, both young and middle-
aged adults reported more mind-wandering than older adults (M = 2.87, SD = .76), 
respectively p < .001 and p = .001. In the French speaker group, the effect of age was 
also significant, F (2, 151) = 8.44, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10. Results showed that young adults 
(M = 3.70, SD = .73) had higher mind-wandering frequency than middle-aged (M = 3.18, 
SD = .93), p = .004 and older adults, (M = 3.09, SD = .89), p = .008. However, middle-
aged adults and older adults mind-wandering frequency was equivalent, p = .999. 
These data presented in Figure 5.1 demonstrate an earlier decrease in mind-
wandering frequency in the French speaking group (between 36 and 54 years old). 
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5.3.2.2. Mindfulness 
 A 3 (Age; Young, Middle-Aged, Old) by 2 (Language; English, French) ANOVA 
was conducted on MAAS scores. A main effect of age was evidenced, F (2, 302) = 3.57, 
p = .029, ηp
2 = .02, indicating that young (M = 4.00, SD = .82) had a tendency to be less 
mindful than older adults (M = 4.37, SD = .80), p =.033. Young and older adults did not 
differ from middle-aged adults (M = 3.98, SD = .81) on this score, respectively p = .999 
and p = .058. 
 Results suggested an increase of mindfulness as one grows older, in line with 
results regarding mind-wandering. However, mindfulness does not seem to be 
influenced by cultural differences between the two populations. 
5.3.2.3. Mood 
 A 2 (Valance; Positive, Negative) by 3 (Age; Young, Middle-Aged, Old) by 2 
(Language; English, French) ANOVA was conduct on PANAS scores. The main effect 
of valence was significant, indicating that participants tended to express more positive 
affect (M = 2.74, SD = .75) than negative (M = 1.85, SD = .81), F (1, 302) = 131.09, p 
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Figure 5.1. The effects of participants' native Language 
(English, French) and their age group (Young, Middle-age, Old) 
on mind-wandering frequency measured by the DDFS.  
Note: Error bars represent Standard Errors. 
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< .001, ηp
2 = .30. The main effect of native language revealed that English participants 
(M = 2.18, SD = .54) tend to express less affect than their French counterparts (M = 
2.40, SD = .53), F (1, 302) = 7.21, p = .008, ηp
2 = .02.  
 Results revealed a general tendency for participants to express more positive 
affect than negative ones. In addition, French native speakers tended to be more 
expressive than English native speakers.  
5.3.2.4. Future thinking 
 A 2 (Specificity; Clarity, Frequency) by 3 (Age; Young, Middle-Aged, Old) by 2 
(Language; English, French) repeated measure ANOVA was conduct on FST scores. 
The main effect of age was significant, F (2, 302) = 6.63, p = .002, ηp
2 = .04, indicating 
that young adults (M = 3.58, SD = .75), scored higher on the future-self thoughts 
questionnaire than older adults (M = 2.96, SD = .78), p = .002. Young and older adults 
did not differ from middle-aged adults (M = 3.23, SD = 1.01) on this score, respectively, 
p = .231 and p = .336.  
 The interaction between specificity and age was significant, F (2, 302) = 11.01, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .07 (Figure 5.2.). The decomposition of the interaction showed that 
future-self thoughts clarity did not change across life span, F (2, 305) = .163, p = .850, 
ηp
2 = .00, whereas its frequency did, F (2, 305) = 17.495, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10. Results 
revealed that young adults (M = 3.88, SD = 1.17) had more frequent future-self thoughts 
than middle-aged adults (M = 3.30, SD = 1.31), p = .004 and older adults (M = 2.77, SD 
= .98), p < .001. Middle-aged adults and older adults had a similar frequency of future-
self thoughts, p = .090.  
 Therefore, results demonstrate that the frequency of future-self thoughts 
decreases with age for both French and English speakers. The clarity of the thoughts 
however, was not influenced by either age or culture.  
 
113 
 
5.3.2.5. Self-attentiveness 
 A 2 (Self-Attentiveness; Rumination, Reflection) by 3 (Age; Young, Middle-
Aged, Old) by 2 (Language; English, French) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on RRQ scores. The main effect of age was significant [F (2, 302) = 3.35, p 
= .037, ηp
2 = .02], indicating that older adults (M = 3.27, SD = .59) had less self-attentive 
thoughts than young adults (M = 3.55, SD = .59), p = .031. Young and older adults did 
not differ from middle-aged adults (M = 3.49, SD = .61) on self-attentiveness, 
respectively p = .999 and p = .218. The three-way interaction between self-
attentiveness, language and age was not significant, F (2, 302) = 1.20, p = .303, ηp
2 = 
.01, however, the three two-way interactions revealed interesting findings.  
 The interaction between self-attentiveness and age was significant, F (2, 302) = 
4.829, p = .009, ηp
2 = .03.  Further analyses revealed that reflection rates did not change 
across life span, F (2, 305) = 1.01, p = .365, ηp
2 = .01, whereas rumination rates did, F 
(2, 450) = 7.36, p = .001, ηp2 = .03. As such, young adults (M = 3.66, SD = .06) 
ruminated more than older adults (M = 3.16, SD = .14), p = .003. Middle-aged (M = 
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Figure 5.2. The effect of interaction between future-self thoughts 
(FST) specificity (Clarity, Frequency) and participants’ age group 
(Young, Middle-age, Old).  
Note: Error bars represent Standard Errors. 
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3.39, SD = .12) adults did not differ from young or older adults on this measure, 
respectively p = .112 and p = .607.  
 The interaction between self-attentiveness and native language was significant 
F (1, 302) = 8.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .05.  Further analyses showed that both rumination 
and reflection rates differed as a condition of culture, respectively F (1, 306) = 14.70, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .05 and F (1, 306) = 19.70, p < .001, ηp
2 = .06. However, English native 
speakers presented higher rates of rumination (M = 3.73, SD = .85) and lower rates of 
reflection (M = 3.27, SD = .72) than French native speakers (Rumination, M = 3.36, SD 
= .87; Reflection, M = 3.65, SD = .78). 
 The interaction between language and age was significant, F (2, 302) = 3.99, p 
= .018, ηp
2 = .03. Decomposition of the interaction demonstrated that in the case of 
French native speakers, age did not have an impact on the overall measure of self-
attentiveness, F (2, 151) = 1.81, p = .168, ηp
2 = .02. However, age seemed to have an 
impact on the overall measure of self-attentiveness in the English native speaker’s 
group, F (2, 151) = 6.06, p = .003, ηp
2 = .07. As such, young (M = 3.54, SD = .06) and 
middle-aged adults (M = 3.68, SD = .12) presented higher rates of self-attentiveness 
than older adults (M = 3.12, SD = .13), respectively p = .008 and p = .004. Young and 
middle-aged adults presented similar scores on this measure, p = .810.  
 Results demonstrated cultural and age difference regarding attention toward the 
self as measured by rumination and reflection. Firstly, findings showed that only 
rumination rates seem to be impacted by age, with a decrease of such thoughts as age 
increases. Secondly, French and British citizens presented an opposite pattern of self-
attentiveness, with French native speakers engaging more in self-reflection and less in 
rumination than English native speakers. Finally, self-attentiveness revealed to be 
stable across time in the French population but not the British one, where a decrease 
occurs in later age. These data are summarised in Figure 5.3. 
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5.3.2.6. Cognitive failures 
 A 3 (Age; Young, Middle-Aged, Old) by 2 (Language; English, French) ANOVA 
was carried out on the CFQ scores and revealed no significant effects. Surprisingly, 
findings did not evidence any age effect on this measure of cognitive failure.  
5.3.2.7. Depressive symptoms 
 A 3 (Age; Young, Middle-Aged, Old) by 2 (Language; English, French) ANOVA 
was carried out on BDI scores.  A significant main effect of age was evidenced, F (2, 
302) = 4.47, p = .012, ηp
2 = .03, indicating that young adults (M = 16.83, SD = 11.58) 
tended to score higher on the depression inventory than older adults (M = 10.95, SD = 
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Figure 5.3. Effects of culture and age on 
rumination and reflection scores.  
a. The effect of participants' age (Young, 
Middle-age, Old) on Rumination and 
Reflection rates.  
b. The effect of participants' native 
Language (English, French) on 
Rumination and Reflection.  
c. The effect of participants' native 
Language (English, French) and their 
age group (Young, Middle-age, Old) on 
their overall self-attentiveness rates.  
Note: Error bars represent Standard Errors 
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9.70), p = .009. Middle-aged adults (M = 15.80, SD = 9.69) scores on the depression 
inventory were similar to both young, p = .999 and older adults, p = .090.  
 Results regarding depressive symptoms did not reveal any cultural differences, 
but did show an effect of age, indicating that young adults tended to be more depressed 
than older adults.  
5.3.3. Confirmatory factor analysis. 
 Based on the literature and the aforementioned primary analyses, it is clear that 
mind-wandering experiences are eclectic by nature. Specifically, three features seem 
to be associated with mind-wandering experiences: self-orientation, negative mood, 
and attentional skills. In this study, the self-related construct was measured by the 
reflection and future-self thoughts frequency subscales; the negative construct was 
measured by the depressive symptoms, negative affect and rumination scales; and the 
attentional construct was measured by the mindfulness and cognitive failures 
questionnaires. In consideration of the literature, the model will also implement age as 
a factor influencing mind-wandering frequency. To assess the fit of our measurement 
model to the data formally, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used. Conclusions 
about structural model fits were based on commonly used fit indices with cut-offs 
suggested by Kline (2015): χ2 /df < 2; CFI > .90 for reasonably good fit; RMSEA < .05 
for good fit, < .08 for reasonable fit.  
 The fit indices of the model were as follows; χ2 (19) = 60.80, p < .001, χ2 /df = 
3.20, CFI = .949, RMSEA = .085. All measures loaded significantly on the negative and 
attentional construct. Reflection marginally loaded on the self-related construct (.189). 
However, it seemed that only age (-.155) and the attentional construct (-.363) 
significantly predicted mind-wandering. Each of the four factors (self-related, negative, 
attentional and age) co-varied significantly with each other. Although rumination was 
suspected to be largely associated with the negative construct, by nature rumination 
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has a self-related component. Therefore, with the aim of improving the model, 
rumination scores were added to the self-related construct. This change was based on 
modification indexes from this analysis, and in accordance with theory; by definition 
ruminative thoughts are self-related. This new model, presented in Figure 5.4, showed 
to have a reasonably good fit; χ2(18) = 40.29, p = .002, χ2 /df = 2.24, CFI = .973, RMSEA 
= .064. The fit of the model was improved, and each measure loaded significantly on 
its construct of interest. In this new model, only the attentional (-.308) and self-related 
constructs (.314) predicted mind-wandering frequency, while the four factors co-varied 
significantly with each other.  
 Next, a group comparison was conducted to identify if the fit of the model 
differed between French and English native speakers. To do so, two models were 
compared: one allowing for variability between the two groups (H1), and one restricting 
the loading of the four factors (self-related, negative, attentional and age) to an equal 
number in both populations (null hypothesis, H0). Although the overall fit statistics show 
that both models are a good fit (H1, χ2(36) = 58.86, p = .009, χ2 /df = 1.63, CFI = .973, 
RMSEA = .046; H0, χ2(40) = 73.23, p = .001, χ2 /df = 1.83, CFI = .961, RMSEA = .052), 
the nested model comparison that assesses the worsening of overall fit due to imposing 
the four restrictions on the original model shows to be statistically significant χ2(4) = 
14.37, p = .006. This finding suggests that the two models differ, and that the model 
with equal factor loadings (H0) should be rejected in favour of the original model (H1). 
Consequently, the model created here does not fit French and English native speakers 
equally and therefore separation is warranted.  
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  Looking only at English native speakers the model showed to have a 
reasonably good fit; χ2 (18) = 27.17, p = .076, χ2 /df = 1.51, CFI = .980, RMSEA = .058. 
As shown in Table 5.4. the negative (.030) and attentional constructs (-.001) did not 
significantly contribute to mind-wandering frequency. Therefore, the model was 
improved by removing these two direct effects. The fit of the new model was good; χ2 
(20) = 27.19, p = .130, χ2 /df = 1.36, CFI = .984, RMSEA = .048. However, the 
contribution of reflection was not significant (.118). Therefore, with the aim to improve 
Figure 5.4. Structural equation model predicting mind-wandering frequency with self-
related, negative and attentional constructs and age.  
Single-headed arrows connecting latent variables (circles) and observed variable 
(rectangles) represent standardised path coefficients, indicating the contribution of the 
variables. Double-headed arrows connecting the factors represent the correlations 
among the factors. 
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further this model the measure of reflection was removed. The third model created for 
the English native speakers was of very good fit; χ2(13) = 12.17, p = .514, χ2 /df = 0.94, 
CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000. This final model is presented in Figure 5.5. As can be seen, 
in this population only age and self-related thoughts are directly influencing mind-
wandering frequency. It is worth noting that the negative (.457) and attentional 
constructs (-.582) significantly co-varied with the self-related construct and most likely 
contributed indirectly to mind-wandering frequency.  
 Looking only at French native speakers the model revealed to have a 
reasonable fit; χ2(18) = 31.69, p = .024, χ2 /df = 1.76, CFI = .965, RMSEA = .071. As 
shown in Table 5.4 the self-related (.068) and negative constructs (.102) did not 
significantly contribute to mind-wandering frequency. Therefore, the model was 
improved by removing these two direct effects. The fit of the new model was reasonably 
good; χ2(20) = 33.23, p = .032, χ2 /df = 1.66, CFI = .967, RMSEA = .066. Based on 
modification indexes from this analysis this model was further improved by added a 
direct path between reflection and mind-wandering frequency. The third model created 
for the French native speakers was of good fit; χ2(19) = 22.29, p = .270, χ2 /df = 1.17, 
CFI = .992, RMSEA = .034. This final model is presented in Figure 5.5. As can be seen, 
in this population it is age, attentional skills and reflection that are directly influencing 
mind-wandering frequency. It is worth noting that the self-related (-.352) and negative 
constructs (-.677) significantly co-varied with the attentional construct and most likely 
contributed indirectly to mind-wandering frequency. Finally, rumination scores did not 
significantly load onto the self-related construct (.166) yet removing it from this construct 
did not improve the model fit; χ2(20) = 30.51, p = .062, χ2 /df = 1.53, CFI = .973, RMSEA 
= .059.  
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Figure 5.5. Structural equation model predicting mind-wandering frequency with different constructs in a population of native English speakers 
(left) and native French speakers (right).  
Single-headed arrows connecting latent variables (circles) and observed variable (rectangles) represent standardised path coefficients, 
indicating the contribution of the variables. Double-headed arrows connecting the factors represent the correlations among the factors. 
121 
 
 
Table 5.4. Factor loading for models with data from both groups separately. 
 
 English native speakers 
 
French native speakers 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
R
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 
Self-related    
 
   
 Reflection  .117 .118 - 
 
.233 .211 .195 
 Future Fq. .528 1 .525 1 .523 1 
 
1.026 1 1.122 1 1.209 1 
 Rumination .446 *** .448 *** .434 *** 
 
.208 .184  .166 
Negative    
 
   
 Depressive S. .959 1 .958 1 .955 1 
 
.819 1 .810 1 .811 1 
 Negative A. .667 *** .667 *** .669 *** 
 
.659 *** .665 *** .664 *** 
 Rumination  .401 *** .392 *** .406 *** 
 
.609 *** .626 *** .635 *** 
Attentional    
 
   
 Cognitive F. -.860 *** -.860 *** -.861 *** 
 
-.855 *** -.845 *** -.844 *** 
 Mindfulness .863 1 .862 1 .861 1 
 
.795 1 .794 1 .794 1 
Mind-wandering         
 Self-related .933 *** .963 *** 1.00 *** 
 
.068 - - 
 Negative .030 - - 
 
.102 - - 
 Attentional -.001 - - 
 
-.456 *** -.562 *** -.545 *** 
 Age .323 .338 * .403 * 
 
-.245 *** -.267 *** -.258 *** 
 Reflection - - - 
 
- - .209 *** 
C
o
v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 
Self / Negative .449 ** .467 *** .457 *** 
 
.330 *** .307 *** .288 *** 
Self / Attentional -.592 *** -.598 *** -.582 ***  
 
-.410 *** -.385 *** -.352 *** 
Self / Age -.625 *** -.626 *** -.664 *** 
 
-.300 *** -.276 *** -.257 *** 
Negative / Attentional -.669 *** -.670 *** -.672 ***   
 
-.649 *** -.668 *** -.677 *** 
Negative / Age -.132 -.132 -.132 
 
-.169 ᵻ -.170 ᵻ -.173 ᵻ 
Attentional / Age .134 .134 .134  
 
.153 .153 .153 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, ᵻ p < .07, and 1 regression weighed at 1. 
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5.4. Discussion  
 Given the myriad of evidence demonstrating strong socio-cultural influences on 
cognition and behaviour, it is surprising that cultural impacts on internal trains of thought 
have been neglected.  This study aimed to investigate the influence of culture on mind-
wandering experience across different age groups, by comparing a population of 
English (UK) and French (France) speakers. This approach considered not only 
differences in the frequency of mind-wandering but critical characteristics and content 
that shape the occurrence of such self-generate thoughts. Overall, the data highlighted 
how culture drives differences in age-related declines in mind-wandering frequency. 
Importantly, socio-cultural experience impacted on the frequency of relatively more 
negative (rumination) and positive (reflection) thoughts, as well as participants’ overall 
affective expressiveness. Finally, evidence suggests that different theoretical models, 
for the French and British populations, capture the complex relationships between 
mind-wandering and related features.   
 Consider first the frequently observed age-related decrease in mind-wandering 
frequency. Research using both self-report questionnaires (Giambra, 1989) and 
experience sampling in laboratory settings (Jackson & Balota, 2012) has demonstrated 
a reduction of mind-wandering as we age. Early explanations focussed on the cognitive 
capacity view of ageing to explain this counter-intuitive finding. In ageing, the capacity 
to direct attention and resources to the task at hand declines, resulting in a decreased 
ability to switch or share resources between activities and internal trains of thought. The 
executive failure account of mind-wandering experience (Riby, Smallwood, & Gunn, 
2008; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) suggests that one’s cognitive control enables the 
flexible adjustment of mind-wandering events, such as reducing its occurrence in the 
context of a difficult task. In a similar vein, older adults’ lower cognitive control may 
prevent them from engaging in mind-wandering experience while performing cognitive 
tasks. Co-ordinating multiple tasks and executive deficits of this nature have been 
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widely reported in the ageing literature (for a meta-analysis see Riby et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, during ongoing tasks, if both task-related and task-unrelated thoughts are 
probed, older adults tend to report concerns about their performance. This task-related 
interference has been reported to be more dominant in older adults than young adults 
(e.g. McVay et al., 2013). Anxiety, worry, and monitoring of performance for older adults 
may demand cognitive resources to maintain performance, and further reduce the 
possibility of task-unrelated thoughts to emerge.  
When comparing our two populations, results evidenced an earlier decrease in 
mind-wandering for the French speakers (36-54 years old), than for the English 
speakers (over 55 years old). Most research on ageing does not include this middle age 
group in their investigation, yet findings suggest that this period may well be subject to 
changes in mind-wandering rate.  Early stage theories (Erikson, 1978) suggest moving 
from middle-age to later adulthood is a critical point in development, and many 
moderators of successful progression and ageing have been identified. Sociocultural 
context influences our roles, beliefs and values, and shapes our identity and thought 
processes, even when we are approaching later adulthood. Together, this suggests that 
individuals’ sensitivity to changes at this time of life can support modifications in mind-
wandering experiences. However, one must consider the nature of the items composing 
the DDFS. The focus is mainly made on one’s general tendency to mind wander as a 
whole, which perhaps is not sensitive enough to capture the very nature of the different 
thought processes that are included under the umbrella terms of daydreaming and 
mind-wandering. As such, questionnaires measuring more specific type of thoughts can 
be highly informative.  
 Examination of individual differences in self-focus (rumination vs self-reflection) 
is particularly informative regarding the aforementioned age-related declines in mind-
wandering frequency. While reflection rates seem stable across ages, rumination rates 
evidenced a drop in later adulthood. Rumination involves negatively oriented thought 
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content (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), and has been associated with perceived 
threats, losses, or injustice to the self (Joireman, 2004), and the daydreaming style 
Guilt-fear of Failure (characterised by anguished fears, fantasies and aggression; 
Shrimpton et al., 2017). During early adulthood, a large number of decisions made will 
inevitably shape ones’ future in the short and/or long term. As evidenced by the 
literature on the reminiscence bump, this period of life is known to be filed with key life 
events such as falling in love, starting a new job, and building a family (Rathbone, 
Moulin, & Conway, 2008). Inevitably, at the time where such important events are 
experienced or anticipated, one can expect greater future-related thoughts (e.g. see 
results on future-self thoughts; Stawarczyk et al., 2012), but also greater anguished 
fears, fantasies, or perceived threats to the self. Critically, these elements largely 
support ruminative thoughts and could explain the higher rates found in younger adults 
compared to older adults. This interpretation is further corroborated by younger adults’ 
tendency to be subject to anxiety and depressive symptoms (Jorm, 2000), which are 
commonly associated with higher rates of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  
In contrast with rumination, self-reflection is defined as self-attentiveness 
motivated by curiosity in the self. A self-reflective thinking style enables problem-solving 
and promotes good mental health (Takano & Tanno, 2009; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
Previous research has highlighted the positive nature of such thoughts with reflection 
associated with the positive-constructive daydreaming style (Shrimpton et al, 2017). 
Here it is suggested that the resilient features of self-reflection, such as openness to 
experience, self-knowledge (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), perspective taking (Joireman, 
III, & Hammersla, 2002), and the ability to learn from mistakes (Joireman, 2004) are 
essential across all stages of life. Major self-reassessment triggered by social and 
personal events occur at any moment in life, whether it is choosing a career path, 
building a family, managing teenagers or ageing parents, or adapting to physical and 
cognitive changes in later adulthood (Demo, 1992; Helson & Moane, 1987; Neugarten, 
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1974). Therefore, it is not surprising that the therapeutic value of self-reflection is used 
across all ages (Appelbaum, 1973; Conte et al., 1990). 
 Focusing on the impact of culture, rumination rates were found to be higher for 
English than French native speakers, whereas the opposite pattern was evidenced for 
reflective rates. As previously outlined, self-reflection is of great value for openness to 
experience, self-knowledge, perspective taking, and the ability to learn from our 
mistakes. The benefits of self-reflection are in line with more general positive outcomes 
associated with mind-wandering including creativity, goal planning and future planning 
(Koestner, Lekes, Powers, & Chicoine, 2002; Smallwood et al., 2011; Verhaeghen, 
Joormann, & Aikman, 2014). Therefore, reflection seems particularly important in the 
context of positive life changes, as opposed to the relatively more negative rumination 
counterpart. Bearing in mind the results on mood (see discussion below), one could 
infer that the higher emotional expressiveness found in French speakers, may enable 
a larger gathering of self-knowledge throughout life; therefore, raising reflection rates. 
Interestingly, some features of this population illustrate this idea. For example, rates of 
professional reconversion elicited in France are relatively high; in 2012, a survey was 
conducted in France indicating that 60% of the working population declared having 
changed their area of work at least once (Ipsos, 2012). Among those, 55% declared 
that the change was by their own will and not because of dismissal, and 71% stated 
that this decision marked a change in their life beyond the professional aspect of things. 
In this context, great self-reflection skills are required, such as the ability to learn from 
one’s mistakes, or openness to new experiences. Despite the lack of research on the 
impact of culture on reflection’ rates, these elements suggest a concrete explanation of 
the French speakers’ higher rates of reflection. In contrast, British citizens’ propensity 
to be less expressive about their emotions can be interpreted as a tendency to avoid 
the processing of feelings. Rumination is related to more avoidance and extrinsic 
content of goals (Thomsen, Tønnesvang, Schnieber, & Olesen, 2011), while expressive 
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writing interventions showed a reduction in the occurrence of ruminative thoughts in 
formerly depressed patients (Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 2006). Together, this 
suggests that British citizens’ tendency to overlook their feelings may foster ruminative 
thoughts as opposed to reflective ones. 
 Ultimately, the impact of culture and age on the overall rates of self-focused 
thoughts are in line with the previously discussed findings. Self-centred thoughts 
showed to be stable in the French native speakers’ population, while a significant 
decrease occurred for English native speakers in later adulthood. Keeping in mind that 
French citizens self-focused thoughts are largely composed of self-reflection, and that 
self-reflection was evidenced as a stable feature across ages, one may consider that 
the unchanged rates of self-focus in this population is an expression of self-reflection 
foremost. Similarly, the observed decrease of self-focus thoughts for older native 
English speakers may be driven by the decrease of ruminative thoughts in this stage of 
life, and the reliance on these type of thoughts for the British population.  
 A further critical component influencing mind-wandering considered here is 
mindfulness abilities across the lifespan. This finding has been evidenced previously in 
the ageing literature, yet no clear interpretation of why this increase occurs has been 
suggested (Splevins et al., 2009). Mindfulness is defined as the ability to be focused on 
the present moment and often involves greater attention to detail and effective 
processing of stimuli in the environment. This increase in mindfulness may illustrate the 
age-related decrease of mind-wandering frequency and the increase of performance 
monitoring (i.e. Task-relevant interference; McVay et al., 2013). A somewhat simplistic 
view is that both concepts have been considered as opposite constructs, however 
numerous examples suggest that both mind-wandering and mindfulness can have 
benefits, as both increase creativity (Baird et al., 2012; Lebuda, Zabelina, & Karwowski, 
2016). Research should further explore this apparent paradox.  
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 Another component supporting the age-related decrease in mind-wandering 
frequency, is the reported reduction in the frequency of future-self thoughts with 
increased age. Prior research has demonstrated a decrease in future-self thought 
frequency as one gets older, with no age differences regarding the clarity of the 
thoughts (Berntsen et al., 2015; Stawarczyk et al., 2012). That is, the quality and 
vividness of the thoughts remain stable, merely their quantity decreases. This effect on 
the frequency may be due to a decrease in future perspectives as we grow old, thus 
inducing either fewer future-selves to think about, or a personal bias that leads to 
avoiding future perspectives progressively, consciously or not. From the literature the 
important contribution of future thinking to mind-wandering episodes is explicit (Baird et 
al., 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Smallwood et al., 2009). Therefore, this suggests 
that the reduced frequency of self-future thoughts experienced by older adults will 
inevitably induce a reduction of the general mind-wandering frequency. 
 The present study also incorporated measures of depression as well as 
rumination, both previously identified as important components of mind wandering. 
Depressive symptoms are closely associated with rumination (Austin et al., 2001; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and related research has reported higher mind-wandering 
frequency in dysphoric patients (Smallwood et al., 2005). Results here evidenced a 
decrease in depressive symptoms with age, alongside the decrease of mind-wandering 
frequency and future thinking. This age-related decrease in depressive symptoms, 
which may appear counter-intuitive, has been illustrated in the literature for a “young 
old” population. Indeed, previous research on age differences in depression has 
frequently shown the “young old” (i.e. 55 to 75; Neugarten, 1974) to be less depressed 
than middle-aged and younger adults (Gatz & Hurwicz, 1990; Jorm, 2000). However, 
the “old old” adults tend to have quite high levels of depression. Here, in the older adult 
group, participants were above 55 years of age with an average of 64.85, therefore, 
fitting into the “young old” category. Altogether, findings suggest that the age-related 
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decrease in depressive symptoms could contribute to the age-related reduction of mind-
wandering episodes, along with the reduced future thinking frequency and increased 
mindfulness abilities.  This therefore gives further insight into the relationship between 
depressive thoughts and mind-wandering.  
 Nevertheless, another element was theoretically expected to support the age-
related decrease in mind-wandering frequency. Mind-wandering has long been 
associated with attentional deficits, thus indicating the importance to measure cognitive 
failures. Older adults have widely been reported to have difficulties on measures of 
executive control (e.g. Braver & West, 2008) but self-reported failures were not 
observed here. However, other studies seem to be in line with our findings. For 
example, a normative study did not evidence any correlations between CFQ scores 
(Broadbent et al., 1982) and any demographic factors, including age. An explanation is 
the difficulty for older adults to report their cognitive failures, or more general difficulties, 
in the sensitivity of the measure to capture change (especially given the data was 
acquired online), compared to laboratory measures of executive dysfunction. Indeed, 
older adults tend to claim to have remarkable worries about their cognitive abilities, but 
do not seem to be able to record the cognitive lapses that are known to increase in 
ageing (Mecacci & Righi, 2006). Additionally, data acquisition (i.e. online study) is a 
confounding factor that needs to be kept in mind when considering this result, as it may 
have induced a selective bias.  
 Limited work has been carried out on the individual differences in thought 
processes across French and English speakers. Therefore, precise predictions 
regarding the impact of the emotionality of thought content are difficult to generate. 
Overall, English speakers showed less extreme positive and negative emotions than 
their French counterparts. Although investigations of cultural differences in emotional 
expressiveness are rare, lay observations of beliefs and behaviours of French and 
British citizens suggest cultural differences in the expression of their emotions. British 
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citizens have an intriguing relationship with their own and other people's emotions; they 
tend not to be overly demonstrative and look down on gushing public displays of 
emotion (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009; Khor & March, 2007). This 
tendency to hide their feelings is in sharp opposition to French citizens. As an 
illustration, French citizens show high propensities to express their feelings toward the 
government, through demonstrations and strikes. A survey conducted between 2009 
and 2013 revealed that France had the second highest rate of strikes, among 12 
European countries, while the UK was in the 9th position (Osborne, 2016). Those 
drastically different approaches to self-expression are in line with work on the Déjà vu 
experience. Fortier & Moulin (2015) report French citizens’ tendency to describe their 
experience of ‘Déjà vu’ as more disturbing than English citizens. This corroborates the 
idea of wider self-expression from this population. Nevertheless, those elements of 
explanation are exploratory, and further scientific investigations should be conducted in 
order to clarify this finding.  
 Finally, confirmatory factor analyses were carried out to provide an overview of 
the complex relationships between the key features of mind-wandering experiences. 
Our theoretical model hypothesised that the combination of the negative construct (i.e. 
rumination, depressive symptoms and negative affect), the self-related construct (i.e. 
future-self thought frequency, self-reflection and rumination), the attentional construct 
(i.e. mindfulness abilities and cognitive failures), and age would drive the variation of 
mind-wandering frequency. Within this model mind-wandering frequency is portrayed 
as an umbrella phenomenon that integrates a multitude of features. Notably, age was 
found to have a limited contribution to mind-wandering frequemcy, which is surprising 
considering the well documented age-related decrease of mind-wandering (Giambra, 
1989; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; McVay et al., 2013). However, the 
factor of age was highly connected to the self-related construct, a factor composed of 
two measures known to decrease with age (i.e. rumination and future-self thoughts). In 
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addition to age, the negative construct also presented limited contribution to mind-
wandering variation in frequency. Evidence has clearly outlined the relationship 
between mind-wandering and negative affect (Poerio et al., 2013), and depression or 
related symptoms like rumination (Smallwood et al., 2005). Research suggests that 
these negative features are largely found for past related thoughts (Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011), while future-related thoughts show positive outcomes, such as 
improved mood and reduction of stress (Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, 
et al., 2013). Critically, mind-wandering experiences have been described as largely 
future-oriented (Baird et al., 2011). Therefore, the limited contribution of the negative 
construct may reflect the smaller propensity of negatively oriented and past-related 
thoughts. Additionally, a strong relationship was evident between the negative and 
attentional construct, suggesting that part of the negative construct’s contribution was 
driven by attentional lapses. Lastly, despite the reasonably good fit of the model to the 
data, further statistical analyses demonstrated a different fit for both English and French 
native speakers.  
 Considering both groups separately, for the English native speakers mind-
wandering frequency largely relied on the self-related construct with no direct influence 
from the attentional construct, while the opposite pattern was demonstrated for the 
French native speakers. These two constructs are shown to be highly related to each 
other in both models. However, in the British model, the self-related construct was 
composed of ruminative and future-self thoughts, while it was mainly future-self 
thoughts in the French model. Here it is suggested that the contribution of the self-
related construct in the British population is driven by their higher rates of ruminative 
thoughts. Despite no cultural difference outlined on the attentional measures (i.e. 
mindfulness and cognitive failures), the influence of this construct was significant for 
the French model. Research clearly states the importance of executive control to flexibly 
manage ones’ thoughts (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). This raises questions as to why 
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the attentional characteristics are not central to mind-wandering frequency in the British 
population. One avenue to consider is the possibility of an indirect effect, where the 
attentional construct contributes to mind-wandering frequency via its strong relationship 
with the self-related construct. Subsequently, the factoring of self-reflection into the self-
related construct for the British population was in agreement with the previously 
discussed cultural differences on self-centred thoughts. However, in the French 
population, where reflection rates are high, this measure contributed to the self-related 
construct and mind-wandering frequency directly. Ultimately, together, these findings 
demonstrate an influence of culture on the complex experience of mind-wandering.  
 Nevertheless, some limitations must be taken into account when interpreting 
these findings. Firstly, conducting an online survey most certainly influenced the 
characteristics of the population recruited. This is especially true for older adults, as not 
all of the ageing population have access to internet or are comfortable with the use of 
electronic devices. Additionally, it provoked an unbalanced distribution of participants 
across age groups. Secondly, it is difficult to know if the findings differentiating French 
from English native speakers can be attributed to a cultural difference or merely a 
language effect via the interpretation of the questionnaires. Indeed, even if back-
translation of questionnaires is commonly used, it does not guarantee equivalence 
across two languages: one word in Language A may correspond to multiple words with 
slightly different connotations in Language B. For example, a neutral word in English, 
when translated into French can have a slightly negative connotation, and therefore 
would induce differences in participants’ report. Nevertheless, correlations of similar 
weight are found between questionnaires for each population. For example, depressive 
symptoms, which were not influenced by culture, correlated positively, at the same 
extent for both group, with rumination rates (r = .58 and r = .55), with negative affects (r 
= .64 and r = .54), and mind-wandering (r = .39 and r = .43), which all varied depending 
on cultural affiliation. Additionally, a study controlling for the language of testing 
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evidenced cultural differences between European American and Chinese (Ji, Zhang, & 
Nisbett, 2004). They stressed that the cultural effect was bigger when language was 
not taken into account, meaning that language of testing does modulate results, but it 
does not mediate them. Therefore, even though the language of testing may lead to 
changes in responses, such changes occurred in a limited range and did not necessarily 
threaten the conclusion pertaining to cultural comparisons.  
 In conclusion, findings from this study clearly evidence cultural differences 
between English and French speakers, and most importantly they seem to impact one’s 
experience of mind-wandering significantly. Those results also gave a warning toward 
overgeneralization of findings. Indeed, if mind-wandering is experienced in every 
culture, supported by shared cognitive processes, the experience in itself may be 
different, as highlighted by the findings. Firstly, mind-wandering frequency decreased 
at an earlier age for French speakers. Then, rumination and reflection rates were 
different in both populations, and exerted different age-patterns. Finally, French 
speakers showed heightened mood as compared to English speakers. Therefore, 
results stress the importance of considering and measuring cultural affiliations during 
participants’ recruitment as it can modulate the findings. Ultimately, considering these 
results along with the previous findings from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, it demonstrates 
that the nature of mind-wandering experiences is a key element to be investigated in 
the ageing population. Having explored these experiences in two lab-based studies and 
in one large-scale questionnaire-based study, Chapter 6 considers the experimental 
manipulation of such thoughts using meditation training. 
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Chapter 6. The implications of meta-awareness and 
meditation.  
 In this final empirical chapter, the variability of self-generated thoughts in ageing 
will be further investigated. Having previously considered the neurocognitive profile of 
older adults and the implication of individual differences such as cultural affiliation, this 
chapter will investigate regulation processes involved in self-generated thoughts. This 
chapter will focus on the implication of meta-awareness and meditation practice on 
thought content. In the first experiment, the use of probe and self-caught methods will 
enable the identification of thought patterns that are more likely to reach meta-
awareness in young and older adults. In a second experiment (a pilot), thought content 
in young and older adults will be experimentally modulated by the practice of meditation. 
Results demonstrated that individuals are merely aware of temporal thoughts but not 
task-related interferences. The time course over which thoughts are generated was 
suggested as a critical feature underlying this selectivity in thought control. Results also 
confirmed the malleability of thought content following a 4-week intervention in both 
young and older adults. This provides encouraging evidence for the development of 
interventions aimed at patients with pathological mind-wandering experiences.  
6.1. Introduction  
 Previous investigation from this thesis, in line with the literature on spontaneous 
cognition and memory, clearly suggests that age-related changes in self-generated 
thoughts are not limited to a decreased frequency, but also include changes in thought 
content. While Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 outlined older adults’ tendency toward 
deliberate on-task and visual thoughts, Chapter 5 demonstrated the importance of 
thought content in the age-related decrease of mind-wandering frequency. However, 
the influence of meta-awareness of mind-wandering experiences seemed to have been 
overlooked. Meta-awareness refers to one’s awareness of the content and process of 
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consciousness (Dahl, Lutz, & Davidson, 2015), which is significantly increased by the 
practice of meditation (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013). Critically, 
meta-awareness of mind-wandering is the key element enabling the flexible adjustment 
of their occurrence and potentially content. This chapter will aim to address this gap in 
the literature by documenting thought content in ageing with the consideration of both 
meta-awareness (experiment 1) and meditation practice (experiment 2).  
Typically, investigation of meta-awareness in mind-wandering consists of the 
combination of two experience sampling methods. Research aiming to characterise 
thought content largely uses the probe-caught method. This method provides an 
overview of the self-generated thought processes that occur during a task without 
relying on participants’ meta-awareness (see Chapter 2 for description of the probe-
caught method). Therefore, experiences of task focus, mind-wandering with 
awareness, or mind-wandering without awareness are collected (Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2006, 2015). Alternatively, the self-caught method provides sampling of only 
mind-wandering episodes that reached meta-awareness (see Chapter 2 for 
description). Thus, the combination of both methods enables the differentiation between 
mind-wandering experience with and without awareness. Such methodology showed 
that alcohol intoxication (Sayette et al., 2009) and cigarette craving (Sayette et al., 
2010) tend to increase the probability of mind-wandering experiences (probe-caught), 
while decreasing the probability of noticing them (self-caught). Other research has 
found similar findings in people who wanted to reunite with a former romantic partner 
(Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2013).  
However, a question that remains unanswered is whether certain types of 
thoughts are more likely to be noticed than others. Meta-awareness of self-generated 
thoughts is essential as it later leads to the suppression or perseveration of the 
experience (Allen et al., 2013). Identification of the differences in thought control 
depending on thought content could inform further the regulation process account of 
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mind-wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Importantly, older adults tend to not 
always use their monitoring skills efficiently (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000). Therefore, 
investigating mind-wandering meta-awareness in this population should be informative. 
To address this gap in the literature, the first experiment will measure thought patterns 
in  young and older adult groups, using a multi-dimensional experience sampling 
method (MDES; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; Smallwood et al., 2016), with a probe 
and self-caught method to differentiate self-generated thoughts with and without 
awareness. 
 Evidence suggests that mindfulness meditation increases awareness of mind-
wandering states and leads to reductions of such experiences (Mrazek, Franklin, 
Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013). Mindfulness-based meditation consists of being 
attentive to the present moment and to self-regulate attention in a non-judgmental way 
(Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Its practice increases 
one’s ability to be aware of the external environment, the bodily sensations, and the 
ongoing train of thoughts; resulting in an increase of self-knowledge and the power to 
transform one’s behaviour (Vago & Silbersweig, 2012). Accordingly, interventions as 
short as 8 minutes have proven effective at reducing mind-wandering experiences 
(Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). However, research on the effect of 
mindfulness meditation on thought content is limited. One study found a reduction of 
unpleasant thoughts and an increase of pleasant thoughts after a 9-weeks compassion 
mindfulness-based mediation (Jazaieri et al., 2016). Nevertheless, this promising 
finding comes with limitations as no control group was used. Additionally, to the best of 
my knowledge, this is the only study investigating the influence of meditation on thought 
content. Therefore, a second experiment, framed as a pilot study, will further document 
the effects of compassion mindfulness-based meditation on mind-wandering 
experiences and extend it to the ageing population.  
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 Overall, the aim of this chapter is to further study thought content in ageing, 
while considering the implication of meta-awareness and meditation practice. The first 
experiment will target the identification of thought patterns that are more likely to reach 
meta-awareness in young and older adults. The second experiment (a pilot) will 
investigate the impact of compassion mindfulness-based meditation on thought 
frequency and content in young and older adults. In both cases, it is essential that a 
wide and representative sample of mind-wandering episodes be collected for older 
adults; however achieving this can be difficult because of the age-related decreases of 
mind-wandering experiences. Therefore, methodological adjustments are required to 
encourage self-generated thoughts. Research often reports the strong influence that a 
task has on mind-wandering rates (see Chapter 1). For example, tasks’ difficulty or 
variability tend to increase participants’ focus and reduce mind-wandering experience 
(Faber et al., 2018; McVay & Kane, 2012). The task previously used in this thesis 
alternates between an easy 0-back condition, where thoughts can proliferate, and a 
hard 1-back condition, where more focus is required (Konishi et al., 2015). Therefore, 
in order to promote mind-wandering experiences, only the easy 0-back condition will be 
used, which will reduce both task difficulty and variability (i.e. no switching between two 
conditions). Then, multi-dimensional experience sampling (MDES) will be used to 
capture the complexity of self-generated thoughts (Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; 
Smallwood et al., 2016). 
6.2. Experiment 1  
6.2.1. Aims and objectives 
 The objectives of the first experiment are to document thought content in the 
context of meta-awareness and ageing. An undemanding task will be used to foster 
mind-wandering experiences, particularly in the older adult group. Multidimensional 
experience sampling will be carried out with probe-caught and self-caught methods 
separately. Previous research using MDES in probe-caught methods found that older 
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adults experience more focused and visual thoughts than young adults did, with no 
difference on mental time travelling (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Similar findings are 
expected in this study. Nevertheless, considering the significant change applied to the 
task (i.e. suppression of the hard condition), different types of thoughts could emerge. 
For example, a distinction between future-self and past-social thoughts may occur (this 
dichotomy is often found in young adults; Baird et al., 2011; D’Argembeau et al., 2011; 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). Some research 
suggests that older adults experience fewer future-oriented thoughts and past-oriented 
thoughts compared to young adults. However a consensus has not been reached 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Berntsen et al., 2015; Jackson et al., 2013; Rendell et al., 
2012; Schlagman, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2006). Additionally, task simplification may 
uncover a-temporal thoughts and task-related interference. A-temporal thoughts relate 
to imaginative thoughts that cannot be specifically attributed to either the past or the 
future (e.g. “I need groceries”). A-temporal thoughts tend to increase in ageing, 
particularly when compared to future-related thoughts (Jackson et al., 2013; Rendell et 
al., 2012). Task-related interference (TRI) (McVay et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2004) 
on the other hand, refers to thoughts related to task performance, strategies, or time 
duration (e.g. “This task is boring”, “I am good at this”, “When is this going to end?”). 
Older adults experience significantly more TRI than young adults (McVay et al., 2013). 
No research has directly compared thought content as measured using a probe-caught 
and self-caught method on the effect of meta-awareness. Therefore, this part of the 
investigation will be exploratory. Nevertheless, it is suspected that typically occurring 
thoughts, such as future and past-related thoughts, will come to awareness more often 
than abstract thoughts.   
139 
 
6.2.2. Method 
6.2.2.1. Participants  
 A sample of 36 young adults (M = 21.94, SD = 4.49) and 38 older adults (M = 
69.42, SD = 7.42) were recruited for this study. The young adults’ mean years of 
education was 15.71 (SD = 2.63) and the group was 80.55% composed of females. 
Older adults on average had 16.20 (SD = 4.13) years of education and 63.16% were 
female. Participants received either course credits or gift vouchers in compensation for 
their time and travel. Inclusion criteria were to be native English speaker and to have 
normal or corrected vision and hearing. Exclusion criteria were the presence or history 
of a neurological or psychiatric disorder, currently taking antidepressants, and regular 
practice of meditation, Tai-chi, or Yoga in the past 3 years. Older participants completed 
the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein et al., 1975) to ensure that they did 
not have dementia or mild cognitive impairment (threshold: score ≥ 26/30; M = 28.63, 
SD = 1.28). This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Health 
and Life Sciences of Northumbria University. The investigation was conducted 
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and participants 
provided written informed consent. 
6.2.2.2. Procedure 
 Participants were seen for a minimum of one hour and thirty minutes to two 
hours in the laboratory. At the beginning of the session, all participants gave informed 
consent, which was followed by a set of demographic questions. Older adults also 
completed the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975). Participants were then asked to complete 
a 0-Back task adapted from Konishi et al. (2015), lasting approximately 30 minutes. The 
task was completed once with a probe-caught sampling method and once with a self-
caught sampling method, the order of the presentation of the tasks was randomised. 
All participants completed a practice of the task beforehand. Finally, participants 
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completed a set of 10 questionnaires (these will be described in the second experiment 
below).  
6.2.2.3. The n-back working memory task 
 The task used in the present study followed the same procedure as the one 
used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, however, only the 0-back condition was used (see 
Figure 6.1). For further details please refer to the method section of Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. The same task was used in the probe-caught and the self-caught method.  
 To sample participants’ ongoing experience, a Multi-Dimensional Experience 
Sampling method was used (Smallwood et al., 2016). Participants repeatedly answered 
13 questions using a four-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Completely). Please 
refer to Chapter 3 for more details about the questions. In the probe-caught method, an 
average of 19.39 (SD = 1.60) probes were presented. In the self-caught method, 
participants were asked to carefully monitor their thoughts during the task and to press 
the ‘p’ key every time they realised that their mind was wandering. When pressing the 
‘p’ key the same 13 questions were automatically presented on the screen. On average 
participants pressed the ‘p’ key 8.91 times (SD = 8.12). In both conditions, the task was 
set to last 15 minutes, excluding the time taken to answer the questions. The full 
completion of each task varied between 20 and 30 minutes. Importantly, a number of 
participants, namely one young adult and 10 older adults, have not reported any mind-
wandering experiences in the self-caught condition. Therefore, these participants were 
not included in the following analyses.  
Figure 6.1. Illustration of the 0-Back task used. 
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6.2.3. Results 
To analyse the MDES, the set of questions was decomposed using principal 
component analysis (PCA), applying varimax rotation. This allowed the core patterns of 
variance within the self-reported data to be characterized in a smaller set of underlying 
dimensions. Three factor solutions were selected with eigenvalues > 1 and the loadings 
that describe these dimensions are presented in the form of a heat map in Figure 6.2: 
Component One – Task-Related Interference - with high weighting indicating thoughts 
that were deliberate, detailed, evolving, habitual, vivid, and in the form of images, 
accounting for 22.59% of the variance. Component Two – Past-Oriented Thoughts - 
with high weighting indicating negatively toned thoughts relating to other people, the 
past, and presenting low task focus, accounting for 15.10% of the variance. Component 
Three – Future-Oriented Thoughts - with high weighting reflecting thoughts that were in 
the form of words and about the self and the future, accounting for 10.26% of the overall 
variance. 
In order to identify the influence of age and method of experience sampling on 
these three PCA components, 2 (Age; Young, Old) by 2 (Measure; Probe-caught, Self-
caught) mixed ANOVAs were conducted on participants’ mean regression scores for 
each factor. Results on Task-Related Interferences revealed a main effect of age, 
showing that older adults (M = .23, SD = .84) experienced more TRIs than young adults 
(M = -.19, SD = .56), F (1, 61) = 13.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18. Results demonstrated a main 
effect of the type of measure, showing that thoughts captured using the probe-caught 
method (M = .17, SD = .82) were more often TRI than the ones captured using the self-
caught method (M = -.01, SD = .53), F (1, 61) = 10.16, p = .002, ηp
2 = .14. Additionally, 
an interaction effect, illustrated in Figure 6.2, was found between age and the type of 
measure [F (1, 61) = 26.41, p < .001, ηp
2 = .30]. Further analyses showed that older 
adults (M = .33, SD = .93) experienced more TRI than young adults did (M = -.24, SD 
= .62) when measured by a probe-caught method [F (1, 72) = 9.73, p = .003, ηp
2 = .12], 
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but not when measured by a self-caught method [F (1, 61) = 1.57, p = .215, ηp
2 = .03]. 
Additionally, the type of measure only had an effect in the older adult group, with more 
TRI when captured by the probe-caught method (M = .65, SD = .81) than by the self-
caught method (M = .08, SD = .54), F (1, 27) = 21.96, p < .001, ηp
2 = .45. 
Results on the Past oriented thoughts revealed a main effect of age, showing 
that older adults (M = -.53, SD = .47) experienced less past related thoughts than young 
adults (M = .35, SD = .53), F (1, 61) = 34.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .36. Additionally, results 
demonstrated a main effect of measures, showing that thoughts captured via the probe-
caught method (M = -.17, SD = .68) were less past related than the ones captured via 
the self-caught method (M = .42, SD = .60), F (1, 61) = 68.22, p < .001, ηp
2 = .53. 
However, the interaction effect between age and the type of measure was only 
marginally significant [F (1, 61) = 3.73, p = .058, ηp
2 = .06].  
Results for the Future oriented thoughts revealed no effects of age on this type 
of thoughts, F (1, 61) = .033, p = .856, ηp
2 = .00. A main effect of measures showed that 
thoughts captured via the probe-caught method (M = -.09, SD = .63) were less future 
related than the ones captured via the self-caught method (M = .24, SD = .77), F (1, 61) 
= 15.44, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20. Results evidenced an interaction effect, illustrated in Figure 
6.2, between age and the type of measure, F (1, 61) = 8.80, p = .004, ηp
2 = .13. Further 
analyses showed that, in the case of older adults, thoughts collected via the probe-
caught method (M = -.25, SD = .70) were less future related than thoughts collected via 
the self-caught method (M = .37, SD = .86), F (1, 27) = 17.16, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39. 
However, this difference was not evident in the group of young adults, F (1, 34) = .650, 
p = .426, ηp
2 = .02. 
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6.2.4. Discussion  
 Meta-awareness is essential to the regulation of self-generated thoughts, as one 
needs to notice mind drift before inhibiting it. However, limited work has documented 
the effects of meta-awareness on thought content in young and older adults. This 
experiment specifically aimed to address this gap in the literature by collecting a wide 
sample of self-generated thoughts among young and older adults with a self and probe-
Figure 6.2. Determining different type of self-generated thoughts and their occurrence 
depending of the task condition and the age group. 
(Left) Heat map illustrating the loading of the different questions on the three factors 
resulting from the principal component analyses (PCA). Varimax rotation was applied 
to the data set. (Right) The effects of interaction between Age (Young, Old) and Task 
measures (Probe-caught, Self-caught) on mean regression scores for Task-Related 
Interferences and Social Past thoughts. Note. *** p <.001 and ** p <.01; Error bars are 
Standard Errors. 
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
Young Old Young Old Young Old
Task-
Related
Interference
Past-
oriented
Future-
oriented
Probe-caught Self-caught
+1 -1 PCA Loading 
Relationship to Age Group 
M
e
a
n
 r
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 s
c
o
re
s
 
** *** *** 
144 
 
caught method. Three types of self-generated thoughts were reported, namely task-
related interference, past-oriented, and future-oriented thoughts. These three type of 
thoughts have been previously described within younger adults (Baird et al., 2011; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2011; McVay et al., 2013; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). In the present 
experiment, effects of age were reported with a decrease of past-oriented thoughts and 
an increase of task-related interferences (TRIs). Effects of methodology outlined fewer 
TRIs, and more future and past-oriented thoughts in the self-caught than the probe-
caught method. The effect of measure for TRI and future-oriented thoughts was 
particularly evident for older adults.  
 The use of a simplistic task enabled the distinction between past and future-
oriented thoughts, which was not found in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. A large body of 
research has documented these two types of thoughts separately (Baird et al., 2011; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2011; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 
2013). Past-oriented thoughts are mainly described as being social and negative (Baird 
et al., 2011; Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, & D’Argembeau, 2013). This was replicated in 
the present study, and extended by demonstrating their off-task nature, which is in line 
with the literature showing increased task-disengagement and errors following negative 
thoughts (Banks et al., 2016). Characteristics of the future-oriented thoughts outlined in 
the present study are also in line with previous literature with strong self-referential and 
verbal features (Baird et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). This is thought to 
reflect the autobiographical planning function of future thoughts (Baird et al., 2011; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011).  
 Considering now the effect of age on these thoughts, results demonstrated a 
decrease of past-related, but not future-related thoughts with age. Both the mind-
wandering and the voluntary autobiographical memory literature report a reduction in 
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past-related thoughts in ageing (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Jackson et al., 2013; 
Schlagman et al., 2006). An argument for this is that older adults have a bias toward 
task focus and positive thoughts (Charles & Carstensen, 2010; Charles & Luong, 2013), 
preventing them from experiencing past-oriented thoughts which tend to be negative 
and off-task (Jackson et al., 2013). There is however some disagreement with this view 
since one study found no age-related difference in involuntary autobiographical memory 
using dispositional measures (Berntsen et al., 2015).  
 Regarding future-related thoughts, the present findings seem to contradict 
previous work. While retrospective reports and laboratory studies present an age-
related decrease of future thinking (Berntsen et al., 2015; Stawarczyk et al., 2012), a 
diary study reported an increase of such thoughts in this population (Gardner & Ascoli, 
2015). However, in the present study no age effect was reported on these thoughts. 
Rates of future-oriented thoughts were also influenced by methodological settings. 
Specifically, older adults reported more future-related thoughts when they had to 
monitor their thoughts, than when they had to recall their experience from few seconds 
before. Older adults have relatively well preserved metacognitive and monitoring 
abilities (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000), but their recollection skills are impaired (Brewer, 
Marsh, Meeks, Clark-Foos, & Hicks, 2010; Sacher, Taconnat, Souchay, & Isingrini, 
2009; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, & Isingrini, 2007). The nature of the self-
caught method (i.e. participants are asked to monitor their thoughts throughout the task) 
may foster this meta-cognitive skill and increase older adults’ awareness of ongoing 
thought. 
 On the other hand, the probe-caught method relies on the recollection of 
previously experienced thoughts, and older adults may fail to adequately recall their 
experiences. Thus, their known difficulties in episodic remembering in the laboratory 
and real world settings impacts thoughts explored using this paradigm. Another 
interpretation involves taking into account the time needed and allocated to the 
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generation of mind-wandering experiences. Older adults present a reduced processing 
speed (Salthouse, 1996) and previous chapters have documented how older adults’ 
brain structure may jeopardise their ability to self-generate thoughts. As such, the 
construction of complex mind-wandering episodes may be more difficult and time 
consuming for this population. That is, results may be explained by the interrupting 
nature of the probe-caught method which compromises the construction of complex 
mind-wandering experiences (i.e. prompts tend to redirect attention to the task). In 
contrast, the self-caught methods leave older adults with sufficient time to fully create a 
mind-wandering experience. This implies that meta-awareness only occurs once a 
mind-wandering episode is entirely generated. Future work could use the temporal 
precision of the electroencephalogram to distinguish between these interpretations.   
 Task-related interferences have been identified as a third type of thought 
occurring during an undemanding task. In accordance with previous work (McVay et 
al., 2013), the present study demonstrated an age-related increase in TRIs. More 
specifically, older adults presented more TRIs than young adults in the probe-caught 
condition. Additionally, the effect of measure was only evident for older adults, with 
more TRIs in the probe compared to self-caught condition. Before going into the 
interpretation of these findings, arguments for the categorisation of this component as 
TRIs and not a-temporal thoughts should be made. TRIs are preoccupations about 
one’s performance or strategies (e.g. “When is this going to end?”, “I am good at this”, 
Counting or naming the shapes), they are described as task-related while not being 
task-focused (McVay et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2004). Therefore, it is likely that 
TRIs will be more vivid, detailed, and habitual than future or past-related thoughts. Such 
phenomenological concordances were not found with a-temporal thoughts. A-temporal 
thoughts are imaginative but without any temporal direction (e.g. “I need groceries”; 
Jackson et al., 2013; Rendell et al., 2012). Therefore, similarities regarding evolving 
and deliberate features are expected between a-temporal and mental time travelling 
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thoughts. It is expected that a-temporal thoughts will be less vivid and visual than past-
oriented thoughts (Jackson et al., 2013; Rendell et al., 2012), and less habitual and 
detailed than future-oriented thoughts (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013), which was not 
found here. Together, these findings support the categorisation of this component as 
TRIs. However, the possibility of external distractions (EDs) such as sensory 
perceptions/sensations irrelevant to the current task cannot be excluded (e.g. “I am 
cold”, “The kids outside are noisy”; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). 
Unfortunately, no study has yet investigated the phenomenal characteristics of either 
TRIs, EDs, or a-temporal thoughts to support this inference. Therefore, interpretation 
about this type of thought should be considered with caution.  
 Previous work has demonstrated an increase of TRIs in ageing (McVay et al., 
2013). The present study reported this effect only within the probe-caught method. 
Previously in this discussion, it was suggested that time may be essential to the 
generation of complex mind-wandering experiences (i.e. future-oriented thoughts). 
Hence, as attentional decoupling occurs, early mind drifts could transform and produce 
more complex and typical mind-wandering experiences (i.e. future-oriented thoughts). 
Older adults present slowed cognitive processes, meaning that, for them, more time is 
necessary to construct complex mind-wandering experiences. As a result, they may 
spend more time in a state of initial mind drifts where attention is partially related to the 
task while not really focused on the processing of information. If TRIs are representative 
of such early mind drifts, it is therefore evident that the interrupting nature of the probe-
caught method will increase their frequency in a population with slower cognitive 
processes, namely older adults. Hence, it would appear that one is more aware of fully 
constructed thoughts than earlier mind drifts. Another interpretation is that TRIs are not 
considered as mind drifts by participants, and therefore not reported in the self-caught 
condition. Elsewhere, older adults’ higher rates of TRI in probe-caught methods have 
been interpreted as the result of changes in personal concerns. Older adults may be 
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concerned about their performance (e.g. stereotype threat; Jordano & Touron, 2017) 
and young adults about their daily life (e.g. McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010). Thus, resulting 
in a switch of self-generated thoughts from future-oriented thoughts for young adults 
and TRIs for older adults.  
 Overall, this first experiment has replicated previous findings in ageing and has 
evidenced the influence of methodology. This study reported that thoughts gaining 
consciousness are merely temporal as opposed to task-related interferences. Critically, 
the time course of thought generation has been outlined as an important feature to 
understand the regulation process of self-generated thoughts.  Following these results, 
a second experiment will experimentally modulate thought content using meditation 
practice, and therefore further explore the regulation processes.  
6.3. Experiment 2 
6.3.1. Aims and objectives  
 This second experiment aims to experimentally modulate the occurrence of 
specific self-generated thoughts. According to the literature, the use of a compassion 
mindfulness-based meditation training appears to be a promising avenue (Jazaieri et 
al., 2013, 2016). However, mindfulness-meditation intervention studies have raised 
some methodological issues (Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015). Firstly, the nature of the 
intervention used is often insufficiently described. Mindfulness-based meditation 
comprises a panel of practices (e.g. breath focus, body scan), and sometimes includes 
compassionate features. Critically, it was found that different approaches of 
mindfulness meditation induce different effects on various measures (Chiesa et al., 
2011; Goyal et al., 2014). In the present study, a body scan mindfulness-based 
meditation will be used. Additionally, considering previous findings from compassion-
based meditation on thought content, compassion features will be added to the body 
scan to emphasise the importance of approaching mind drifts with love and kindness. 
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The intervention will last 4 weeks. While previous research showed effects on thought 
content after 9 weeks (Jazaieri et al., 2016), others found effects on mind-wandering 
rates after only 8 minutes of mindfulness meditation (Mrazek et al., 2012). A 
compromise of 4-weeks was chosen to minimise the number of dropouts and maximise 
the effect of the intervention.   
 Another common methodological issue is the lack of active control conditions. 
While some studies use waiting lists, others only use baseline measures to identify 
intervention effects (Davidson & Kaszniak, 2015). The lack of active controls prevents 
researchers from differentiating effects attributable to the mindfulness intervention and 
the ones attributable to the regular practice of any activity. Therefore, this study will use 
an active control condition, where participants will listen to audio-recorded books. 
Finally, a central issue to mindfulness intervention studies is the impossibility of 
achieving double blindness, as participants are inevitably aware of the mindful nature 
of the intervention. In an attempt to minimise this issue, both conditions were advertised 
as valid interventions, one targeting attention (i.e. meditation condition) and the other 
targeting memory (i.e. control condition). Thus, participants in the control condition 
should display expectations for the intervention comparable to participants in the 
meditation condition. This, and the credibility and appreciation of the intervention, will 
be assessed at the end to provide a subjective measure of participants’ overall 
experience.  
 It is hypothesised that following the meditation intervention participants will be 
more task focused (Mrazek et al., 2012). This effect may not be found in older adults 
considering their already high attentive state to task performance. Regarding thought 
content, a reduction of negative and therefore past-related thoughts is expected in both 
age groups (Jazaieri et al., 2016). However, at present there is a dearth of literature 
regarding other types of self-generated thoughts, thus this part of the analyses will be 
exploratory in nature.   
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6.3.2. Method 
6.3.2.1. Participants  
A subset of the participants from Experiment 1 have taken part in this second 
experiment. One of the major difficulties with intervention studies is to ensure double 
blindness. Therefore, the study was advertised as investigating the implication of two 
interventions, one being a memory training (control group) and the other a meditation 
training (experimental group). To prevent bias during group attribution, participants 
were alternatively allocated to one of the groups. Additionally, groups, recordings and 
booklets were renamed by a researcher outside of this project to ensure double-
blindness. A total of 19 young and 29 older adults completed the full experiment. Eight 
young adults were in the control condition (M = 22.50, SD = 4.07; 87.5% Female), while 
11 were in the meditation condition (M = 23.64, SD = 5.33; 72.7% Female). Fourteen 
older adults were in the control condition (M = 69.50, SD = 6.95; 64.3% Female), while 
15 were in the meditation condition (M = 67.87, SD = 6.37; 60% Female). Participants 
were seen twice in the laboratory and were asked to complete the intervention for 28 
days in between. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Health and Life Sciences of Northumbria University. The investigation was conducted 
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki and participants 
provided written informed consent. 
6.3.2.2. Procedure 
After completing the first session (see method section of Experiment 1), 
participants were given instructions for the completion of the intervention. A booklet and 
access to a set of 28 recordings was provided to all participants, which were either 
accessed via an MP3 player or shared via an online folder. Participants in the control 
group were told to listen to a different story every day and to report the key elements of 
the story straight afterwards (see Appendix A for instructions). Participants in the 
experimental group were asked to listen to a guided meditation every day and to report 
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any thoughts, feelings, or emotions experienced during the practice straight afterwards 
(see Appendix A for instructions). All participants were encouraged to be honest 
regarding the completion of the training, and three evaluative questions were asked at 
the end of the booklets, targeting the efficiency, benefits, and agreeableness of the 
intervention. After 28 days, all participants came to the laboratory for a second meeting. 
During this session, participants underwent the exact same procedure as the first 
session (please refer to the above method section p. 139). At the end, participants were 
fully debriefed about the aim of this study, revealing the existence of a control group. 
Participants were given the opportunity to access the recordings of the other condition 
if required. 
6.3.2.3. Materials  
6.3.2.3.1. Recordings 
The recordings used in the control condition were taken from Librivox 
audiobooks (https://librivox.org/). All recordings referred to books in the public domain 
such as “The Necklace” by Guy de Maupassant. Book recordings lasted on average 
21.05 minutes (SD = 2.29). In the meditation condition, four recordings were used (See 
Appendix B for an example). Recordings were created by a trained meditation teacher 
and were all based on body scan meditation while incorporating compassion features 
to it (e.g. “During the meditation each time your mind wanders, just noticing that, and 
bringing a feeling of loving kindness and compassion for yourself, then gently coming 
back to the meditation practice”). The first week was a “head to toe” body scan, the 
second was “toe to head”, week three was only focusing on the hands, and the fourth 
week focused on the face. Recordings lasted 19.63 minutes in average (SD = 0.50). 
6.3.2.3.2. Questionnaires 
 The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS, Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a 
15-item scale introduced by the following sentences: “Below is a collection of 
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statements about your everyday experience. Please answer according to what really 
reflects your experience rather than what you think your experience should be.” 
Participants must rate the statements on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost 
always) to 6 (almost never). For example, ‘I rush through activities without being really 
attentive to them’ or ‘I snack without being aware that I'm eating’. A higher score 
indicates more mindful abilities. Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability (α = .89). 
 The Meta‐Cognitive Questionnaire (MCQ30, Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 
2004) was used to assess participants’ metacognitive beliefs, judgments, and 
monitoring tendencies. This questionnaire consists of 30 items capturing five aspects 
of metacognition, namely cognitive confidence (i.e. “I do not trust my memory”), positive 
beliefs (i.e. “Worrying helps me cope”), cognitive self-consciousness (i.e. “I monitor my 
thoughts”), uncontrollability and danger (i.e. “When I start worrying I cannot stop”), and 
need to control thoughts (i.e. “It is bad to think certain thoughts”). For each question, 
participants used a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Do not agree) to 4 (Agree 
very much). Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability for the cognitive confidence (α 
= .89), positive beliefs (α = .90), cognitive self-consciousness (α = .91), uncontrollability 
and danger (α = .90), and need to control thoughts subscales (α = .72). 
The Involuntary Autobiographical Memory Inventory (IAMI; Berntsen et al., 
2015) consists of 20 items designed to measure the frequency with which participants 
spontaneously think about a past or future event. Within the instructions, participants 
are informed that “The following questions address how frequently memories and 
imagined future events come to your mind by themselves (without trying) during daily 
life.” For each question, participants have to use a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (Never) to 5 (Once an hour or more). Examples would be, ‘Memories of personal 
events pop into my mind by themselves—without me consciously trying to remember 
them.’ for past memories and ‘When I am bored, imaginary future events come to my 
mind by themselves —without me consciously trying to evoke them.’ for future events. 
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Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability for the future (α = .91) and past subscale 
(α = .88). 
 The Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS, Giambra, 1993) is one of the 28 
scales composing the Imaginal Process Inventory (Singer & Antrobus, 1963) and 
consists of 12 items assessing daydreaming frequency. Participants are asked to 
choose on a five-point Likert scale the nature of thoughts appropriate for them. For 
example, ‘I lose myself in active daydreaming’ can be answered by either (1) 
Infrequently, (2) Once a week, (3) Once a day, (4) A few times during the day or (5) 
Many different times during the day. Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability (α = 
.94).  
 The Short Imaginal Processes Inventory (SIPI, Huba, Singer, Aneshensel & 
Antrobus, 1982) was used in order to measure three specific types of daydreaming. 
Fifteen items composed each one of the three types of daydreaming, namely Positive-
Constructive Daydreaming (i.e. “My daydreams are often stimulating and rewarding.”), 
Guilt and Fear of Failure (i.e. “In my fantasies, I show my anger towards my enemies.”), 
and Poor Attentional Control (i.e. “I find that I easily lose interest in things that I have to 
do.”). Participants used a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Definitely not true for 
me) to 5 (Very true for me) to answer each question. Cronbach’s alphas revealed good 
reliability for the Positive and Constructive (α = .84), the Guilt-Fear of Failure (α = .79), 
and Poor Attentional Control subscale (α = .84). 
The Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999) consists of 24 items designed to assess reflection and rumination where 
participants are asked to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree to statements. 
Answers are given on a five-point Likert-scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 
(Strongly agree). According to Trapnell & Campbell (1999), rumination and reflection 
both involve heightened attention to self. Rumination is "self-attentiveness motivated by 
perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self"; reflection is "self-attentiveness 
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motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self" (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, 
p.297). Examples would be, ‘My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish 
I'd stop thinking about’ for rumination, and ‘I'm very self-inquisitive by nature’ for 
reflection. Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability for the Rumination (α = .92) and 
Reflection subscale (α = .91). 
 The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) 
consists of two 10-item mood scales that measure positive and negative affect 
respectively, both as states and traits. Participants are asked to rate the extent to which 
they experience particular emotions right now with reference to a five-point Likert-scale 
ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very much). Examples of emotions would 
be, ‘distressed’ or ‘excited’. Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability for the Positive 
Affect (α = .89) and Negative Affect subscale (α = .86). 
 The Cognitive and Emotional Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ‐short, 
Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006) was used to evaluate the specificity of the regulation 
strategies used in response to the experience of threatening or stressful life events. The 
questionnaire is composed of 18 items which participants answered using a five-point 
Likert-scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost always). An example of a 
question would be “I think I have to accept the situation”. Cronbach’s alphas revealed 
good reliability (α = .76). 
 The World Organisation Health (WHO; Breek, Hamming, Vries, Aquarius, & 
Henegouwen, 2001) questionnaire measures individuals’ quality of life overall and in 
specific domains. It consists of 26 questions, which are answered on a five-point Likert-
scale with different labels depending on the question. For example, for the question 
“How would you rate your quality of life?” participants could answer (1) very poor, (2) 
poor, (3) neither poor nor good, (4) good or (5) very good. Cronbach’s alphas revealed 
good reliability (α = .90). 
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The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) is a widely used 
tool for assessing the severity of depressive symptomatology. The 21 items are rated 
on a four-point Likert scale, from 0 to 3 points. Scores range from 0 to 63. For example, 
‘Past failure’ can be answered by either (0) I do not feel like a failure, (1) I have failed 
more than I should have, (2) As I look back, I see a lot of failures or (3) I feel I am a total 
failure as a person. Cronbach’s alphas revealed good reliability (α = .90). 
6.3.3. Results 
6.3.3.1. Descriptive characteristics  
Firstly, 2 (Age; Young, Old) by 2 (Condition; Control, Meditation) ANOVAs have 
been conducted on participants’ year of education, days practiced, and rating to the 
perceived effectiveness, benefits, and enjoyment of the practice, to ensure the 
equivalence of the participants across conditions. Differences were found on the 
effectiveness [F (1, 44) = 5.43, p = .024, ηp
2 = .11] and benefits rating [F (1, 44) = 5.60, 
p = .022, ηp
2 = .11], showing that participants in the meditation condition perceived the 
intervention as more effective and more beneficial than the participants in the control 
condition (see Table 6.1).  
  
156 
 
 
6.3.3.2. Intervention effects on thoughts 
To analyse the MDES, the set of questions was decomposed using principal 
component analysis (PCA), applying varimax rotation. This allowed the core patterns of 
variance within the self-reported data to be characterized in a smaller set of underlying 
dimensions. Ratings from both age groups, condition, time of testing (pre, post), and 
type of measure were assessed together. Four factors were outlined with eigenvalues 
> 1. However, observation of the scree plot suggested the occurrence of five factors, 
therefore, five factors have been selected and the loadings that describe these 
dimensions are presented in the form of a heat map in Figure 6.3: Component One – 
Task-Related Interference - with high weighting indicating deliberate, detailed, positive 
emotion, evolving, habitual, and vivid thoughts, accounting for 21.71% of the variance. 
Component Two – On-Task Thoughts - with high weighting indicating highly focused 
thoughts that are not related to other people, accounting for 16.50% of the variance. 
Component Three – Future-Oriented Thoughts - with high weighting reflecting thoughts 
Table 6.1. Mean (Standard Deviation) of participants’ years of education, number of 
days practiced, and participants’ rating of the intervention, all for each group under 
study. 
 Young Old Overall 
 Contr. Medi. Total Contr. Medi. Total Contr. Medi. 
N = 48 8 11 19 14 15 29 22 26 
Education 
15.75 
(2.25) 
16.73 
(3.26) 
16.32 
(2.85) 
16.62 
(3.01) 
15.21 
(5.16) 
15.89 
(4.25) 
16.29 
(2.72) 
15.88 
(4.41) 
Days 
practiced 
23.63 
(2.77) 
23.45 
(5.24) 
23.53 
(4.27) 
26.86 
(3.46) 
24.53 
(6.07) 
25.66 
(5.04) 
25.68 
(3.54) 
24.08 
(5.65) 
Effective 
2.25 
(.89) 
3.55 
(1.13) 
3.00 
(1.20) 
2.21 
(1.05) 
2.40 
(1.12) 
2.31 
(1.07) 
2.23 
(.97)* 
2.88 
(1.24)* 
Benefits 
2.38 
(1.06) 
3.55 
(1.21) 
3.05 
(1.27) 
2.14 
(1.10) 
2.53 
(1.06) 
2.34 
(1.08) 
2.22 
(1.07)* 
2.96 
(1.22)* 
Enjoy 
2.37 
(.74) 
2.81 
(.75) 
2.63 
(.76) 
2.50 
(1.22) 
2.67 
(1.23) 
2.59 
(1.21) 
2.45 
(1.06) 
2.73 
(1.04) 
Note. * p < .05 
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that were about the self and the future, accounting for 9.51% of the overall variance. 
Component Four – Thought Modality - with high weighting reflecting thoughts that were 
in the form of words rather than images, accounting for 7.85% of the overall variance. 
Component Five – Past-Oriented Thoughts - with high weighting reflecting thoughts that 
were about the past and negative, accounting for 7.42% of the overall variance.  
In order to identify the influence of age and method of experience sampling on 
these five PCA components 2 (Age; Young, Old) by 2 (Condition; Control, Meditation) 
by 2 (Time; Pre-test, Post-test) repeated measure ANOVAs were conducted on 
participants’ mean regression scores for each factor. Unfortunately, due to many 
participants not having reported mind-wandering experiences during the self-caught 
task, including the measure (Probe-caught, Self-caught) as an independent variable 
would result in the exclusion of 5 older adults in the meditation condition and 7 in the 
control condition. Considering the already small sample of participants in this pilot study, 
the decision to exclude this variable from the analyses was made.  
Results on On-task thoughts displayed an effect of age indicating that older 
adults (M = .32, SD = .45) experienced more focused thoughts than young adults (M = 
-.31, SD = .48), F (1, 44) = 19.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31. An effect of interaction between 
time and age was found, F (1, 44) = 4.60, p = .037, ηp
2 = .10. The interaction between 
time, age, and condition was also significant, F (1, 44) = 4.84, p = .033, ηp
2 = .10. Further 
analyses showed that an effect of time was only evident for young adults in the 
meditation condition [F (1, 10) = 15.73, p = .003, ηp
2 = .61] and showed increased task 
focus after the intervention (see Figure 6.3.). Results on Future thoughts showed a 
significant interaction between time and condition, F (1, 44) = 4.41, p = .041, ηp
2 = .09. 
Further analyses revealed an effect of time only in the control condition with a reduction 
of future thoughts after the intervention (pre-test, M = .11, SD = .45; post-test, M = -.09, 
SD = .63), F (1, 21) = 4.78, p = .040, ηp
2 = .19. Results on Thought Modality showed  
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Figure 6.3. Determining different type of self-generated thoughts and 
their evolution depending on intervention condition and the age group. 
(Top) Heat map illustrating the loading of the different questions on the 
five factors resulting from the principal component analyses (PCA). 
Varimax rotation was applied to the data set. (Bottom) The effects of 
interaction between Age (Young, Old), Condition (Control, Meditation) 
and Time (Pre-test, Post-test) on mean regression scores for On-task 
thoughts. Note. *** p <.001; Error bars are Standard Errors. 
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a significant interaction between time and condition, F (1, 44) = 4.34, p = .043, ηp
2 = 
.90. Further analyses revealed that the meditation condition marginally increased visual 
thoughts, F (1, 44) = 3.13, p = .089, ηp
2 = .11 (pre-test, M = -.01, SD = .67; post-test, M 
= -.17, SD = .68). Results on Past thoughts presented a main effect of time with a 
general reduction of past-related thought after both interventions (pre-test, M = .04, SD 
= .46; post-test, M = -.09, SD = .47), F (1, 44) = 5.21, p = .027, ηp
2 = .11. Results on 
TRI revealed no significant effects.  
6.3.3.3. Explaining the dropout rates 
Dropout rates from this intervention were revealed to be important: 47.2% of 
young adults and 23.7% of older adults. This section will attempt to pin down the 
personal characteristics differentiating participants that completed the study from the 
ones that did not. For this purpose, analyses will only be conducted on dispositional 
characteristics (measured using questionnaires) collected upon the first session.  
 Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the questionnaires displaying 
a number of subscales (i.e. MCQ30, the SIPI, the RRQ, the IAMI, and the PANAS) with 
Dropout (Yes, No) and Age (Young, Old) as between factors. Additionally, one-way 
ANOVAs with the same between factors were conducted on the remaining 
questionnaires (i.e. DDFS, BDI, CERQ, MAAS, WHO). An interaction between SIPI and 
dropout was found significant, F (2, 140) = 7.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10. Participants who 
completed the study reported more positive-constructive thoughts (M = 3.16, SD = .54) 
and less guilt-fear of failure thoughts (M = 2.02, SD = .55) than participants who did not 
(Positive-constructive, M = 2.79, SD = .53; Guilt-fear of failure, M = 2.29, SD = .54), F 
(1, 72) = 8.09, p = .006, ηp
2 = .10 and F (1, 72) = 4.25, p = .043, ηp
2 = .06 respectively. 
Additionally, an interaction was found to be significant between PANAS and dropout, F 
(1, 70) = 7.18, p = .009, ηp
2 = .09. Participants who completed the study reported more 
positive affect (M = 34.88, SD = 6.95) and less negative affect (M = 21.77, SD = 8.37) 
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than participants who did not complete it (Positive, M = 30.50, SD = .6.30; Negative, M 
= 17.15, SD = 5.20), F (1, 72) = 7.12, p = .009, ηp
2 = .09 and F (1, 72) = 8.58, p = .005, 
ηp
2 = .11 respectively. 
6.3.4. Discussion  
 Despite previous work showing a reduction of mind-wandering frequency 
following the practice of meditation (Mrazek et al., 2013; Mrazek et al., 2012), limited 
work has considered the implication of heterogeneity of self-generated thoughts. The 
aim of this study was to measure the impact of meditation practice on different types of 
thoughts in young and older adults. In this perspective, participants either practiced 
meditation or listened to book recordings for 4 weeks. Multidimensional experience 
sampling was conducted before and after the intervention. As expected, the practice of 
meditation increased young adults’ ability to focus on a mundane task. This effect was 
not found for older adults, who displayed higher focus rates than young adults at 
baseline. A reduction of negative thoughts initially reported by Jazaieri et al. (2016) was 
also replicated here for both young and older adults. Preliminary findings suggest an 
increase of visual thoughts after the practice of meditation. Participants in the active 
control group reported a decrease of both past and future-oriented thoughts. Lastly, a 
self-selection bias was found, with participants completing the study showing high 
positivity and low negativity. 
 A growing body of literature has explored the benefits of mindfulness-based 
meditation on health, wellbeing and cognition (Carmody & Baer, 2008; Chiesa et al., 
2011; Evans et al., 2008; Pagnoni & Cekic, 2007). Practicing meditation increases 
performance on attentional control and sustained attention (Anderson, Lau, Segal, & 
Bishop, 2007; Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Moore, Gruber, Derose, & Malinowski, 
2012) and reduces mind-wandering experiences (Mrazek et al., 2013). This was 
replicated in the present study where young adults reported to be more on-task after 
the meditation training. However, it was not the case for older adults, who were more 
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on-task at baseline. Meditation practice also demonstrated a tendency to increase 
visual thoughts in both young and older adults (marginal finding). This can be explained 
either by the nature of the body-scan meditation which encourages the visualisation of 
different body parts, or by an increase in present moment awareness leading to better 
processing of the visual task.  
 One study looking into the impact of meditation on thought content has outlined 
a reduction of negative thoughts (Jazaieri et al., 2016). Similarly, the present study 
found a decrease of negative/past-oriented thoughts after the practice of meditation for 
both young and older adults. By nature, mindfulness-based meditation encourages 
individuals to notice bodily sensations as well as incoming thoughts. Individuals are 
guided to let go of these thoughts and to bring focus back to the present moment, often 
characterised by an object (e.g. body, breathing). Compassion features incorporated 
into mindfulness meditation are designed to nurture the acceptance of mind drift by 
reinforcing kindness toward oneself. This aspect is suspected to reduce negative 
thoughts. Nevertheless, the present study is not differentiating between the contribution 
of mindfulness and compassion features. Critically, the benefits of the present 
intervention may be explained by the combination of both mindfulness and compassion 
features. Future research should aim to disentangle the mechanisms by which 
meditation practice reduces negative and past thoughts. Furthermore, an avenue to 
ponder is the mediating role of thought content in the benefits of meditation-based 
interventions. Meditation practice reduces both negative thoughts, as well as 
behaviours related to their occurrence such as negative mood, depression and poor 
performance (Banks et al., 2016; Marchand, 2012; Poerio et al., 2013; Ramel, Goldin, 
Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & 
O’Connor, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2005; Smallwood, O’Connor, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the behavioural benefits of meditation practice could be driven by changes 
in thought content, particularly the reduction of negative/past thoughts.  
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 A strength of this study was the use of an active control condition to distinguish 
the contribution of meditation practice from the simple practice of an activity. In the 
control condition, participants listened to book recordings instead of guided meditations. 
Young and older adults reported fewer future and past-oriented thoughts after this 
intervention. Similar findings were previously reported, with both meditation and 
listening to book recordings reducing negative mood and depressive symptoms 
(Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010). Stories used in this 
intervention were not personally relevant to participants. One interpretation is that this 
feature encouraged personal detachment from one’s current concerns. Thus, the 
reduction of current concerns may have led to fewer thoughts intrinsically linked to the 
self, namely future and past-oriented thoughts. Comparing this to the effect of 
meditation practice, it seems that the benefits of meditation lies in the selectivity of the 
changes. While past-oriented thoughts are merely detrimental, future-oriented thoughts 
are more beneficial for everyday functioning (Banks et al., 2016; Engert et al., 2014; 
Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). Hence, the practice of 
meditation seems to target disadvantageous thoughts, while preserving more 
advantageous ones.   
 Finally, an exploratory approach was taken to uncover individual characteristics 
underlying participants’ engagement in the study. Participants who completed the full 
study showed high positive affect and positive-constructive thoughts, as well as low 
negative affect and guilt-fear of failure thoughts at baseline. Positive and constructive 
thoughts imply a positive approach, where self-generated thoughts are seen as 
worthwhile and stimulating. On the other hand, guilt and fear of failure refer to a negative 
approach where they are seen as negative and frightening (Huba et al., 1982). The self-
selective bias observed here suggests that self-efficacy is indispensable to the 
fulfilment of a time-consuming experiment. Participants’ optimistic and pessimistic take 
on life may be an underlying factor encouraging study completion. Importantly, this 
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brings a new perspective to the previously discussed findings. Firstly, the generalisation 
of the intervention effects described beforehand is limited. Secondly, failure to replicate 
a reduction of past-oriented thoughts and an increase of visual thoughts in ageing may 
be bound to this selectivity bias. Indeed, despite all participants in the second 
experiment taking part in the first one, age-effects found in experiment one (i.e. fewer 
past-oriented thoughts). While the lack of statistical power should be kept in mind, future 
studies may want to consider individual differences as factors influencing intervention 
outcomes.  
6.4. Conclusion  
 Overall, limitations should be kept in mind when considering these findings. 
Firstly, the use of the multidimensional experience sampling method, however useful, 
can cause difficulties in the categorisation of the thoughts. Indeed, the lack of studies 
describing the phenomenological characteristics of the task-related interferences, a-
temporal thoughts, or external distractions made the labelling of the component more 
difficult. Using a categorical approach could be used in parallel with the MDES to shed 
light onto the phenomenology of certain self-generated thoughts. Secondly, the 
difference between self and probe-caught thoughts were not analysed in the second 
experiment despite manifest differences in the first experiment. This decision, despite 
preserving statistical power, has weakened and limited the understanding of 
intervention effects. The literature suggests that meditation practice increases meta-
awareness of one’s state of mind (Mrazek et al., 2013). Therefore, in the meditation 
condition, different patterns of thoughts could have been found in the probe versus self-
caught method. To resolve this problem, a larger sample of participants should be 
recruited. As such, and in the face of recruitment difficulty with substantial dropout rates, 
future work should consider the use of a shorter intervention. For example, one-week 
interventions would enable the recruitment of more participants completing the full 
experiment and reduce the incidence of the self-selected bias observed here.  
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 To conclude, understanding self-generated thoughts in the context of ageing is 
essential and should go beyond frequency measures. Critically, research has shown a 
lack of consideration of the broad complexity of these experiences, with little evaluation 
of how thought content adapts to different context. The present chapter focused on the 
influence of meta-awareness and meditation practice on thought content in ageing. In 
the first experiment the use of different experience sampling methods demonstrated 
that one is merely aware of temporal thoughts but not task-related interferences. The 
time course with which thoughts are generated is thought to be a critical feature to 
explain this selectivity. Evidence should be considered when investigating the 
regulation process of self-generated thoughts. A second experiment demonstrated the 
malleability of thought content in both young and older adults. Importantly, both 
interventions displayed significant results, with different patterns. Nonetheless, caution 
must be taken when exploring these findings as a self-selective bias was reported.  
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Chapter 7. General discussion of project findings. 
 This chapter aims to summarise the findings of the four empirical studies 
outlining the benefits of convergent methods in the investigation of the wandering mind. 
The original contribution to knowledge made by this project will be explained and 
discussed in relation to: the implication of the DMN in age-related changes of self-
generated thoughts, the age-related changes of thought content, the sensitivity of self-
generated thoughts to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, and the possibility of 
experimentally modifying thought content. Methodological considerations, as well as 
methodological limitations, that have arisen during the development of this programme 
of work will also be reported. Importantly, suggestions for the direction of future 
research are outlined, and conclusions are drawn regarding the conceptualisation of 
mind-wandering experiences and the implication of ageing.  
7.1. Overview 
 A large variety of experiences fall under the name of mind-wandering. Self-
generated thoughts are very heterogeneous regarding their content, form, outcomes, 
and underlying neural patterns (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006, 2015). This variability is particularly influenced by the environment, 
methodological setting, and individual differences (e.g. Faber et al., 2018; Rummel & 
Boywitt, 2014; Seli, Cheyne, et al., 2015; Smallwood et al., 2002). The core aim of this 
thesis was to investigate one of these individual differences, namely ageing.  
Older adults present a diverse neurocognitive profile, with poor attentional 
control and episodic memory (Addis et al., 2010, 2008; Braver & West, 2008; Schmitter-
Edgecombe et al., 2000), as well as a cerebral reorganisation of the DMN and atrophy 
of the frontal lobes (Damoiseaux, 2017; Damoiseaux et al., 2008; Rabbitt, 2005; 
Robbins et al., 1998). More recently, research has documented a decrease of mind-
wandering experiences in ageing and a number of interpretations have been suggested 
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(for a review see Maillet & Schacter, 2016). However, changes in thought content and 
how this is linked to the cerebral organisation of the brain has been overlooked. In order 
to address this gap in the literature, both the heterogeneity of thought processes and 
the underlying neural patterns were central to this project. Understanding the 
complexity of self-generated thoughts in this population is the key to fully understanding 
the component process account of mind-wandering previously outlined (see Chapter 
1). Particularly, older adults’ deficits in attentional control, memory, or decreased activity 
and connectivity within the DMN could refine the understanding of the regulation and 
generation processes of mind-wandering.   
 Self-generated thoughts are transient, covert, and sometimes occur without 
awareness. For these reasons studies have merely relied on participants’ self-reports, 
making the objective measurement of mind-wandering experiences difficult. To 
overcome these complications, this PhD programme used convergent methods within 
and between studies to further characterise self-generated thoughts in ageing. With 
convergent methods the strength of a measure can compensate for the limitation of 
another. Thus, combining self-report measures with more objective measures, such as 
neuroimaging data, strengthened our understanding of the processes at play. The 
systematic investigation of this phenomenon from different perspectives has provided 
a more complete picture of an otherwise covert state. Specifically, the first section of 
this program of work, which combined self-report and neuroimaging measures, 
revealed the implication of the DMN. In the second section, mind-wandering 
experiences in ageing were studied from a behavioural perspective, outlining the 
flexibility of these experiences. Overall, an original contribution to knowledge was 
provided by (i) investigating older adults’ neurocognitive profile and its relation to the 
complexities of mind-wandering experiences, and by (ii) exploring the impact of one’s 
cultural affiliation, mindful abilities and meta-awareness on thought content in ageing.  
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7.2. Summary of the findings  
 First, an overview of the findings from the four empirical chapters will be 
presented. Summarising the data here will set the scene for subsequent theoretical 
discussions and consideration of the unique contribution of this thesis. Although the 
age-related decrease in off-task thought is now well documented, a clear neuro-
cognitive account of what underlies this change in self-generated thought has been 
lacking. Both Chapters 3 and 4 aimed to address this gap in the literature by combining 
electrophysiological (Chapter 3) and functional connectivity magnetic resonance 
imaging (Chapter 4) with self-report measures of self-generated thoughts in young and 
older adults.  
 Chapter 3 aimed to (i) describe the link between age-related changes in brain 
electrophysiology and age-related changes in self-generated thought, and to (ii) define 
neural patterns underlying specific self-generated thoughts. In young adults, beta power 
over centro-parietal right area enabled the flexible adjustment of mental time travelling 
to match task demands; a pattern not found in older adults. General increases in alpha 
and beta power were indicative of the involvement of the default mode network in off-
task thoughts. Delta power was found to be essential in mental time travelling 
experiences, most likely by lowering concentration and supporting memory processes. 
Interestingly, hemispheric differences in gamma power were representative of thought 
modality, with more left lateralised activity being associated with verbal rehearsing 
during a demanding task.  
 Following on from the electrophysiological findings, Chapter 4 investigated the 
possibility that age-related changes in off-task thinking were correlated with changes in 
the intrinsic organisation of the brain using functional connectivity measures. Given the 
importance of executive control and memory in coordinating and generating the content 
of self-generated thoughts, regions underlying these processes were the focus (i.e. 
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anterior temporal lobe, hippocampus, and inferior frontal gyrus Noonan et al., 2013; 
Tulving, 2002).  
In younger participants, the reduction in the strength of connectivity between the 
left anterior temporal lobe and prefrontal DMN regions was correlated to a greater shift 
toward spontaneous off-task thought when task demands were low. Importantly, in the 
older individuals, lower connectivity between the same two regions was associated with 
preserved performance on a creativity task, suggesting that age-related changes in this 
area are not linked to impairments in cognition across domains. Together, these data 
provide converging evidence that one reason why ongoing thought becomes more 
focused on tasks as we age is related to changes in the connectivity of the default mode 
network. Therefore, these results extended findings from Chapter 3, where 
spontaneous off-task thoughts were related to activity in the default mode network as 
evidenced by alpha and beta power.  
 Continuing with the convergent approach of this thesis, Chapter 5 studied the 
implication of cultural affiliation on mind-wandering experiences across the lifespan. 
Dispositional measures of mind-wandering, mindfulness, mood, rumination, self-
reflection, future thinking, depressive symptoms, and cognitive failures were gathered 
in a population of French and English native speakers. Findings revealed a decrease 
in mind-wandering frequency at an earlier age in French-speaking participants. Cultural 
effects were demonstrated on rumination and reflection rates across the lifespan, in 
general with more rumination and less reflection in English speakers. Overall, 
negatively oriented thoughts were dominant in English speakers compared to the 
generally more expressive thoughts in French speakers. Confirmatory factor analyses 
explored different theoretical models to explain mind-wandering frequency in the 
French and British populations. This chapter clearly evidenced experiential differences 
in mind-wandering as a function of culture and age. 
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 Finally, the last empirical chapter of this thesis added to our understanding of 
self-generated thoughts by experimentally manipulating thought content. Particularly, 
this chapter aimed to further inform the regulation processes involved in mind-
wandering, by considering the influence of meta-awareness and meditation on thought 
content. The first experiment used probe and self-caught methods to identify thought 
patterns more likely to reach meta-awareness in young and older adults. A second 
study experimentally modulated thought content in young and older adults using a 
meditation-based intervention. Results demonstrated that one is merely aware of 
temporal thoughts, but not task-related interferences. The time course with which 
thoughts are generated was suggested as a critical feature underlying this selectivity. 
Results also confirmed the malleability of thought content following a 4-week 
intervention in both younger and older adults. This provides the groundwork to design 
interventions targeting patients with pathological mind-wandering experiences. 
 Overall, this body of work confirmed older adults’ bias toward deliberate on-task 
thoughts, which was particularly evident during mundane, less cognitively demanding 
tasks. The findings also extended our knowledge by demonstrating an age-related 
decrease of negatively oriented thoughts, namely ruminative thoughts and past-
oriented thoughts. Older adults also experienced more visual thoughts and task-related 
interferences, while presenting no changes in self-reflection or future-oriented thoughts. 
Brain imaging data outlined the importance of the DMN in the generation of 
spontaneous off-task thoughts and mental time travelling. Building upon previous fMRI 
work (H.-T. Wang, Bzdok, et al., 2018), variability in thought content was found to reflect 
variability in spectral power. Finally, the use of converging methods evidenced that 
thought content significantly changed as a function of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. 
Therefore, the French culture tends to favour self-reflection, difficult tasks encourage 
verbal rehearsal, and meta-awareness mainly targets temporal thoughts, while 
meditation specifically reduces negative and past-oriented thoughts.  
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7.3. Original contribution to knowledge  
 This project has extended our knowledge on the age-related decrease in mind-
wandering, age-related changes in thought content, the sensitivity of self-generated 
thoughts, and their malleability. Two studies specifically considered the impact of older 
adults’ distinct neurocognitive profile on self-generated thoughts for the first time. In 
fact, it can be concluded that age-related changes in self-generated thoughts are 
underlined by age-related changes in brain activity; specifically, within the DMN. Firstly, 
spectral power reflecting DMN activity and endogenous top-down processes (i.e. beta 
band), enabled the flexible adjustment of mental time travelling in young adults. 
However, the older adults’ beta band activity was suspected to underlie the absence of 
such flexibility in this population. Secondly, lower connectivity between the left temporal 
lobe and prefrontal regions of the DMN fostered spontaneous off-task thoughts and 
creative thinking in young and older adults respectively. Together, these findings 
indicated how mind-wandering experiences are influenced by the neurocognitive profile 
of older adults. While further work is needed to fully understand the role of the DMN 
network in mind-wandering in ageing, these studies suggest that the problem lays in 
the generation of these experiences.   
 Beyond neuroimaging, this thesis described in detail age-related changes in 
thought content. The behavioural findings of this project replicate the age-related 
decrease in off-task thoughts and extended our knowledge to the heterogeneity of self-
generated thoughts in ageing. When compared to young adults, older individuals 
reported similar rates of positively biased thoughts (i.e. future-oriented thought, self-
reflection), a smaller rate of negatively oriented thoughts (i.e. past-oriented thoughts, 
rumination), and more visual thoughts, as well as task-related interferences. These 
differences are informative due to the influence of thought content upon behavioural 
outcomes. Past-oriented thoughts often increase negative outcomes (e.g. task errors, 
negative mood; Banks et al., 2016; Poerio et al., 2013), while future-oriented thoughts 
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enable more positive outcomes (e.g. efficient planning of personal goals, alleviate 
negative mood, fosters positive mood Baird et al., 2011; Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013). Therefore, the mind-wandering profile of older adults 
adds to previous research describing older adults as positive and mindful individuals 
(Carstensen et al., 1999; Grühn et al., 2010; Splevins et al., 2009). Behavioural 
consequences of these changes in thought content should be investigated to clarify our 
understanding of ageing. Altogether, these findings addressed an important gap in the 
literature by further characterising the cognitive profile of older adults as well as refining 
our theories of the wandering mind. Moreover, this converging methods approach 
demonstrated the utility in combining new advances in both the neurosciences and 
traditional behavioural techniques.   
 With regards to the general population, this project also extended our 
knowledge about the influences of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on thought content. 
Intrinsic factors comprise individual differences, such as pathologies, culture or working 
memory capacity to name a few. As an example, research has outlined how working 
memory capacity positively impacts the flexible adjustment of self-generated thoughts 
(Rummel & Boywitt, 2014). In a similar vein, extrinsic factors, such as task difficulty, 
duration or variability, also modify participants’ experiences. Thus, difficult tasks 
significantly decrease the proportion of mind-wandering experiences (McVay & Kane, 
2009). A contribution from the present project was to extend our knowledge regarding 
both intrinsic and extrinsic factors, and their impact on thought content. The impact of 
task difficulty on frequency was replicated and extended to thought content with task 
difficulty increasing verbal thoughts. Verbal thoughts were predicted by an increase of 
gamma power illustrating the binding of information and higher order processing (Fries, 
2009; Jensen et al., 2007). Binding enables the integration and in-depth processing of 
information coming from different modalities. Indeed, the functional significance 
regarding binding processes has been outlined with evidence of complex mental tasks 
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increasing gamma power (Fitzgibbon, Pope, Mackenzie, Clark, & Willoughby, 2004). 
Thus, imaging data provided evidence that thoughts in the form of words merely 
reflected verbal rehearsal, a strategy particularly useful during a demanding task and 
an important element in working memory function. Regarding intrinsic factors, individual 
differences such as one’s cultural affiliation and language were previously found to have 
notable impacts on cognition. For instance, time is conceptualised differently in 
Mandarin and English populations (Boroditsky, 2001), and French citizens tend to be 
more expressive than British citizens (Fortier & Moulin, 2015). This thesis outlined 
cultural difference between French and British native speakers in terms of frequency 
and content of self-generated thoughts. Together, describing the influence of different 
factors has informed us of the variability and sensitivity of thought content as well as 
the functionality of certain self-generated thoughts.  
 Finally, this project comprised one of the first intervention study aiming to 
change thought content in a population of young and older adults. Although self-
generated thoughts are highly sensitive to various factors, limited prior work has directly 
aimed to modify thought content through experimentation. The successful 
transformation of self-generated thoughts has set the scene for a better understanding 
of the regulation and generation processes of mind-wandering. For example, 
minimising participants’ personal concerns should, and has, reduced the occurrence of 
self-referential thoughts and informed the generation process of mind-wandering. On 
the other hand, improving purely attentional control skills should bring greater insight 
about the management of different self-generated thoughts. Last, but not least, the 
contribution of this study also includes the future design of interventions aimed at 
patients facing difficulties with mind-wandering experiences. Several clinical conditions, 
for instance depression and anxiety disorder, would greatly benefit from interventions 
targeting detrimental self-generated thoughts, while preserving beneficial ones. 
Particularly, meditation practice, which has been successfully used with depressive and 
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anxious patients (Goyal et al., 2014; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010), was found 
to significantly reduce negatively oriented thoughts while protecting positive ones 
(Chapter 6). Future work should maximise the benefits of such interventions by studying 
the relationship between changes in thought content and behavioural outcomes.  
7.4. Methodological considerations and limitations  
 Undeniable progress has been made by converging the use of behavioural 
measures, neuroscience, individual differences, and intervention work. Traditional 
behavioural methods and new advances in neuroscience have enabled the refinement 
of theories of the wandering mind. For completeness, a word of caution should be raised 
regarding certain aspects of the behavioural methodology. The methodological 
approach taken in this PhD thesis, which was based on experience sampling, is being 
increasingly used in the literature (e.g. Konishi et al., 2015; Smallwood et al., 2016). 
Using multidimensional experience sampling was highly efficient in capturing the 
complexity of self-generated thoughts, particularly when using principal component 
analyses. This enabled the identification of typical patterns of thoughts within self-
reports with a data-driven approach. Nonetheless, some limitations regarding the 
number of questions and their topic should be kept in mind. Using thirteen probe 
questions, while being the strength of this method, might have also reduced the validity 
of the answers. The large number of questions, as well as the repetitiveness of their 
occurrence, may cause participants to generate automatic responses, therefore not 
reflect their actual experience. Additionally, in some cases, questions may not relate to 
participants’ ongoing experiences, or may not be interpreted adequately. Participants 
are selecting an answer by default and are using it consistently thereafter. Finally, this 
set of questions was based on research with young adults and may not capture older 
adults’ experiences (e.g. features left out or questions not relating to their experience). 
This could be overcome by using open-ended questions, allowing participants to 
describe in their own words the nature of their experience. The Multidimensional 
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experience sampling method could therefore be improved and adapted to a population 
of older adults. Regardless of these limitations, the multidimensional approach is a 
unique tool which efficiently highlights patterns of thoughts within self-reported data. 
   Other limitations are related to the recruitment of older adults, which is critical 
when studying the ageing process. Convenience sampling, while useful and efficient, 
can induce certain biases when it comes to older adults. Older individuals taking part in 
research are often very cognitively and socially active compared to their peers. Such 
characteristics tend to have a protective effect on cognitive decline (Ball et al., 2002; 
Fratiglioni, Paillard-Borg, & Winblad, 2004; Seeman, 2000), meaning that participants 
may not be representative of general ageing population. This may be particularly true 
when recruitment of participants is carried out via internet (see limitations in Chapter 5). 
Additionally, older adults’ often report substantial motivation to help science and 
scientists, suggesting more task engagement in this subgroup. On the other hand, 
younger adults’ motivations are often more immediate (e.g. course credit, or financial 
compensation) and only relate to their participation as opposed to success. Motivation 
is a very powerful factor in task performance (Nicholls, 1984) and mind-wandering 
frequency (Lindquist & McLean, 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013), meaning that comparison between age groups may be biased (Frank 
et al., 2015; Krawietz et al., 2012). Such limitations are imbedded into cohort effects, 
driven by cross-sectional designs. Therefore, a longitudinal approach should be 
encouraged to minimise the effect of this individual difference. Indeed, comparing 
participants to their younger selves will exclude any cohort effects (i.e. motivation to 
take part) or selective bias (i.e. merely only active older adults engage in research), as 
well as reveal the evolution of thought content across the lifespan. Overall, and beyond 
the above-outlined limitations, this thesis presents a strong methodological approach. 
The use of a multidimensional experience sampling, a method capturing the complexity 
of thought content with good reliability, and convergent methods, largely overcomes the 
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difficulties intrinsic to the study of mind-wandering and ageing. Thus, this program 
provides solid groundwork for future research.  
7.5. Future directions  
 The understanding of self-generated thoughts still remains incomplete. 
Substantial efforts should be made to replicate the findings reported in this thesis, as 
well as extending our understanding of such central experiences. Several 
recommendations have been outlined throughout this project, and here, the focus will 
be on the key questions to address.  
 One of the most critical gap in the literature is the identification of markers 
indicating the time course of mind-wandering experiences. Currently, researchers are 
catching participants while mind-wandering, or rely on participants’ meta-awareness to 
report their attentional drifts. The difficulty is the lack of information regarding the onset 
of these experiences, leading to inferences in the time windows selected to represent 
mind-wandering experience (see limitations in Chapter 3), and this precludes the 
investigation of self-generated thoughts across time. To date few studies have used 
either eye tracking or the electroencephalogram to objectively predict mind-wandering 
experiences. This approach has demonstrated great promise and provided new 
information that can help in understanding the wandering mind. One study found pupil 
size to be the best marker of self-reported mind-wandering experiences (Grandchamp, 
Braboszcz, & Delorme, 2014), while another was able to predict probe-caught mind-
wandering up to 72% by using changes in gaze direction and pupil size in a reading 
task (Bixler & D’Mello, 2016). Bixler and D’Mello (2016) identified patterns of eye gaze 
behaviour during mind wandering, namely longer fixations, longer reading times, more 
skipped words and larger variability in pupil diameter. More recently, based on 
electrophysiological measures, Kawashima and Kumano (2017) identified regression 
models predicting mind-wandering intensity during a sustained attentional task. Five 
models (i.e. SVR; Support Vector machine Regression) were identified each presenting 
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different characteristics (e.g. linearity, number of electrodes). Overall, the highest 
correlation coefficient was achieved based on beta (21.5-30Hz) coherence between 
parietal midline and occipital areas. This is in line with findings from Chapter 3 showing 
the involvement of beta band in off-task thoughts and mental time travelling. Together, 
these encouraging successes are paving the way toward more objective measures of 
mind-wandering experiences. Future work may use real time machine learning and 
measure of spectral power to identify the onset of the decoupling process. Using 
continuous self-report of mind drifts to perpetually improve the efficiency of the 
predictive model.  
 Secondly, investigations of self-generated thoughts in ageing urgently need 
more ecological and naturalistic approaches. The environment of the laboratory (i.e. 
university campuses), while relatively familiar to young adults, can generate stress 
responses in older adults. For example, older adults’ memory performances appear 
highly sensitive to the testing environment (Sindi, Fiocco, Juster, Pruessner, & Lupien, 
2013). This sensitivity may be explained by the activation of ageing stereotype threat, 
stating that older adults inevitably display poor cognitive performances. The ageing 
stereotype was previously found to increase task-related interferences (Jordano & 
Touron, 2017). In this respect, researchers are encouraged to explore age-related 
changes in self-generated thoughts in different contexts, more favourable to older 
adults. For instance, using meaningfull information such as characters in photographs, 
rather than random words with no significance for older adults, showed to remove age-
related deficit in memory (Rahhal et al., 2002; Fung and Carstensen, 2003; Sindi et al 
2016). Considering how cognitive tests, as well as computer devices, can be perceived 
as threatening to older adults’, the use of motor-based task could be beneficial. For 
example, experience sampling could be conducted while participants are folding pieces 
of paper in a simplistic and more complex manner (e.g. origami).  
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To illustrate the importance of an ecological settings it is worthwhile considering 
the example of prospective memory performance. Prospective memory corresponds to 
the memory to perform actions in the future (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996). Although 
prospective memory was first found to decrease with age (Craik, Klix, & Hagendorf 
1986), later investigations using naturalistic settings showed preserved or even 
improved abilities in ageing (e.g. Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990; for a review see 
Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004). This contradiction is known as the ‘ageing 
paradox’ (Bailey et al., 2010; Rendell & Craik, 2000). Together with the impact of the 
environment, this stresses the need for studies in naturalistic settings. For example, 
using a similar experience sampling method, once during a mundane task in the 
laboratory and once during everyday life, will give a wider understanding of self-
generated thoughts in ageing. Preliminary evidence from a diary study, where 
participants were probed for a week 5 times a day at random occasions, (work in 
progress in collaboration with Dr. Smallwood) is pointing towards different patterns of 
age-related changes in self-generated thoughts.  
 A final recommendation, given our evaluation of individual differences, is the 
consideration of other populations, particularly ones presenting changes in the integrity 
of the DMN and related abilities (e.g. memory, attentional control, introspection, 
reference to the self). Research has mainly focused on ADHD and depression due to 
their attentional deficits illustrated by, respectively, high distractibility and intrusive 
thoughts (for further detail refer to Chapter 1). Preliminary work has also investigated 
self-generated thoughts in Alzheimer patients, and reported a further decrease of such 
experiences when compared to healthy older adults (Gyurkovics et al., 2018). This 
seems to further corroborate findings from this thesis that the DMN is at the centre of 
the age-related change in mind-wandering since Alzheimer patients present worsen 
DMN connectivity than healthy older adults (Greicius et al., 2004). Further work with 
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Alzheimer patients following the strategy and methodology used in Chapter 3 and 4 
should confirm such claim.   
Several other pathologies could inform the component processes account of 
mind-wandering. For example, individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder present 
difficulties in executive function, theory of mind, emotion perception (de Vries & Geurts, 
2015; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), and trouble with social interactions and 
introspection. ASD patients also experience more ruminative self-focus events (Crane, 
Goddard, & Pring, 2013), and tend to have a higher level of egocentrism (Frith & de 
Vignemont, 2005), despite impairments in introspection (Lombardo & Baron-Cohen, 
2011). The distinctiveness of their relation to the self and to others could refine theories 
regarding the functionality of self-generated thoughts and particularly with regard to 
social problem solving. Additionally, difficulties in introspection may induce lower meta-
awareness of mind-wandering experiences. Such investigation would clarify our 
understanding of the management process of self-generated thoughts in this 
developmental disorder. 
Another suggestion is the investigation of patients with Schizophrenia Disorder. 
Somewhat in opposition to the older adults’ profile, this pathology shows overactivity 
and overconnectivity within the DMN (Garrity et al., 2007; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 
2009). Critically, patients’ profile, namely poor self-consciousness (Danion et al., 2005; 
Potheegadoo, Cuervo-Lombard, Berna, & Danion, 2012), deficit in self-identity (Raffard 
et al., 2010), and mentalising (Dimaggio, Salvatore, Popolo, & Lysaker, 2012), could 
inform the self-referential feature of mind-wandering. One study found an increase of 
mind-wandering experiences in this population (Shin et al., 2015), which was related to 
the stronger manifestation of positive psychotic symptoms (i.e. severer presence of 
inner speech and delusional beliefs). The authors suggest that this could be mediated 
at a neural level, since frequent mind-wandering was inversely related to connectivity 
within the DMN in schizophrenia patients. Ultimately, several other pathologies 
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presenting impairments in the integrity of the DMN could inform our understanding of 
these complex experiences, including Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (Stern, 
Fitzgerald, Welsh, Abelson, & Taylor, 2012), Down syndrome, and Williams syndrome 
(Vega, Hohman, Pryweller, Dykens, & Thornton-Wells, 2015). The systematic study of 
self-generated thoughts in population with atypical DMN activity and connectivity will 
bring different visualisations of the complex relation between mind-wandering and the 
DMN. This could, then, lead to more applied research and the development of 
interventions targeting specifically the difficulties of these populations.  
 Overall, because of the recency of the mind-wandering literature, a plethora of 
recommendations can be formulated. In general, researchers should pursue the 
converging methods dynamic to refine and extend the knowledge gathered in this 
thesis.  
7.6. Conclusion  
 To conclude, this project contributed to the understanding of mind-wandering 
experiences in ageing in a number of ways. Essentially, four salient findings were 
identified from this programme of work. First, evidence that age-related changes in 
mind-wandering experiences are bound to changes in the recruitment of the default 
mode network were provided. Second, age-related changes in mind-wandering 
experiences were found to go beyond a simple decrease in frequency. Older adults 
reported stable rates of positively oriented thoughts, a decrease of negatively biased 
thoughts, and more visual thoughts as well as task-related interferences. Third, mind-
wandering experiences were highly sensitive to intrinsic and extrinsic factors. At an 
intrinsic level, cultural affiliation affected thought content, with the French culture 
favouring self-reflection. At an extrinsic level, experience sampling supporting meta-
awareness was merely targeting temporal thoughts, difficult tasks tended to increase 
verbal rehearsal thoughts, and meditation specifically reduced negatively oriented past-
oriented thoughts. Finally, thought content was experimentally modulated by the 
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practice of meditation and activities hindering self-reference. This has opened the field 
for future research aiming to construct interventions targeting the negative effects of 
mind-wandering on task performance and mood. Overall, by the successful use of 
convergent methods, these findings have added to the theoretical understanding of the 
wandering mind, advancing our knowledge of age-related changes regarding 
behavioural and neural characteristics of self-generated thoughts.  
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APPENDIX A: Instructions given to participants 
in both the control and experimental condition. 
Control condition: 
Please write down a short summary of the story you just listen to. Expand by adding 
any details, information that you remember, there is never too much information.    
 
Experimental condition:  
Please write down any thoughts, emotions, feelings, sensations that came to you during 
practice. Expand by reflecting on how this informs you further on your knowledge of 
yourself, your values, what is most important for you in life. Also, feel free to write 
anything that comes to your mind that you feel is important.  
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APPENDIX B: Transcript of one of the four 
guided meditation used in the experimental 
condition (Toe-Head).  
Settling down into a comfortable position, taking your place on the floor and perhaps 
shifting hips, shoulders allowing the spine to straighten, opening the hands, letting your 
feet flop out gently to the sides.  Before we begin the practice, be aware that your 
mind will wander during the meditation.  Try to offer yourself compassion and 
just gently notice when you have wandered, and bring your mind back to the 
guidance, picking up where you left off.  Letting your eyes close softly, softly 
becoming aware of your breathing, centering yourself there on the floor.  Noticing how 
the breath moves gently in, and is held within, the body, and then how it is released, 
and held there outside the body.  Noticing that the next breath comes quite naturally, 
that the body knows exactly how to pace the breath, enabling you to soften and come 
to stillness here on the floor.  Feel the warmth of your body, the gift of the breathing, 
and bringing compassion to your body and yourself.  During the meditation each 
time your mind wanders, just noticing that, and bringing a feeling of loving 
kindness and compassion for yourself, then gently coming back to the meditation 
practice. On the next in breath, just bring your attention to sensations around the heel 
of the right foot, where your foot meets the floor, resting attention gently, just noticing 
sensations of pressure from the floor, warmth of clothing or coolness, allowing 
sensations of urges to move or adjust your position, just noticing sensations and urges, 
offering thanks for the messages your mind and body give to you, without having 
to act on them.  Just letting the wisdom of your body let you know what’s going 
on there.  Bringing your attention up and across the sole of the hard working right foot, 
bringing attention inside and through the perfect right foot, through the heel of the right 
foot, the arch, around the toes of the right foot, and being able to come back to the in 
breath, each time you notice that you’ve become distracted or led away by wandering 
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thought, practicing softness and forgiveness around those distractions, 
accepting and letting go and then bringing attention back, to the whole of the right 
foot, with the next in breath.  Sweeping attention up now through the right ankle, the 
right calf, noticing sensations of the floor beneath, support from the floor, feelings of 
temperature, of comfort or discomfort, urges to move or to be still, noticing without 
needing to respond and react, just noticing, then bringing your attention up over the 
right shin, on the next in breath, over the right knee cap and through the knee joint, 
back of the right knee, over and through the lower right leg, right ankle and right foot.  
Releasing, perhaps noticing thoughts of gratitude and thanks, of loving kindness 
for the hard working lower right leg and foot.  On the next in breath, just notice 
sensations around the back of the right thigh, bringing your compassion and attention 
lightly, resting on the right thigh.  The sensations of clothing, floor, temperature, allowing 
thoughts and sensations to arise, forgiving and thanking each one lightly, with 
loving kindness you can bring your attention back to the right thigh, right knee, 
right shin, calf and ankle, right foot.  On the next in breath becoming aware of sensations 
through  the left leg, perhaps of heaviness or light, on the next in breath you might like 
to rest your loving attention in turn, onto the left foot, heel of the left foot, through the 
arch of the hardworking  left foot, the toes of the left foot, attention and awareness 
lighting on the left ankle, on the in breath moving awareness through the ankle joint up 
through left calf, over and through left shin, offering thanks and acceptance, giving 
love back, perhaps, and gentleness, to any thoughts, memories, internal 
dialogues that you just notice, can accept for later attention, and gently bring 
your loving attention back with the next in breath to the left knee.  From the back 
of the left knee, through the joint to bring awareness to the left knee, sweeping attention 
up and over the left thigh, through the left thigh, sensations of support from the floor 
beneath the left thigh, and allowing your attention, on the next in breath, to move 
compassionately, with kindness and light through the upper left leg, left knee, the left 
calf and shin, the left ankle and leg foot.  On the next in breath you’re able to let your 
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awareness encompass both legs, both knees, both ankles, both feet.  On the next in 
breath you can bring your attention to sensations through the groin and seat, through 
the hips and belly, noticing and letting go of distractions, forgiving and offering loving 
kindness, acceptance in  naming and deciding to bring your attention back, on the 
next in breath to sensations through the lower back, up through the navel, attention 
encircling the waist, without having to follow thoughts and distraction, you can just bring 
your attention back, on the next in breath to sensations across the ribs and through the 
ribs, sensations across the chest and breathing in, noticing sensations through the heart 
beat and lungs, breathing in, and allowing your attention to rest lightly on the movement 
of the chest, tummy and ribs, and breathing out, noticing sensations through the spine 
and you gently bring your attention through the body to the upper back, allowing your 
attention to move up and through the spinal column, through and between each rib.  If 
your mind has wandered, just sending the thought or feeling a note of kindness, 
you can revisit this later, and coming back, to notice the support from the floor 
beneath you, bringing your compassion to the shoulder blades, each in turn, around 
the edges and deeper, to pockets of heat or tension under and through the should 
blades practising kindness around any areas of tension or heat, offering softness 
where tightness might be.  Letting your attention rest on the tops of both shoulders 
now, through the collar bone and base of the neck, moving loving kindness and 
compassionate attention through the upper arms, through skin, sensations of clothing, 
allowing yourself to notice when your thoughts have drifted away and with kindness, 
with love, gently bringing your attention back to the muscles of the upper arms, through 
the elbows, the inside of the elbows, breathing in and bringing attention through both 
forearms, taking each wrist in turn to visit first the right wrist, letting yourself become 
aware of sensations through and upon the wrists, the back of the right hand and the left 
hand, temperature, floor, comfort, softness, just letting thoughts arise without having to 
follow them, and on the next in breath bringing attention right through the bones of the 
hands, across and over the palms of the hands now and the fingers and finally the 
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thumbs of the right hand and left hand.  Able to attend, with love, lightly, breathing, 
upon any sensations through both hands, both arms, the elbows, breathing and 
allowing sensations through the shoulders and chest, through the ribs and spine, 
breathing and noticing, just noticing, and letting go of sensations through heart and 
lungs, navel and waist.  Allowing the wise body to notice any areas of tension or 
discomfort, allowing the distractions to be named, accepted and gently let go.  
On the next in breath bring your attention to the neck and throat, swallowing and 
breathing, noticing and moving attention lightly, just noticing the thoughts or feelings 
that may come up and bringing your attention back with kindness, with thanks for 
the wisdom of the body.  Here the lower jaw, through the jaw, the nape of the neck, 
tongue resting softly in the mouth, sensations across the chin, lips, through and over 
the nose, the cheeks and around to the back your head, breathing in, you can let your 
awareness rest upon the sensation of the breath moving through the nose, the 
sensations round the temples, the feelings around eyes, eyebrows and up and over the 
forehead to the very crown of your head.  Allowing thoughts and feelings that arise 
as you hold your face gently in awareness, cradling the head, the neck the body 
in loving kindness, awareness giving way to forgiveness and loving compassion.    
On the next in breath you can gently bring your attention back to breathing and letting 
go of any sensations through the head and face, neck and shoulders, the arms and 
hands.  On the next in breath just noticing and letting go of sensations through the 
shoulder blades and ribs, through the belly and lower back, breathing in, lighting upon 
the hips and groin, the thighs, knees, lower legs and feet, breathing in, aware of 
sensations through the whole body, breathing out and letting go, with loving kindness, 
with gratitude for the wisdom of the body, before bringing attention just to the next 
breath.  Breathing.  In a few moments a bell will ring to end the practise.  For now, just 
breathing, awareness, acceptance, compassion and loving kindness, before 
bringing your attention back to the next inbreath.  Remember to breathe and 
smile.
  
  
  
